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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Admittedly, this rather bulky study of the adjustment 
process of a small open economy participating in a currency 
area makes at times both tedious and burdensome reading.
This was never explicitly the aim for the author, but 
in a way this was an outcome to be expected, when I first 
set out to analyze the monetary unification process seen 
from the angle of a small open economy, because one of the 
aims for the study was to show that the monetary integra­
tion process was far more complex than established theory 
on monetary integration purports to show.
Monetary integration theory, of mainly a monetarist 
orientation, from the last decade, tends to show the ad­
justment process to uniform rates of domestic inflation as 
a mechanistic outcome of a harmonization of national sup­
plies of credits.
This belief that credit restraint is the panacea for 
balance of payments disequilibria is based on the dictum 
that the exchange rate is the relative price of two monies, 
hence the adjustment process is mainly a question of having 
national money supplies converging.
Indeed the present study shows that the adjustment 
process for a small inflation prone open economy is far 
more complicated. The process is burdensome and tedious, 
and by interpreting external disequilibria as a fiscal phe­
nomenon, this study suggests that a broader range of in­
struments be used.
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The previous over reliance on restrictive monetary 
policies combined with a high degree of short to medium 
term autonomy for fiscal policy have had serious struc­
tural repercussions by changing the pattern of production 
and consumption for the economy.
The resulting squeeze on the tradeables sector as a 
direct result of restrictive monetary policies, shifts 
the adjustment burden from the nontradeables sector to 
the tradeables sector. The result, as demonstrated in 
the present study, is a chronic expansion of the public 
sector, which in turn makes future adjustment yet more 
difficult.
The chances are now that the economy will experience 
a new variety of a "vicious circle", from overvaluation 
of the currency to a permanent expansion of the public 
sector.
The study is laid out in the following way: chap­
ters 1 and 2 focus on monetary integration from an indi­
vidualistic point of view, opposed to the more common 
collective approach of traditional integration theory.
The apparent lack of fiscal integration theory in litera­
ture is noted.
The theme in chapters 3 and 4 is the impact of 
smallness and especially openness on domestic economic 
policy-making, and the necessary preconditions for mone­
tary integration.
Chapters 5 and 6 present an analysis of adjustment 
strategies and a framework for international economic co­
ordination, respectively. A formal model of the present
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policy-mix dilemma is presented in chapter 7. The stress 
is on changing relative prices. Chapter 8 is a comparative 
empirical analysis of movements in nominal and real effec­
tive exchange rates for the EMS countries, minus Ireland, 
economic performance and public sector growth. Chapter 9 
is an analysis of the Danish experience, and by interpret­
ing the balance of payments deficit as an essentially fis­
cal phenomenon, we see the real constraints on domestic fi­
nancial policies in a small open economy.
Chapter 10 contains the more important conclusions to 
draw from the study.
I aim indebted to several persons and institutions for 
valuable advice: Prof. M. De Cecco, ray dissertation super­
visor, proved indispensable during the long process of 
writing this study. Prof. N. Thygesen read parts of the 
study at various stages, and has made constructive com­
ments. Dr. H. Lehment made me interested in the link be- 
t
tween stabilization policies and public sector growth. I 
am also very indebted to the kind assistance which at vari­
ous stages came from Mr. P. Schelde-Andersen of the OECD, 
Mr. V. Puggard of the Danish confederation of industries, 
the Danish delegation at the OECD, and last, but certainly 
not least, the staff at the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, 
Kiel, and the staff at the European University Institute, 
Florence»for kind assistance.
The research was conducted at the EUI, Florence, and 
it was financed by a grant from the Danish Ministry of Edu-
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cation. I was also in the happy position to receive the 
’Kurzstipendium fur jüngere Wissentschaftler’ from the 
DAAD, Bonn, which enabled me to stay at the Institut für 
Weltwirtschaft in Kiel for a period. Both contributions 
are thankfully acknowledged.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
"Mr. Micawber solemnly conjured me to observe that if 
a man had twenty pounds a year for his income, and 
spent nineteen pounds nineteen shillings and sixpence, 
he would be happy. Eut that if he spent twenty pounds 
one he would be miserable. After which he,.borrowed a 
shilling of me for porter and cheered up."
It is this dilemma of Mr. Micawber imposed on interna­
tional monetary integration the following study attempts to 
analyze. An externally given exchange rate target, which 
produces an external disequilibrium, the strong currency 
option, is chosen by a small open economy as the main in­
strument for checking domestic inflation for mainly two 
reasons:
i. The emergence of a feeling of economic interdependence 
and
ii. The importance of the open sector as a transmitter of 
inflation, as devised in the Scandinavian inflation 
model.
In the present chapter the repercussion of this on domestic 
parameters is discussed. The question of why and how mone­
tary integration can benefit a small open economy is fur­
ther elaborated upon in chapter 2.
So the following study intends to analyze adjustment 
policies of a small open economy in the context of monetary 
integration. As an example of the small open economy, Den-
1) Charles Dickens, David Copperfield, var, editions.
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mark is chosen, both because of the author's familiarity 
with the subject and because Denmark has participated both 
in the European "Snake" and now participates in the Euro­
pean Monetary System (EMS). Hence it is the aim to see 
how an external given exchange rate target influences the 
conduct of monetary, and especially, fiscal policies, and 
what longer term effects such policies will have for do­
mestic economic structure.
A considerable amount of research has been done on 
costs and benefits of joining a monetary union. Most of 
these studies have been solely concerned about the global 
advantages or disadvantages of monetary integration. 
Analyses from the angle of the national state have been 
more rare.
An explanation of this bias towards globality instead
iof individuality is according to Hamada that economists, 
if potentially representative of the interest of a partic­
ular country or group, sound more persuasive when they ad­
vocate a programme that appears general, rather than one 
that speaks to the national interest". However as we 
shall see, national interest in the present context does 
not necessarily have a negative connotation.
Looking at the distribution of costs and benefits for
2the individual nation, Hamada shows that the benefits of
1) K. Hamada, "On the Political Economy of Monetary Inte­
gration", in R.Z. Aliber, The Political Economy of 
Monetary Reform, New York T9T6.
2) K. Hamada, op. cit.
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monetary integration have the qualities of a public, or 
collective, good, whereas the costs of monetary integra­
tion are highly individual. The costs and benefits of 
monetary integration in turn, are distributed so that 
costs precede benefits. Individual costs precede collec­
tive benefits. With this in mind, the logical subject 
for research, when focusing on the adjustment process to 
new inflation standards of a potential monetary union, is 
the national state.
The chances of survival of any system increase with 
the amount of confidence the participants have in the 
system.
If the initial costs by joining an exchange rate un-
iion suddenly seem excessive, by the way of an overvalued 
exchange rate for instance, in comparison with the per­
ceived later benefits, the chances are that some members 
will "cheat", i.e. not play according to the agreed 
rules, however vaguely defined they may be.
This reminds very much of the zero-sum game, stress­
ing the importance of a real coordination of policies 
amongst the contracting parties.
The degree of confidence is the central issue when­
ever an international system is going to work as a result 
of cooperative efforts.
Confidence in the system and support for the system 
are determined by the attractiveness of the ultimate
1) Cf. W.M. Corden’s distinction between monetary union 
and exchange—rate union in his Monetary Integration, 
Princeton 1974.
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goal, or in the context of monetary unions, by the increas­
ing awareness that the growing interdependence among indus­
trialized nations narrows down the range of other options.
1.1. Monetary integration and interdependence.
As the typical treatment of the term interdependence, 
as encountered in most literature, leaves one with the im­
pression that the analytical contents of this term should 
be self-evident,"* a brief digression of the term is needed 
here in the introduction in order to show that the acknowl­
edgement of interdependence is a necessary precondition for 
the monetary integration process. Although several points 
of disagreement exist between scholars about the true fea­
tures of interdependence, we shall try to divide the argu­
ments into two schools of thought. One which is on the de­
scriptive level, and another which focuses on the prescrip­
tive aspect of interdependence.
1.1.2. Definitions of interdependence.
2Keohane & Nye use the costs of the constraints which 
are imposed on one government by the action of another gov­
ernment as a measure. Furthermore the authors divide the 
term into two slightly different effects, sensitivity and 
vulnerability.
Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within 
a policy framework. That is, how quickly do changes in one
1) As rightly pointed out by R.C. Bryant, Money and Mone- 
Policy in Interdependent Economies, Brookings
2) See R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdepend 
ence, New York 1977.
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country bring costly changes in another country?
Vulnerability on the other hand is a measure of expo­
sure, and it decreases when one actor can alter its poli­
cies by finding substitutional policies for the transac­
tions initially lost.
Rosecrance et al. argue that by interdependence is 
meant "the direct and positive linkage of the interests of 
states such that when the position of one state is changed,
the position of other states are affected in the same di- 
2rection".
More formally, Rosecrance et al. argue that two econo­
mies are highly interdependent when there is an equaliza­
tion of factor prices between them. This definition is 
identical to the definition of market integration, and thus 
stresses the point that interdependence should be seen as 
part of the integration process.
A more fruitful approach in the present context is the 
one developed by Richard Cooper, which here will be coined 
the prescriptive approach.^
Where Keohane and Nye, and to a lesser extent 
Rosecrance et al. stress the ability of national states to 
exert power against each other, Cooper's approach focuses 
on the high degree of interconnectedness which should lead
1) R. Rosecrance et al., Whither Interdependence, Interna­
tional Organization, Summer 1977.
2) Ibid.
3) R.S. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence, New 
York 1968, and R.S. Cooper, Economic Interdependence 
and Foreign Policy", World Politics, January 1977.
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governments to recognize their common interests, which is 
the necessary basis for a shared ability to tackle common 
problems.
VJhere Rosecrance et al. use the equalization of fac­
tor prices as a measure, Cooper goes one step further and 
focuses on the international repercussions of variations 
in factor prices brought about by policy actions of na­
tional governments trying to pursue strict national objec-
"As nations become increasingly interdependent, as 
capital and skilled labour become less exclusively 
national in their orientation, countries desiring to 
pursue tax or regulatory policies that deviate widely 
from those in other countries will find themselves 
stimulating large inflows or outflows of funds, firms 
or persons: These induced movements will in turn
weaken the intended effects of the policies, or make 
them more costly.
A consequence of this state of affairs is that
"a second kind of growing economic interdependence, 
institutional rather than structural, can be dis­
cerned among industrial nations. This institutional 
interdependence occurs when these countries must, by 
prior agreement confer, and even reach joint deci­
sions, on matters of economic policy."2
As has been amply demonstrated^ in the literature
1) Cooper (1977), op. cit., p. 166.
2) Ibid., p. 163.
3) The feeling of interdependence and pressures from
third currencies notably the US#, as integrative forc­
es are shown in i.e. M. Fratianni & T. Peters, One 
Money for Europe, London 1978, N. Thygesen, The Emerg-
Trezise, The European Monetary System: Its Promise
and Prospects, Brookings 1979, J. Statler, "The Euro­
pean Monetary System, From Conception to Birth", In­
ternational Affairs, April 1979, and T. DeVries, On 
the Meaning and the' Future of the European Monetary 
System, Princeton 1980.
tives.
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about monetary integration, considerations of the above- 
mentioned nature were driving forces behind the creation 
of schemes like the "Snake" and the EMS.
However, conditions of interdependence, which in the 
context of stabilization policies, tends to decrease the 
multiplier effect of any expansive policy action, cannot 
be used in the domestic political debate because of the 
isoteric nature of the term, and the more narrow time ho­
rizon of policy makers.
"Governments wish to be reelected. So governments 
tend to have a high rate of time preference since 
their time horizon is relatively short. As a re­
sult, in cases of conflict between internal and ex­
ternal targets, elected governments typically choose 
to achieve the former and sacrifice the latter by 
renouncing previous commitments on international 
rules of the game."^
1.1.3. Denmark and the adjustment process. Macroeconom­
ic policies of deflation in a small open economy.
As a case study for the national adjustment process
inside a proposed currency area Denmark is selected.
There are many reasons for choosing Denmark. Firstly,
Denmark is one of the "core" countries, from a European
integrational point of view, as the country was one of
the original members of the "Snake". Another reason is
2that Denmark, according to Thygesen, showed "signs of 
structural deficits and currency overvaluation from the
1) See J.A. Frenkel, "Reflections on European Monetary 
Integration", in Weitwirtschaf11iches Archiv, Band 
111, 1975, p. 217.
2) N. Thygesen, "Are Monetary Policies and Performances 
Converging?", in Banca Nazlonale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review, Sept. 1981, p. 310.
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start of the EMS. Structural deficits and overvaluation 
of a currency will, as is shown later, tend to prolong the 
adjustment process, and make it more costly, both in terms 
of lost utilization of production factors, but also in 
terms of an increase in foreign indebtedness, resulting 
from the need to replenish domestic international re­
serves, while maintaining an overvalued currency.
A third reason for choosing Denmark as a case study 
is the more curious one, that Denmark, according to Zis,^ 
is the only country of all the participants in European 
monetary integrative efforts, which has not experienced 
smaller fluctuations in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
ECU, since the ECU was first "invented" in 1972.
A reason for this divergence of the Danish krone is 
underlined by Thygesen: "even more important in the long
run is the need for national authorities in the weaker 
economies to perceive more clearly the dangers to their 
currencies in getting their fiscal policies as far out of 
line as present trends suggest". Accordingly, the role of 
fiscal and budgetary policies will, as is demonstrated in 
chapter 2, be on top of the research agenda.
1.1.4. Danish monetary policy in the past decade.
The main feature of Danish monetary policy during the
1) George Zis, "EMS, A Framework for International Mone­
tary Reform", Intereconomics, March/April 1982, p. 69.
2) N. Thygesen (Sept. 1981), op. cit., p. 321.
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last decade has been the attempt to peg the Dkr to an ex­
ternal currency, the Dm, which faces prospects of higher 
stability than the Dkr in terms of future purchasing power.
This is the so-called strong currency option.
The doctrine that holding the Dkr/Dm rate steady in 
order to break domestic inflation has the intellectual par-
-jentage in the Scandinavian inflation model, which stresses 
the role of the external sector as link for wage-inflation.
The model, briefly presented, states that small open 
economies are subject to the law of one price. Danish ex­
porters must observe world prices for their products, as 
they are price-takers. This implies that employers in the 
export and import substitution sectors are forced to keep 
down the rise in labour costs in order to keep these at the 
level ruling in the rest of the world.
The only room for wage increase is exogenous increases 
in the world price level, or increases in domestic produc­
tivity. This wage moderation is then expected to be trans­
mitted to the sheltered sectors of the economy.
The historical background for the model was the rela­
tively high productivity in the export sectors and a degree
1) The model is originally developed by Aukrust in
"Instilling II fra utredningsutvalget?' for Inntektsoppgj^rene 
1966, Oslo. Some English versions are: L. Calmfors,
Swedish Inflation and International Price Influence,
IIES paper no. 45, Stockholm, and A. Lindbeck, Imported 
and Structural Inflation and Aggregate Demand, IIES pa­
per 95, Stockholm.
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of undervaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in the
60's. The manufacturing sectors charging world prices for
/
the exports had substantial profits, which led to wage 
drifts into other sectors where productivity traditionally 
was lower. This had clear inflationary consequences.
So in a fixed exchange rate system like the Snake and 
now the EMS the strong currency option of pegging a weak 
currency to a strong currency is an instrument to check 
domestic inflation, in order to make national inflation 
rates converge at the lowest possible level,  ^ which in 
turn is a prerequisite for stable exchange markets in EMS 
currencies.
Another more obvious reason for the strong currency 
option is the belief that an externally strong currency 
can stabilize inflationary pressures coming from the out­
side, and a related issue is the straightforward one that 
current account deficits are financed more easily with a 
strong currency.
The trade-off to the strong currency option is higher 
unemployment and seemingly persistent deficits on the cur­
rent account as part of the deflation.
2Periods of deflation are, according to Blackaby, pe­
riods where politicians, in order to defend themselves,
1) It is not here the issue of questioning the relevance 
of trying to obtain a lower inflation rate as is done 
in F. Hahn, Memoranda on Monetary Policy, 17 July 
1980, HMSO, no. 720.
2) Frank Blackaby, "Exchange Rate Policy and Economic 
Strategy", Three Banks Review, No. 126, 1980.
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turn to medical metaphors:
"We have to accept that the surgery will be painful 
and the treatment distasteful, but there is no other 
way of returning to general good health",
or more appropriately the old analogy of cupping and 
bleeding:
"it may have reduced the patient's fever, but it cer­
tainly left him weakened rather than strengthened."
Looking at the rather modest changes in the real ex­
change rate after nearly a decade with the strong currency 
option, despite many changes in the nominal rates, the 
question easily arises whether the whole exercise was 
worthwhile. Could perhaps domestic macroeconomic policies 
have achieved the required adjustment? And this without 
the bias against the foreign trade sector, which primarily
has been affected by the strong exchange rate.
2Another Blackaby quote fits nicely into this pat­
tern:
"Once the government accepts the proposition that it 
is simply deflating the economy, then it can at least 
take the first, limited steps towards a more sensible 
strategy. There is no law which says that a defla­
tionary policy has to fall particularly heavily on 
the foreign trade sector, which is what has been hap­
pening . . .  It is perfectly possible to devise a 
deflationary strategy which raises unemployment by the 
same amount as present policies, and therefore has 
just as big an effect on prices and earnings (whatev­
er that may be), but is not biased against industries 
which compete with foreign suppliers."
1) Cf. N. Thygesen, Exchange Rate Policies and Experienc- 
es of Small Countries, Princeton 1980, p.
2) F. Blackaby (ed.), The Future of Pay Bargaining, 
NIESR, London 1980, p. T T i
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The primary objective by deflating the economy is to 
prevent price increases.
The traditional tool for this was in the past incomes 
policies. Why incomes policies seem to have lost their ef­
fect, and hence attraction, is not the subject for discus­
sion here, but it is clear that governments in most Western 
countries, conservatives or social democrats, increasingly 
rely on monetary policies in order to control aggregate de­
mand .
With the advent of regional currency areas, especially 
the "Snake" and the EMS, this reliance on monetary policies 
has understandably been aggravated.
This because the mainstream theory of monetary inte­
gration relies heavily on the new monetarism, as discussed 
in chapter 2, and also, which in reality comes to the same 
thing, because priorities of macroeconomic policies seem to 
have shifted away from output stability to price stability 
and external balance. For weak currencies such a shift in 
priorities implies a deflation in order to reach a lower 
average inflation rate.
Whether such a deflationary process is desirable, or 
necessary, is beyond the point set for the present work.
The task here is to see hov; effective different tools 
of macroeconomic policy have been in the Danish attempt to 
implement the strong currency option, and whether the wel­
fare costs of this could be minimized by using another mix
- 17 -
of macroeconomic policies than is presently being used. 
This in order to stress the fact that it is the efficiency 
of this deflation which is crucial for keeping adjustment 
costs down, and make monetary union an attractive goal al­
so for weak currencies.
The high rate of unemployment, which is partly the 
result of an appreciating exchange rate, makes a public 
deficit nearly unavoidable, with declining tax receipts
and increases in social transfers. There is then, accord-
1ing to Grauwe, also a chance for vicious circles for an 
overvalued currency:
"What is particularly disturbing about this is that 
the overvaluation of the currency which normally is a 
temporary phenomenon leads to am automatic and perma­
nent expansion of the government sector. This makes 
further adjustment difficult, and as was argued ear­
lier, may transform a temporary overvaluation into a 
protracted one. Vicious circles may also exist for 
overvalued currencies."
This indicates that the path for adjustment for a small 
open economy in a currency area like the EMS is very nar­
row. On the one hand exchange rate adjustment, downwards, 
is not a domestic policy tool any more, and besides that, 
could have serious repercussions by increasing inflation­
ary pressure. On the other hand fixed exchange rates, de­
spite inflation differentials, maintained by capital im-
1) Paul de Grauwe, "Symptoms of an Overvalued Currency, 
the Case of the Belgian Franc ", in Marcello De Cecco 
(ed.), International Adjustment, Oxford 1983.
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ports, may lead to a change in the country's demand and 
output pattern, which may prolong adjustment.
Recent criticism from especially the German Bundes- 
•jbank and the OECD has stressed the importance of a bet­
ter coordination of national fiscal and budgetary poli­
cies, as well as monetary policies in order to achieve a 
higher degree of convergence of national inflation rates. 
This debate is not new however:
"It is not very fruitful to ask the central bank to 
control the money supply, if nobody can control the 
public deficit
and a similar British view:
"The key to maintaining a reasonable monetary expan­
sion in Britain must be a reduction of public sector 
borrowing. It is inconceivable that this can con­
tinue to run at a rate of 12% of GNP without thereby 
generating a renewed acceleration in the rate of 
money creation."-^
The question which is raised here, and vhich will be 
dealt with in extenso in the present text is that of 
choosing the appropriate instrument to fight inflation in 
a small open economy being integrated into a larger cur­
rency area.
By choosing the strong currency option a small open 
economy seems to be able to control industrial prices,
1) See German Bundesbank, Annual Report 1981, and OECD, 
Budget Financing and Monetary Control, Paris 1982.
2) Remarks by E. Hoffmeyer, Governor of the Danish Na­
tional Bank, in BIS, Press Review No. 221, Nov. 1976.
3) D. Laidler, "Inflation in Britain", American Economic 
Review, Sept. 1976, p. 499.
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but as the recent divergence of national inflation rates 
amongst the EMS countries suggests, this control of indus­
trial prices did not have a conclusive influence on general 
cost of living indexes.
1.1.4. A framework for the analysis of macroeconomic poli­
cies .
Before embarking on the task of comparing the effi­
ciency of different policies in the phases of deflation,
-]which ends when convergence of inflation rates is reached, 
it is convenient already here to present a simplified 
framework for the analysis of macroeconomic policies.
Basically macroeconomic policies consist of the fol­
lowing five activities:
i) Determining the net issue of money by the central bank, 
i.e. the issue of notes and coins, as well as increases in 
the deposit liabilities of the central bank to the private 
sector banks.
ii) Determining the public sector financial deficit. The 
public sector deficit equals the total current expenditure 
on goods and services plus income transfers and debt inter­
est payments by the public sector minus current receipts 
plus gross domestic investment, less capital transfer re­
ceipts. Determining the public sector deficit (or surplus) 
involves many policy tools, of which two main components
1) A clarification of the problem is presented in chapter
2, but the actual analysis first takes place in chap­
ters 6 - 7 - 8 .
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are the fixing of the public expenditure level and the deter­
mination of the tax rate levels.
iii) Determining the net sale of foreign assets by the pub­
lic sector, the central bank included. This involves net de­
creases in the official international reserves, and transac­
tions with foreign central banks and the IMF.
iv) Determining the net sale of public sector securities, 
excluding the ones mentioned under items i and iii.
The four above-mentioned items must sum to zero, implying 
that the financial deficit is equal to the issue of money, 
the sale of securities, the sale of foreign assets or some 
combinations of these. It follows also that only three of 
the items can be determined independently. The last item is
somewhat out of context, but as is shown in chapter 6, it
must be included in the list of options:
v) Determining the exchange rate.
- 21 -
Chapter 2
Monetary integration and the national adjustment process. 
The scope for analysis.
Below the scope for analysis is presented. The need 
for formal monetary integration is a logical outcome of the 
preceding process of market integration.
So looking at costs and benefits of monetary integra­
tion we conclude that costs precede benefits, and that ben­
efits are of a collective nature, while costs of adjustment 
are purely individual.
Using domestic credit restraint as the primary tool 
for economic convergence highlights another dimension of 
the distribution of costs and benefits, because the adjust­
ment burden seems to fall more heavily on the tradeables 
sector than on the nontradeables sector. This paradox is 
formally analyzed in chapter 7.
The obvious answer to this bias in adjustment costs 
for the two sectors is that budgetary policies should play 
a more dominant role in the overall strategy of making na­
tional inflation rates converge.
This in spite of the earlier rejection of fiscal poli­
cy as a tool for monetary integration made originally by 
observers of a new monetarist way of thinking.
So in the present chapter a discussion of the roles of 
monetary and fiscal policy in the process of monetary inte-
- 22 -
gration is set forward and the conclusion is that fiscal 
policy indeed does matter.
Why do countries feel the need to participate in mone­
tary integration ventures, and what are the possible effects 
of integration efforts on a country's economic structure and 
performance?
An essential prerequisite for monetary integration is 
market integration. The Rome treaty provided member coun­
tries with a tool to achieve market integration by lifting 
possible barriers which could hinder intra EC trade.
However on the financial side, the logical consequence 
to market integration is monetary integration, as uncertain­
ty about future exchange rates is seen as an equally impor­
tant hindrance to the free flow of goods and assets as tar­
iff barriers and quantitative controls.
The disillusionment with the short reign of flexible 
exchange rates, as imposed immediately after the breakdown 
of the Bretton-Woods system,1 gave nourishment to new re­
gional currency areas. The "Snake" was an attempt to main­
tain a joint EC-float in times with rapid movements on the 
exchange markets, and the EMS is a more broadly based, and 
more ambitious, attempt to provide a currency area with in­
ternal stable exchange rates. For countries with a higher
1) The disillusion with the short reign of floating ex­
change rates stems essentially from the conceived fact 
that floating exchange rates tended to overshoot, thus 
triggering off either vicious circles of inflation or 
virtuous circles of disinflation.
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than average inflation rate this means, according to conven­
tional theory, a reduction of the growth rate of the money 
supply, in order to bring about a reduction in inflation 
rates.
According to new monetarist theory the adjustment proc­
ess covers the span of time where a reduction in the domes­
tic money supply helps force the domestic inflation rate 
down to the level reigning abroad.
The first effect of a reduction of the money supply is 
a diminished effective money demand in relation to money 
wages, which in turn will affect the level of output and em­
ployment. The result is a disequilibrium in the labour mar­
ket with fewer jobs available than existing demand. On the 
aggregate this implies, ceteris paribus, a lower real na­
tional income, which will affect the real exchange rate in 
the following ways:
a) Imports will tend to be reduced relative to exports, as­
suming that imports have a higher income elasticity than 
domestic goods. This effect tends to raise the exchange 
rate.
b) Tight monetary conditions will raise the real interest 
rate as a response to the scarcity of money relative to 
the amount of economic transactions, assuming a steady 
velocity of circulation.
A high real interest rate will attract capital inflows from 
abroad, if foreign investors estimate the interest rate dif-
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ferential to be larger than a potential exchange-rate rea­
lignment. Such an inflow of foreign capital will raise the 
real exchange rate.
So during the adjustment process to a new equilibrium, 
the real exchange rate tends, ceteris paribus, to appreci­
ate as a result of the lower real national income and its 
effects on the current account and because of the effects 
of the higher real interest rate on the capital account.
This chain of events is coined the strong currency option.
In order not to sacrifice the domestic export sector, flex­
ibility in nominal exchange rates is a must, if the infla­
tion differentials are too high, in order to influence real
1exchange rates. However as Thygesen (1980) points out:
"the main contribution to changes in real exchange rates 
must come from the domestic efforts of the participants."
Now, which kind of efforts are consistent with partici­
pation in a currency area, and which efforts are deemed to 
be inconsistent? This is a difficult question to answer, 
but it is one of the aims of the present study to, at least, 
give a tentative answer.
2.1. Costs and benefits from monetary integration.
Examining the costs and benefits deriving from the mem­
bership of a currency area, three basic types of benefits 
are readily identified:
1) N. Thygesen, Exchange Rate Experiences and Policies of 
Small Countries: Some European ExampTes of the 197Q'rs ,
Princeton 1980.
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The first type of benefits is linked to the traditional
argument about decreasing transaction costs for an interna- 
itional money. The gradual reduction of uncertainty about 
future exchange rates will result in the integration of as­
set, as well as goods markets, which in turn will provide a 
more efficient allocation of resources, and hereby promote 
economic growth.
The second argument for monetary integration is the one
we suitably could call "the monetarist/rational expectations
2argument. This argument states that monetary integration 
disciplines governments, which have not yet been able to 
fight inflation effectively, by allowing their currencies to 
depreciate, and hence ending up in a vicious circle of in­
flation and devaluation. A firm commitment to a fixed ex­
change rate, by belonging to a credible currency area, will 
diminish future inflationary expectations, which in turn 
will have an impact on the behaviour of economic units, when 
future prices are determined.
The third argument for monetary integration could be 
coined the "new macroeconomics argument", and this argument 
has a strong bearing on the former argument, but it is far 
more radical in its implications.
Since money illusion seems to be a thing of the past, a 
reduction in real wage rates by depreciating the nominal ex-
1) For a further discussion of this argument see C.P. 
Kinaleberger, "The Benefits of International Money", 
Journal of I n t e r r.a ti on a 1 Economics, Sept. 1977.
2) The argument has its roots in the Scandinavian inflation 
model.
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„ change rate will have next to no effect, as economic agents
will find ways to counteract such policies.1
In order to evaluate the costs of monetary integration
the following components leading to monetary integration are
2identified from the perspective of time:
a) The linking of national currencies with a narrowing or 
vanishing band. No common central bank with common re-
3serves is established. This is what Corden calls the 
pseudo exchange rate union.
b) The coordination of economic policies in order to pre­
vent disequilibrium in the balance of payments.
c) Some clearing mechanism for national external balances 
disequilibria, using a commonly accepted reserve asset.
d) Convertibility between capital and current transactions 
is established, which should imply that
e) Public confidence in the irrevocable nature of the fixed
exchange rates is established. This state first emerg-
4es, however, according to Hamada: "only after a sub­
stantial transition period, during which there is a suc­
cessful maintenance of the de facto fixity of exchange 
rate parities, or only after some kind of political uni­
fication. "
1) For a clarification of the influence of the new macroe­
conomics on economic policy inside a currency area, see
chapter 5.
2) These are basically Hamada1 s , op. cit., variables.
3) See Corden (1 972), op. cit.
4) Hamada, op. cit.
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f) Finally, a common currency is issued by a single central 
bank, v/hich circulates in the currency area. This leads 
to the complete currency area.
So returning to the question about the perceived costs 
of monetary integration for a small open economy with an 
above average inflation rate, the costs are that of balance 
of payments adjustment with rigid exchange rates, when the 
countries forming the currency area do not fulfill the de- 
mands of the optimum currency area.
Using Hamada's variables it can easily be seen that 
there is a difference in the time profile and distribution 
of costs and benefits. The benefits are of a collective na­
ture, like a public good, and these are only fully attained 
in the last stage of the monetary unification process, i.e. 
when public confidence in the irrevocability of the fixity 
of the exchange rate is reached.
The costs of monetary integration are immediate and of 
a highly individualistic nature.
It is therefore logical, as stated in the previous 
chapter, to use the national level, the nation state, as our 
research object.
Much has been written about the "global" advantages and 
disadvantages of monetary integration. Focusing on a small 
open economy in order to examine the effects of the strong 
currency option, and policies to pursue a politically ac­
1) See chapter 4 for the connection of microeconomic dis­
turbances and monetary integration by the discussion of 
the optimal currency area theories.
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ceptable period of transition, thereby approaching monetary
integration from the grass-roots so to say, is not a common
theme in available literature. Traditionally the costs of
monetary integration have been exposed in terms of the
2Phillips-curve trade-off.
The convergence of national inflation rates would be 
more costly in terms of inflation and unemployment respec­
tively if, initially, national trade-offs varied.
Low inflation countries thus would have to accept an 
unnecessary rise in domestic inflation rates, while high 
inflation countries would experience a high transitional 
unemployment rate. The experience of inflation in the last 
decade has seriously shattered the belief of a trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment,^ and if such a trade­
off indeed exists, it seems to be on unacceptable levels. 
This is the steepening of the Phillips curve.
There are several hypotheses for this diminishing 
trade-off between employment and inflation. An often cited
1) Some notable exceptions are Thygesen (198 0a), op. cit., 
and Paul deGrauwe, "Symptoms of an Overvalued Currency, 
The Case of the Belgian Franc ", in M. De Cecco (ed.), 
op. cit. (1983).
2) See i.e. H. Grubel, "The Theory of Optimal Currency 
Areas", The Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 3,
1970. J.M. Fleming, "On Exchange Rate Unification",
The Economic Journal, vol. 8, 1971, B. Balassa, "Mone­
tary Integration in the European Common Market", in 
A.K. Swoboda (ed.), Europe and the Evolution of the In­
ternational Monetary System, Geneva 1973.
3) Cf. the following quote: "a serious puzzle first
emerged when the inflation rate scarcely budged in the 
recession of 1970", in A. Okun & C. Perry, Innovative 
Policies to Slow Inflation, Erookings paper 2, 1978.
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reason is the growing feeling of policy instability and re­
sulting rational inflation expectations, which in turn un­
dermine money and exchange rate illusion.
1Parkin was the first to conclude that if domestic mon­
etary policies no longer can boost employment significantly 
then the cost of joining a monetary union must be small in­
deed .
"The central problem with which the transition must 
deal is that of arriving at a European consensus of 
what the rate of inflation should be and then equaliz­
ing national inflation rates, so that intra European 
exchange rates need not adjust."2
With hindsight, this rather optimistic proposition gives 
rise to a more complicated problem than it pretends to 
solve, namely, what we could call the N-th inflation rate 
problem, although it seems to be generally accepted that the 
lowest possible level of inflation gives a superior trajec­
tory for real economic variables than an arbitrarily chosen 
higher level, as a continuance of inflationary policies and 
inflationary behaviour do not bring lasting advantages to 
employment and real economic growth.
1) M. Parkin, "An Overwhelming Case for European Monetary 
Union", The Banker, Sept. 1972. P. deGrauwe demonstrat­
ed the same point geometrically in his "Conditions for 
Monetary Integration, a Geometric Interpretation", Welt- 
wirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 111, 1975, and it is prob­
ably these theories Roy Jenkins had in mind when he 
stated in his Jean Monnet lecture (Florence 1977) that: 
"We need to discard political arguments based on obso­
lete, inadequate or irrelevant economic theory: That
the objections to objections to European monetary inte­
gration are the differing preferences on inflation and 
unemployment as between member states."
2) M. Parkin, op. cit.
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Furthermore, the new monetarist view, as originally 
presented,1 showed as the main point, that the need for ex­
change rate variations arises purely out of different rates 
of domestic credit expansion. Different rates of credit 
creation are both the cause of exchange-rate realignments
and of differentials in domestic inflation rates. And as
2Parkin notes: "What emerges from this then is that ex-
change-rates are largely irrelevant."
Although logically consistent, seen from the pure mon­
etary approach to the exchange rate, this proposition lacks 
the scope for what will happen in the medium to long term, 
as opposed to the short term horizon of the monetarist ap­
proach.
One could take the opposite stand and claim that a 
tight credit policy would cripple investment and hence re­
duce future output, which would implicate that the current 
account will deteriorate rather than improve.
This apparent paradox that tight credits, on one hand, 
are the panacea for all balance of payments problems, and 
on the other hand can seriously limit current and, more 
probably, future output, thus deteriorating rather than im­
proving the current account, stems from the limited concep­
tion of time of the new monetarist approach, cf. Allen &
1) By i.a. E.S. Phelps, Inflation Policy and Unemployment 
Theory, The Cost Benefit Approach to Monetary Planning, 
London 1972, and D. Laidler, "The Current Inflation11,""
National Westminster Quarterly Review, November 1972.
2) Parkin, op. cit.
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1Kenen who claim that the new monetarist approach: "focuses
single mindedly on monetary equilibrium in the never never 
land of the stationary state".
And secondly, that since the exchange-rate is the rela­
tive prices of monies, then the exchange rate is determined
in and by the money markets. This is a logical flaw, accord-
2ing to Allen & Kenen: "Although the exchange rate is the
price that clears the money market, it is determined jointly 
with other variables, including interest rates, by interac­
tion between money and bond markets. Over time and in the 
long run, moreover, the exchange rate comes to conform with 
the requirements of equilibrium in the goods markets, not on­
ly in the bond and money markets."
Newer contributions to the literature on the monetary 
approach to the exchange rate slowly start to agree that oth­
er factors than the money market determine the exchange rate,
3cf. a recent statement by Mussa:
"The exchange rate is a price that reflects not only 
current economic conditions, but also expectations of 
future conditions. The basic point is that apart from 
any influence of the level of the current account on the 
exchange rate, 'innovations' in the current account are
1) P.R. Allen & P.B. Kenen, Asset Markets, Exchange Rates 
and Economic Integration, Cambridge 1981.
2) Allen & Kenen, op. cit.
3) M. Mussa, The Exchange Rate and the Current Account, Lec­
ture given at the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel; 
forthcoming in Kieler Diskusionsbeitrage.
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likely to induce unexpected changes in the exchange 
rate. This is because an innovation in the current 
account defined as a deviation of the current account 
balance from its previously expected level, conveys 
information about changes in economic conditions rel­
evant for determining the equilibrium exchange rate."
2.3. Fiscal policy and its role in the monetary integra­
tion process.
The role of fiscal, or budgetary, policy in monetary 
integration theory is often somewhat neglected or dis­
missed by the notion that deficit countries can easily fi­
nance their deficits on the common financial markets. 
Budgetary policy is thus treated as a mere technical vari­
able, although a country’s fiscal position has an impor­
tant bearing on total domestic monetary demand, hereby af­
fecting the consumption of domestic, as well as foreign 
goods and services.
A typical statement of the apparent irrelevance of 
fiscal policy in the context of monetary integration is 
the following early Corden quote:1
"Monetary integration does not require fiscal inte­
gration, since governments can finance budget defi­
cits by borrowing on the community's capital markets 
. . .  It is an interesting question whether fiscal 
integration requires monetary integration, if it 
does, and assuming that fiscal integration is desira­
ble, we may have an additional argument in favour of 
monetary integration."
1) F.M. Corden (1972), op. cit.
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A counterargument is the rather straightforward one,
■istressed by Meade and Scitovsky, that fiscal and monetary 
unification must go hand in hand, because an effective sta­
bilization policy requires the coordinated use of both fis­
cal and monetary policies.
In the present study it is one of the main goals to 
show that not only does monetary integration require fiscal 
integration, in the meaning of some amount of budgetary co­
ordination, but a failure to do so will inevitably increase 
the costs of adjustment, and seriously endanger the safe 
return to a world of price and output stability, as theory 
describes.
Before analyzing the role of fiscal policy in monetary 
integrative efforts and in order to substantiate the argu­
ment stated above, we shall briefly discuss the origin of 
this bias of monetary policy taking the brunt of deflation 
in an economy seeking to find a lower level of inflation. 
This view is contrary to most of the literature about the 
potency of different financial policies under different ex­
change rate regimes, which for a long time dominated the
1) See J . Meade, The Balance of Payments Problem of a Free 
Trade Area, and T. Scitovsky, Economic Theory and West­
ern European Integration, Stanford 1958. A later reap­
praisal of this view is found in EC Commission Report 
of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in Eu­
ropean Integration, Brussels 1977.
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1debate in the 60s and the 70s, According to these findings
fiscal policy had a relatively higher effectiveness in influ­
encing output and income under fixed exchange rates, as mone­
tary policy would have to be geared to the exchange rate tar­
get. A country belonging to a fixed exchange rate area will 
have to give up its monetary policy independence because the 
interest rate would be exogenously given.
As a result fiscal policy would be the more effective in 
influencing the level of domestic demand.
"Thus under a fixed exchange rate (except to the extent 
that the external accounts were originally in surplus) 
monetary expansion can only be sustained as long as re­
serves hold out, while budgetary expansion if capital 
movements are sufficiently sensitive to interest rates, 
may be sustained indefinitely."2
1) Cf. J.M. Fleming, "Domestic Financial Policies under 
Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates", IMF Staff Papers , 
vol. 9, 19 62, R.A. Mundell, "Capital Mobility and Stabi­
lization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates", 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vo1. 
29, 1963, A.O. Kruger, "The Impact of Alternative Govern­
ment Policies under Varying Exchange Rate Systems", Quar­
terly of Economics, vol. 79, 1965, and E. Sohmen, "Fiscal 
and Monetary Policy under Alternative Exchange Rate Re­
gimes", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 81, 1967. 
R.A. Mundell in an earlier article, "Flexible Exchange 
Rates and Employment Policy", Canadian Journal of Econom­
ics and Political Science, volT 27, T961 , comes to the 
opposite conclusion compared with his 1963 article, but 
this stems from a fallacy in the effects of monetary pol­
icy on the interest rate according to R.S. Boyer, "Finan­
cial Policies in an Open Economy", Economica, vol. 45, 
1978.
2) J.M. Fleming (1962), op. cit.
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In an open economy with integration of goods, assets 
and money markets sustained budget deficits have foreign 
repercussions in forms of spill-overs influencing, primari­
ly, the export sectors of other countries, this as an ef­
fect of the symmetric reduction of the domestic income mul­
tiplier. In the context of a currency area, a neighbour's 
expansionary fiscal policies may tempt governments to free-
ride on neighbours' policies, hereby avoiding the costs of
1issuing their own debt.
Furthermore, the predominance of monetary policy as 
the main tool in monetary integration can be explained in 
terms of the "neo-functional" approach to integration, 
which, put plainly, according to DeVries, "amounts to try­
ing to trick governments into doing in a complicated way,
2what they refuse to do in a straightforward way".
A restrictive monetary policy, i.e. the issue of pub­
lic debt, seems to be more acceptable to the public, at 
least in the short run, than restrictive fiscal policy, 
i.e. tax increases. This coupled with the limited time ho­
rizon politicians seem to have on far-ranging economic is­
1) See P.R. Allen & P.B. Kenen (1981), op. cit., p. 393, 
and W.E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism, New York 1972, p.
28, S. Engerman, "Regional Aspects of Stabilization 
Policy", in R.A. Musgrave (ed.), Essays in Fiscal Fed­
eralism, Brookings, 1965, pp. 53-56.
2) Tom DeVries, On the Meaning and Future of the European 
Monetary System, Princeton 1980, p. 3,
- 36 -
sues, cf. the first chapter, helps explain the apparent bias
on monetary policy.1
The result of such an asymmetrical reliance on monetary
policies, because they are thought to be easily divorced
from current political pressure, is highly undesirable, as
high interest rates by way of the ratchet effect will have
2difficulties in falling.
Returning to the original question about the role of 
fiscal policy in monetary integration, the "new Cambridge 
view" of macroeconomics is in stark contrast to mainstream
3integration theory. The "new Cambridge view" holds that 
fiscal policy must be the main instrument in monetary inte­
gration, as there is a direct connection between government 
budget deficits and current account deficits. The underly-
1) For a further elaboration of this point, see J.M. 
Buchanan, "Easy Budgets and Tight Money", Lloyds Bank 
Review, April 1962.
2) An early view is the one of Frank Paish from 1961: "It
is important that the measure to control the economy 
should be symmetrical. In recent years the measures to 
expand demand have taken the form mainly of tax reduc­
tion, while the main burden of restricting demand has 
been placed on monetary policy and higher interest 
rates. A continuation of this policy could raise inter­
est rates without limits." The Statist, Nov. 10, 1961, 
here quoted from J.M. Buchanan (1962), op. cit.
3) For an elaboration of the Cambridge view see J. Spraos, 
"New Cambridge Macroeconomics, Assignment Rules and In­
terdependence", in R.Z. £liber (ed.), 1977, op. cit.
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ing assumption of the approach is that the household sector 
spends all available income. The implication of this, ac­
cording to Spraos,1 is that fiscal policy should be geared 
to a balance of payments target, while the exchange rate 
should be geared to domestic output stability.
The new Cambridge approach to macroeconomics has been 
severely criticised, especially because of the underlying 
assumption about the household sector spending whatever it 
earns on goods and services, and that this total domestic 
spending influences the exchange rate directly.
It is not the aim of the present study to dismiss or 
support the points made by the protagonists of the new Cam­
bridge approach to macroeconomics, but seeing the main 
points of this approach in the context of monetary .integra­
tion, i.e. a high degree of integration of national finan­
cial markets, the private behaviour assumption about spend­
ing whatever it earns, can be relaxed or even neglected, 
cf. Corden (1977):2
"The current account deficit of a country is the sum 
of the private financial deficits (excess of invest­
ment over savings) and the public deficit. If the 
current account deficit increases this may be because 
the private deficit has risen, which is not a matter 
for public policy concern, or because the public defi­
cit has risen, which indeed may be a matter for con­
cern. But the balance of payments figures in them­
selves will not tell one whether there is a problem. 
One must go directly to the public sector figures (in­
1) J. Spraos, op. cit.
2) W. M. Corden, Inflation, Exchange Hates and the World
Economv: Lectures in International Economy, Chicago
1977.
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eluding the central bank) so^making the balance of 
payments figures redundant,"
VThether this statement of Corden should be attributed to
the new Cambridge approach or a variant of the absorption
2approach is largely irrelevant. Both approaches appeal 
to the balance between national income and expenditures 
by looking at savings-propensities in the private and 
public sectors.
3The point that budget deficits have a definite 
bearing on the external balances is probably the most 
valid point for some kind of budgetary coordination dur­
ing the integration process, as synchronized stabiliza-
1) Corden's point is taken up by McKinnon in "Exchange 
Rate Instability, Trade Imbalances, and Monetary Pol­
icies in Japan and the US", in P. Oppenheimer (ed.), 
Issues in International Economics, Oxford 1980, and 
more recently with direct reference to the Corden 
quote in "The Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Policy: 
Changing Postwar Perceptions", Journal of Economic 
Literature, vol. 19 (June 1981).
2) As originally presented by S.S. Alexander, "Effects 
of a Devaluation on a Trade Ealance", IMF, Staff Pa­
pers , vol. 2, 1952. A more recent discussion is 
found in M. Michaely, Analyses of Devaluation, PPP, 
Elasticities and Absorption, Stockholm 1978.
3) In chapter 3 the link is demonstrated in terms of na­
tional accounting identities.
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tion policies must have a stronger effect than unilateral 
measures because of the previously mentioned large national 
spill-over effects. As put by Magnifico: "Should policy
making powers be allowed to migrate de facto into one or 
two dominant powers, or should they be shared evenly by the 
deliberate integration of fiscal targets and instruments?" 
Furthermore as monetary finance is excluded because of the 
commitment to fixed exchange rates, external borrowing in 
order to sustain the exchange rate level is a must. This 
will affect the economic structure in the period of adjust­
ment .
2In his study of Belgian exchange-rate policy, DeGrauwe 
concludes that the strong currency option combined with an 
expansive budgetary policy was a main contributor to the 
sharp decline of the price of tradeables versus the price
3of nontradeables. An expansionary budgetary policy in­
creases, notably via increased transfers, the demand for im­
ports thus deteriorating the current account, and at the 
same time it permanently expanded the government sector, cf.
4DeGrauwe:
"The question arises here whether it made sense for a 
country to allow its currency to appreciate, and there­
1) M. Magnifico, European Monetary Integration, London 
1973, p. 19.
2) In M. De Cecco (1983), op. cit.
3) For a geometrical demonstration of capital imports and 
the relative prices of tradeables versus nontradeables 
see chapter 7.
4) Ibid.
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by to effectively prevent industrial prices to in­
crease, when at the same time the budgetary policies 
were highly inflationary. What is more, one can ar­
gue that the overvaluation of the BF itself increased 
government transfers and government deficits. It in­
duced the government to operate more and more as em­
ployer of last resort, and a great variety of public 
employment programs were set up. What is particular­
ly disturbing about this is that the overvaluation of 
the currency which normally is a temporary phenomenon 
leads to an automatic and permanent expansion of the 
government sector. This then makes further adjust­
ment difficult, and as was argued earlier may trans­
form a temporary overvaluation into a protracted one. 
'Vicious circles' may also exist for overvalued cur­
rencies . "
In DeGrauwe’s chain of arguments the squeeze effect of the 
initial contraction of the money supply would be temporary 
if the normal Friedmanite expectation about a fall in the 
nominal wage rate (or at least a decline in wage infla­
tion) came true.
However, with a high degree of downward rigidity of 
nominal wages combined with the budgetary sterilization of 
the contractionary effects of the tight monetary policy, 
the only logical way to reduce nominal expenditure would
be by combining the monetary contraction with some kind of
1fiscal contraction.
1) As pointed out by especially VI.*1. Corden, "The Ex­
change Rate, Monetary Policy and North Sea Oil: The
Economic Theory of the Squeeze on Tradeables", in W.A. 
Eltis & P.J.N. Sinclair (eds.), The Money Supply and 
the Exchange Rate, Oxford 1981, p . 34.
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A fiscal contraction in order to remove the bias 
against the tradeable sector can either be brought about 
by raising tax rates or by cutting public consumption. 
Whatever means is used a fiscal contraction in an open 
economy with a high degree of capital mobility will af­
fect the interest rate in a downward direction, which in 
turn, ceteris paribus, will tend to weaken the currency 
and in this way it will relieve the initial bias against 
the tradeables sector.
2.4. The role of public debt in the adjustment process.
It has been the intention in the preceding section 
to stress the importance of fiscal policy in the mone­
tary integration process because the costs of integra­
tion in the medium to long term seem to rise as monetary 
and fiscal instruments are assigned asymmetrically.
However a cost which has not been considered yet, 
but which has a prominent place in this study is the di­
rect cost of financing the consistent deficit on the 
current account during the adjustment period. Until now 
we have discussed mainly the indirect, or secondary, ef­
fects of running a deficit on the current account for a 
prolonged period. The rationality of public borrowing 
in order to adjust to some exogenously given parameters 
when the effects of such stabilization efforts are high-
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•]ly doubted is discussed in chapters 5 and 7.
When borrowing is used to avoid the need to reduce 
current consumption the burden of repayment is placed on 
the next generation, and the costs of doing so may easily 
exceed the benefits enjoyed by the current generation.
If the borrowing is spent on projects which will 
produce a yield in the future then the present gross bur­
den of .finance will be offset by a future income stream, 
and the net result of the transaction will probably be 
positive.
However as the main part of the public debt is used
2for public consumption, the deficit is what Modigliani 
calls deadweight, and his widely accepted principles.for 
the national debt are worth reciting when it is acknowl­
edged that the period for convergence of national infla­
tion rates inside a currency area in reality lasts longer 
than any pessimist expected: "in so far as counter cy­
clical fiscal policy is concerned, our analysis does not 
require any significant re-evaluation of currently ac­
cepted views. Yet, by reminding us that fiscal opera­
tions involve considerations of inter generation equity,
1) Cf. the arguments about debt neutrality and monetary 
superneutrality raised by the protagonists of the 
"new classical macroeconomics".
2) F. Modigliani, "Long Run Implications of Alternative 
Fiscal Policies and the Burden of the National Debt", 
Economic Journal, vol. 71, Dec. 1961, p. 755.
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even when used for stabilisation purposes, it may help to
clarify some issues. It does for example, establish a
prima facie case, at least with respect to ad hoc measures
as distinguished from built in stabilizers, for a course
of action that will minimise the deadweight deficit and
-1stimulate investment rather than consumption."
In the context of monetary integration the inter-gen-
erational aspect becomes even more .accentuated.
When the currency area starts to acquire the features
2of the optimal currency area, with free movements of cap­
ital and labour, one can easily imagine that differences 
in fiscal systems, which in turn will be a function of net 
liabilities in the system, will induce migration of labour 
and/or capital into areas with a lower debt pro capita ra­
tio in order to optimize net benefits.
It is clear that the existence of easy external fund­
ing has many advantages. One is that it temporarily re­
duces the chances that a budget deficit will "crowd out" 
private investment^ because the private sector will be
1) Modigliani, op. cit.
2) See chapter 4 where the criteria for the optimum cur­
rency area are defined.
3) See i.e., Harmen Lehment, "Internationale Aspekte der 
Staatsverschuldung", in Beihefte der Kunj unkturpolitik, 
heft 27, 1981.
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able to use foreign funding too.
However, if one foresees a scenario with continuous 
budget deficits and realignments of the exchange rate, 
i.e. that the confidence in the exchange rate arrangement 
is low, the interest rate parity theorem will probably 
hold true thus diminishing the initial advantage for pri­
vate importers of capital.
Another related question is how long a small economy 
like the Danish can go on financing a seemingly persist­
ent balance of payments deficit, which in 1981 was kr 14
billion or 3.5% of GNP, and which now has lasted for 20
1years. Is there a limit for external indebtedness, and 
if this question is answered positively, how will this 
affect the adjustment process?
2.5. Tight credits in a mixed economy.
Another essential point which ought to be included 
in any analysis on monetary integration is whether tight
1) Cf. some explanations of this balance of payments
deficit. "Capital imports are reasonable for a coun­
try with a small foreign debt when agricultural pro­
tectionism in other countries necessitates accelerat­
ed structural adaptions of industry and agriculture." 
Economic Survey of Denmark, CPH, 1963, p. 11, and "It 
is a declared aim of economic policy to eliminate 
the present deficit on the balance of goods and serv­
ices, but in order to prevent that from impairing the 
internal expansion the elimination is to be achieved 
over some years." Economic Survey of Denmark, CPH, 
1966, p. 77.
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monetary policy is able to constrain public sector consump­
tion. It is clear that a reduced money supply eventually 
will filter through to the public sector, but there are, as 
is demonstrated below, long lags which seem to soften the 
impact. The trend of reduced consumption in the private 
sector and a growing share of consumption in the public 
sector is shown in table 1, which summarizes the use and 
supply of resources in the Danish economy.
As is seen in the table, public consumption relative 
to private consumption has had quite a significant growth 
rate. However it is clear that the sluggishness in the in­
ternational economy, with resulting unemployment, increased 
income transfers and depressed revenues, has had a signifi­
cant impact on the consumption pattern. A recent OECD sur­
vey states that: "Public investment outlays, which were
reduced in 1980, have continued to fall in 1981. At the
same time, public consumption . . . has continued to grow
2faster than in most other member countries."
With such a development it is not surprising that Den­
mark "has a public sector deficit considerably higher than
3in most other countries, around 7% of GNP".
1) The table should only be treated as an empirical exam­
ple of a fairly general trend. The formal empirical 
analysis, with the Danish economy as a case study fol­
lows in chapters 8 and 9.
2) OECD, Economic Surveys, Denmark, Paris 1982, p. 12.
3) Ibid., p. 48.
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Table. 1
Supply and use of resources. Denmark as an example. Per 
cent change from previous periods at constant 1975 prices.
1980a) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981b)
Private consunption 209.9 9.1 1.4 0.1 2.6 -4.1 -1.5
Public consunption 100.4 3.8 2.8 4.7 4.9 5.2 4
Gross fixed invest. 68.3 14.6 -3.3 2.4 -1.7 -13.7 -15.5
public 12.2 8.6 2.5 4.4 4.9 -17.7 -10
residential 18.8 20.1 -12.7 4.1 -2.5 -20.3 -26
business 37.3 18.0 1.1 0.8 -3.3 -8.7 -12
Final domestic de­
mand 378.4 9.3 0.7 1.7 2.3 -3.7 -2.5
Changes in stocks -0.3 1.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.8 -
Total domestic de­
mand 378.4 10.6 0.4 1.4 2.6 -4.5 -
a) Absolute prices in billion Dkr.
b) OECD forecast from Denmark, Economic Survey, January 
1982.
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistiske Efterretninger
and OECD, op. cit.
Taking into account the restrictive Danish monetary
ipolicy during the last decade such a development as de­
scribed above seems difficult to understand.
1) See chapter 8, where indices for monetary and fiscal 
tightness are calculated for selected countries.
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In the context of monetarist theory we shall therefore 
try to formulate a hypothesis why controlling consumption 
in a mixed economy with monetary means has some setbacks, 
and certainly will have distributionary effects, by rein­
forcing the present pattern of resource allocation.
Most monetarist econometric models seem to focus on 
some aspect of the rather complicated relationship between 
total domestic money expenditure and some definition of the 
money supply.
Using such an approach the relative expenditure compo­
nents of total domestic expenditure are often overlooked.
1Congdon, in a series of articles, has tried to deal with 
this problem by asking why the unemployment-inflation rela­
tionship has been adverse despite restrictive monetary pol-
2icies, as has Friedman, of late.
3Congdon's answer is that the movements of public wag­
es and prices are beyond the effects of restrictive mone­
tary policy.
Before embarking on the discussion of the likely ef­
fects of monetary policy in the context of the mixed econo-
4my, two lines of monetarist thinking are worth noting.
1) T. Congdon, Monetarism, An Essay in Definition, CPS,
London 1978. Same author, "Why Has Monetarism Failed 
So Far, Parts 1 & 2", The Banker, March & April 1982.
2) M. Friedman pointed at the excessive public sector
spending in the UK, when Thatcherite policies were
evaluated in Per' Spiegel, Autumn 1981.
3) T. Congdon, op. cit., April 1982.
4) Following Congdon, ibid.
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The first line of thought does not acknowledge the problem,
while the second only acknowledges it implicitly. We shall
briefly present the two lines of thought, and afterwards
try to draw a conclusion in line with the context of this
study. The first way of looking at the dilemma of the
seemingly adverse inflation/unemployment trade-off is in-
1spired by Friedman's Presidential address, where the main
2theme is the "natural rate of employment".
Since macroeconomic policy, according to Friedman, 
does not influence the long-run level of employment, which 
is the domain of the institutions on the labour market, 
then monetary policy should be geared solely to reduce in­
flation by regulating money supply. The implication for 
employment is ignored.-^
The second line of thought is based on the inflation 
expectations argument.
A stringent monetary policy will bring the market the 
message that future inflation rates are likely to diminish. 
Expectations about future market conditions influence the 
setting of prices in both the private as well as the public 
sector, ideally.
1) The 1967 Presidential address is printed in M.
Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money, London 1969.
2) The natural rate of unemployment is the rate where wage
levels are seen to be steady = stable inflation.
3) As there yet is no method to estimate the natural rate
of unemployment.
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However if prices are set "wrongly", i.e. that expec­
tations about future market conditions consistently have 
been false, factor prices are set too high. For labour 
this means a sort of Keynesian unemployment, and for capi­
tal this means higher interest rates and a lower investment 
level.
Now, let us try to distinguish between the two sec­
tors, and see how a monetary slowdown affects the private 
and public sectors respectively.
a) The private sector.
The primary effect of a contractive monetary policy is 
a drop in economic activity, which decreases a firm's cash 
flow. The result is seen on the firm's bank balance. De­
pending on initial conditions the firm will sooner or later 
have to revise planned investment levels, and assuming a 
high rate of inflation, wage claims will be difficult to 
honour.
A decreasing bank balance and increasing liabilities 
force the firm to down-grade its activities.
b) The public sector.
For the public sector the liquidity restraint is not 
felt so burdensome even though revenues are falling in real 
terms, as the credit line between treasury and central bank 
does not seem to be subjugated to commercial debt manage­
ment principles, which should not surprise.
Say that a shock hits the economy. This could be an 
external shock, that is a drastic change in the country’s
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terms of trade, or an internal shock, a drastic reduction 
in the money supply. If the shock hits the households 
first, these can either adjust by reducing real spending, 
or more likely, they would seek to transfer the impact to 
the firms by wage claims. The firms can either respond by 
increasing efficiency, if there is slack to cut, or they 
can reduce their net expenditure on wages and investment, 
which in turn would lead to increased unemployment.
Another possibility would be for the firms to pass 
over the impact of the wage claims to the households, 
which is difficult in an open economy with foreign compet­
itors, by raising prices.
Whichever of the two options is taken, the problem 
will sooner or later end in the public sector because of 
automatic transfers, or support schemes for industry, or 
whatever one could imagine.
If we for a moment neglect income transfers, and look 
at net public consumption,1 a case can indeed be present­
ed, that inflation control via monetary means will squeeze 
the private sector harder than the public sector.
In the private sector market forces are at work, cf. 
the previous section about the impact of a monetary shock, 
and the liquidity in the private sector is a main determi­
nant when wage claims are settled.
1) I.e. total public consumption - (net transfers + pub­
lic investment) = net public consumption.
- 51 -
In the public sector it is more difficult to see1 how 
the conditions in the money market, or other constraints 
which may limit liquidity, will play a role when wage 
claims are settled. As Congdon mentions, wage settlements 
in the public sector are better explained by the sociolog­
ical school of inflation, which stresses relative strength 
of bargaining power, while private sector wage inflation 
is a monetary phenomenon.^
Of course, one may argue that a tight monetary policy 
eventually will work through to the public sector, because 
wage settlements there will be influenced by the wage rate 
in the private sector.
However such a way of reasoning implies that monetary 
policy already has had its direct impact on the private 
sector. An answer to this dilemma is proposed by Con 
Congdon:^
If checking of inflation by means of monetary policy 
is biased in its impact on the two sectors, a case could 
be made for a formal incomes policy which would help to
4"redress the discriminatory impact of monetary policy".
2.5.1. The mixed economy and monetary integration.
In the context of monetary integration, where the 
main goal in the adjustment period is the convergence of
1) Unless there are rigid legal constraints on public 
spending.
2) T. Congdon, "The Incomes Policy Cycle in Britain", The 
Banker, Dec. 1980.
3) T. Congdon, "Why Has Monetarism Failed So Far", The 
Banker, Apr. 1982.
4) Ibid.
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national inflation rates inside the proposed currency area 
primarily by monetary means, the differentiated impact of 
monetary policy on the two sectors raises two conceptual 
problems. Firstly, is it the private sector which primari­
ly should adjust to shocks, and secondly, if the size of 
public sectors varies in the proposed currency area, i.e. 
that public expenditure as percentage of GNP differs wide­
ly, then the rate of success of inflation control via mone­
tary means will differ from country to country proportion-
iate to the relative sizes of public sectors.
The first question is discussed in chapters 6 - 7 - 8 ,  
and the second question should be considered as one of the, 
by now numerous, criteria for a functional currency area, 
which all are analyzed in chapter 4.
1) See chapter 8, where scattergrams of deficits, central 
bank financing, and monetary base growth are shown for 
selected countries.
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Chapter 3
Smallness and openness of an economy, and their implica­
tions for the effectiveness of domestic macroeconomic pol­
icies .
As pointed out in the title of the present study the 
object for research is the small open economy engaged in 
monetary integration. The present chapter seeks to ana­
lyze the implications of "smallness" and "openness" for 
the effectiveness of domestic economic policies. Small­
ness is a familiar textbook phenomenon, so only a brief 
discussion of this concept is included here.
Openness, and by this is meant the increasing impor­
tance for national economic policies of economic linkages 
across national boundaries, has yet to find its definitive 
niche in literature.
The aim of the chapter is therefore to analyze in 
what ways conditions in the money market, the capital mar­
ket, and in the commodity market influence macroeconomic 
policies in an open economy, in order to identify the lim­
its for autonomous economic policy-making.
With the limitations imposed by smallness and open­
ness, a framework for balance of payments policy is intro­
duced and discussed in the last part of the chapter.
3.1. Smallness.
If the price of traded goods is exogenously given, 
the country in question thus being a price taker, the 
economy is considered to be small.
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Such an economy cannot influence its own terms of 
trade in real terms. Whether goods or assets are traded 
internationally depends mainly on institutional factors, 
trade barriers, etc., or transport costs, as well as on 
national consumer preferences and income levels. In the 
theory of the small economy the internationally traded 
goods are homogeneous and perfect substitutes.
Had the goods been imperfect substitutes a small 
economy would have some influence on the price in for­
eign currencies on world markets.
These familiar textbook conditions for economic 
life show that events in the small economy do not have 
repercussions on the rest of the world, as the rest of 
the world is so big and varied that any disturbance 
stemming from the domestic economy easily is absorbed.
The ways a small economy can adjust to the rest of 
the world are limited to quantitative adjustments as it 
cannot, as previously mentioned, influence world prices.
This theory about the small economy was for a long 
time limited to one-good models, but1 it also adapts to 
money and asset markets, as smallness will affect these 
markets in the same way as it affects the goods market.
There are essentially two ways of measuring small­
ness. One is to use the ratio of national GNP to
1) Cf. W. Fuhrmann, "Die Theorie der kleine offene
Volkswirtschaft und das Wirtschaftpolitische Dilem­
ma", in Aussenwirtschaft, Heft 3, 1981.
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"world" GNP, or, two, in a system with fixed exchange 
rates, to use the ratio of the national money stock to 
"world" money stocks.
However it is not the aim here to prove the obvious, 
that Denmark, our research object, is small, but later on 
in the analysis we should keep the definition of "small­
ness" in mind.
3.2. Openness.
"Keynesian macro theory focused on the national 
economy, and the national government was explicitly 
or implicitly asserted to be the national form of 
organisation for achieving macroeconomic stabili­
ty."1
The increasing openness of national economies and 
the effects of this were for a long period a somewhat ne­
glected subject in literature. Keynes made no references 
to the international economy or to foreign exchange mar­
kets in the General Theory, which, according to 
McKinnon, is a remarkable omission since Keynes gave the 
foreign exchange a pivotal role in his earlier "Tract on 
Monetary Reform". If the omission of exchange markets in 
the General Theory was deliberate action in order to sim­
plify things or just a sign of the relative unimportance 
of the external balances is an open question, but the 
consequences of this omission were felt for a long time.
1) A. Lindbeck (ed.), Inflation and Employment in Open 
Economies, New York 1979, p. 1.
2) R.I. McKinnon, "The Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic
Policy: Changing Postwar Perceptions", Journal of
Economic Literature, June 1981.
- 56 -
Today, however, nobody would disagree that internation­
al linkages have a vital impact on the conduct and effec­
tiveness of domestic macro economic policies, although, and 
this is the crucial point, a general consensus on the nature 
of these linkages admittedly still has to evolve.
There are many ways to measure openness. Interest rate
differentials have been used as an inverse measure of the
1 2 degree of openness, but as Whitman notes such a measure is
of necessity bilateral and cannot be used to achieve full
comparability.
This is why the foreign trade ratio, exports and/or im­
ports, as a proportion of gross national product more gener­
ally is used, as this measure is both simple and comparable.
3Using this measure McKinnon shows that the degree of 
openness for a selected group of countries accelerated rap­
idly during the last 15 years.
4Grassman on the other hand demonstrates that a group 
of European and North American countries have "roughly the 
same degree of openness today as a century ago”, and that 
the trend line for several countries is decreasing.
1) A good example is Betaenkning No. 769, a Danish white
book, where the covariance of the Eurodollar and nation­
al interest levels is computed.
2) "Economic Openness and International Financial Flows", 
Marina v. N. Whitman, in Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Nov. 1969.
3) R.I. McKinnon, 1981, op. cit.
4) Sven Grassman, "Long Term Openness of National Econo­
mies", Oxford Economic Papers, 1980, p. 123.
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This paradox between the findings of McKinnon and 
Grassman is easily explained if the share of GNP is ad­
justed for in the calculations.1
As governmental sectors have grown rapidly during 
the last decades a pure trade/GNP ratio will "underrepre­
sent" the trade component in the total, as the public 
sector often has had a faster growth rate than industrial 
and agricultural output, which by nature are tradeables. 
In table 1 on the next page ratios for export/GNP are 
calculated with and without public consumption.
Examining the figures in table 1, we see, not unex­
pectedly that the Scandinavian countries and Holland have 
an actual decline, or a very modest growth from 1951 to 
1979. This seems to support the view of Grassman. How­
ever looking at the second lines, where the figures are 
adjusted for the increase in government spending, a ris­
ing trend line can be seen also for the above-mentioned 
countries, although the 4% increase in the case of Den­
mark is the lowest measured.
The main point, however, is to demonstrate how much 
national markets have become dependent on markets abroad. 
All the European countries have an export/GNP ratio of 
+30%, using the second lines for comparison.
Only the USA is significantly different. With its
1) Which Grassman admittedly takes into account, ibid., 
p. 126, but it does not seem to affect his conclusion 
on p . 123.
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Table 1
Exports as proportion of GNP. Nine selected countries.
1951 1965 1979
Denmark
with public sector 0.33 0.30 0.29
public sector excl. 0.37 0.36 0.40
Italy
with public sector 0.12 0.15 0.25
public sector excl. 0.13 0.17 0.30
Germany
with public sector 0.16 0.20 0.27
public sector excl. 0.18 0.22 0.34
Switzerland
with public sector 0.27 0.30 0.34
public sector excl. 0.31 0.34 0.39
Sweden
with public sector 0.28 0.22 0.31
public sector excl. 0.32 0.26 0.44
Norway
with public sector 0.47 0.38 0.4 6
public sector excl. 0.53 0.4 3 0.58
Belgium
with public sector 0.28 0.36 0.55
public sector excl. 0.32 0.41 0.67
Holland
with public sector 0.48 0.4 5 0.52
public sector excl. 0.55 0.53 0.64
USA
with public sector 0.05 0.05 0.09
public sector excl. 0.06 0.06 0.11
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, March
1981, Country tables, line 90c-99a and 90c- 
(99a-91 f ) .
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big internal markets one might still consider the American 
economy a closed one, which also can be seen from the way 
US economic policy traditionally has been conducted.
Back to the Grassman-McKinnon controversy, if there 
ever was one. The IFS figures used for the calculations 
date only back to 1951, but from that year until 1979, us­
ing the second lines, the trend is clearly rising. The 
central matter then is whether one wants to include gov­
ernment spending or not, when measuring openness.
2.3. Market linkages in open economies.
The following section focuses on the key linkages be­
tween national economies:
a) Capital market linkages
b) Commodity trade
c) The exchange of national monies.
The idea is to analyze how domestic macroeconomic policies 
are affected by these links. The recent theories of ra­
tional expectations and the concepts of neutrality and su-
2perneutrality of policies are acknowledged, but we shall 
assume below that policies do affect output and employ-
1) Cf. the consistency from quote from Georg Schultz,
1973: "American policy as far as liquidity and domes­
tic interest rates are concerned will only be deter­
mined in accordance with the needs of the US economy, 
excluding any other international concerns", from E.L. 
Morse, "La politique américaine de manipulation de la 
crise", Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. 
xii, no. 2.
2) An analysis of the impact of the new macroeconomics on 
stabilization policies in the context of coordination 
of economic policies is found in chapter 5.
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ment, along the lines originally intended for these poli­
cies. We shall also assume that our small open economy is 
linked to the outside world by fixed exchange rates.
3.3.1. Capital market linkages.
The integration of international capital markets and 
the resulting higher degree of international capital mo­
bility have ensured that the "real" cost of capital is the 
same domestically and internationally, save some ineffi­
ciencies pointed out by McKinnon.1 In order to substanti­
ate this proposition, and to discuss the policy implica­
tions of this, we shall start the discussion from the 
point of the interest-rate parity theorem (IRPT).
Briefly stated, IRPT tells us that interest rate dif­
ferentials between securities which are denominated in 
different currencies are explained by the forward premium 
or discount on foreign exchange.
2And as pointed out by, amongst others, Aliber, the 
IRPT holds over the longer run for traded and close sub­
stitute securities denominated in different currencies, 
and to a lesser degree for more nationally oriented secu­
rities .
1) For a discussion see R.I. McKinnon, Money in Interna­
tional Exchange, The Convertible Currency System, OUP,
1979, chapters 4 and 5.
2) See R.Z. Aliber, "The Interest Parity Theorem: A Re­
interpretation", Journal of Political Economy, vol.
81, 1973, pp. 1451-59.
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a) Capital mobility and monetary policy.
Let us start by examining the effects of capital mo­
bility. An expansive monetary policy, i.e. expanding the 
money supply and easing quantitative credit controls, cf. 
item i, section 1.1.4, in an open economy under fixed ex­
change rates will initially reduce nominal interest rates 
on domestic securities, which will lead to capital out­
flows because of portfolio readjustments, induced by the 
opening interest rate differential, and furthermore, such 
an outflow will deplenish foreign reserves, which would 
signal a possible exchange rate realignment. If such a 
realignment did not take place it would certainly reduce 
the money supply, via the reduced level of reserves. In 
theory this would reestablish the initial level of money 
demand, making the expansion irrelevant. Another effect 
is the more directly that increases in aggregate demand 
coming from improved credit conditions would spill over 
into the markets for imported goods, which again would 
have negative effects for the foreign reserves. With a 
high degree of capital mobility an expansive monetary 
policy is constrained by the level of international re­
serves, making this option vulnerable.
b) Capital mobility and fiscal policy.
An expansive fiscal policy, i.e. widening the public 
sector financial deficit, cf. item ii, section 1.1.4, is 
not very effective for stabilization purposes because of
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the diminished multiplier effect, cf. chapter 2, as foreign 
leaks proportionate to the marginal import propensity di­
lute the effects of the initial expansion.
An accommodating effect is that fiscal expansion will 
induce a capital inflow as a response to the current ac­
counts deficit, which will strengthen the foreign exchange 
reserves.
However as the spill-over effect of the expansion is 
large because of openness, this may tempt foreign govern­
ments, i.e. the country's trade partners, to free-ride on 
the expansion. The export-led growth which trade-partners 
of an expanding economy will experience is easily seen as a 
better alternative than issuing their own debt in order to 
promote domestic economic growth.
The logical consequence of this dilemma is that a fis­
cal expansion should be directed towards the nontradeables
sector in order to have stabilizing effects. However such
1a redirection of demand towards the nontradeables sector, 
which mainly consists of the public and private services, 
could have severe structural repercussions, because the ex­
pansion eventually will work through to the external sector 
and create a current accounts deficit, and at the same time
will affect the relative sizes of the tradeables and non-
2tradeables sectors. Similarly, as Branson, amongst others
1) For an explanation of the importance of the two sectors 
see section 3.3.3.
2) W.H. Branson, "Portfolio Equilibrium and Monetary Poli­
cy with Foreign and Non-Traded Assets", in E. Classen & 
P. Salin (eds.), Recent Issues in International Mone­
tary Economics, Amsterdam 1976.
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has pointed out, open market operations by the central bank 
in order to influence the domestic interest rates are more 
likely to succeed if they are directed towards financial as­
sets which are not close substitutes for internationally 
traded assets.
With highly integrated capital markets such financial 
assets are probably hard to find.
2.3.2. Commodity trade linkages.
The integration of markets, as discussed in chapter 2, 
has two main implications for macroeconomic policy in a 
small open economy. The first one has a bearing on purchas­
ing power parity theory, while the second establishes the 
limits of domestic stabilization policy when the original 
disturbance comes from a change in relative prices of inter­
nationally traded goods.
a) Purchasing power parity and its implications for domes­
tic macroeconomic policy.
Stated briefly the theory of purchasing power parity 
(PPP) ventures that the domestic price level measured in do­
mestic currency equals the foreign price level measured in
foreign currency, multiplied by the exchange rate of the do-
2mestic currency and the foreign currency.
1) As suggested by J.A. Frenkel & M.L. Mussa, "Monetary and 
Fiscal Policies in an Open Economy", in American Econo­
mists Association, Papers and Proceedings, May 1981, pp. 
253-258. This source together with Corden (1977), op. 
cit., and McKinnon (1979 & 1981), op. cit., have been 
valuable sources of inspiration for the present section.
2) For a further elaboration of the PPP, both in its rela­
tive as well as in its absolute version, see L.T. 
Katseli-Papaefstratiou, The Reemergence of the PPP Doc­
trine in the 1970's, Princeton 1979.
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jIn 1923 Keynes argued that if disturbances are of a
monetary nature, "then we may expect that PPP and exchange
rate value will come together again before long".
So far so good. The catch is now how to measure the
price-level in order to evaluate an abstract for PPP.
2Balassa, in an early article, asserted that "only by 
incorporating nontraded goods in the model the existence 
of a systematic relationship between PPP and exchange 
rates is indicated".
3Officer points out that productivity differences in 
domestic sectors alter domestic relative prices, which 
makes domestic price levels difficult to compare.
However taking these reservations about PPP into ac­
count together with factors like transport costs, trade 
barriers, etc., the PPP approach seems to be widely ac­
cepted, at least for medium to long term projections. A
4sort of consensus on the subject is expressed by Genberg:
"Discussions of the transmission of inflation natu­
rally start with a price increase abroad and then try
1) J.M. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, vol. iv, Col­
lected Writings of J.M. Keynes, 1923, reprint, London
1 971 .
2) B. Balassa, "The PPP Doctrine, A Reappraisal", Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 72, December 1964, pp. 584- 
596.
3) L.H. Officer, "The PPP Theory of Exchange Rates: A
Review Article", IMF, Staff Papers 23, March 1976, pp. 
1-61 .
4) H. Genberg, "PPP Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange 
Rates", Journal of International Economics, 8, May 
1978, pp. 247-276.
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to identify the channel by which domestic prices are 
affected. The most common such channel is probably 
that suggested by the arbitrage hypothesis. This hy­
pothesis, which is also referred to as the traded 
goods model of the ’law of one price1, simply states 
that the price of a homogeneous commodity must be the 
same in all countries provided the market for this 
commodity is internationally integrated.1
And he concludes: "PPP under fixed exchange rates implies
that inflation rates must, subject to certain reservations 
be equal in all countries of an integrated world economy." 
The policy implication of PPP for a small open economy is 
then that such a country cannot choose its own inflation 
rate, or Phillips curve trade-off, independently of its 
long-run monetary policy and the long-run behaviour of its 
exchange rate. So in the case of a small country which 
fixes its exchange rate to that of a major trading part­
ner, the inflation rate of that country will strongly in­
fluence the domestic monetary expansion rate and the do­
mestic inflation rate, provided this influence is not 
countered by expansive fiscal measures.
b) Changes in the price of internationally traded goods.
As many countries experienced after the first "oil- 
price shock" of 1973-74 stabilization policies in order to 
influence the level of real income after a change in the 
relative prices of internationally traded goods had taken 
place are deemed to fail.
1) See Frenkel & Mussa (1981), op. cit., p. 253.
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Countries which did not pass the whole price increase 
through to the consumer price faced a severe bout of infla­
tion, while countries, and this was manifest after the sec­
ond shock of *78, which followed a strategy of accepting 
the price rise by allowing a decrease in the real wage 
rate, fared better in terms of avoiding later sudden in­
creases in the inflation rate and lost output.
Fiscal policy can in the short run influence the ex­
tent and distribution of losses in the real income level 
stemming from a change in the relative prices of interna­
tionally traded goods, and it can prolong impact periods, 
in which changes in income are translated into changes in 
real expenditure.
In the long run however, it is difficult to see how,
and why, governments should try to control variables total­
ly outside their control. Monetary policy does not per 
definition, see next section, have any impact on the income 
level of a small open economy under fixed exchange rates.1 
As a subset of this discussion the so-called Mundell-Laffer 
ratchet hypothesis should be mentioned as it presents a
2slightly different interpretation of the law of one price. 
This hypothesis claims that as exchange rate realign-
1) For a formal analysis of this proposition see i.e. A.K. 
Swoboda, "Monetary Policy Under Fixed Exchange Rates, 
Effectiveness, the Speed of Adjustment and Proper Use", 
Economica, May 1973, pp. 136-54.
2) A.E. Laffer, "Do Devaluations Really Help Trade?", Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 5, 1973.
- 67 -
ments fail to restore external equilibrium, the only effect 
of realignments is an increase in worldwide inflation, and 
the main culprits seem to be the goods markets.
The chain of argument is the following:
As the law of one price implies that there is a world 
price for, admittedly, homogeneous goods, then exchange 
rate realignments will not change the devaluing country's 
prices vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
The ratchet effect postulates that the export prices 
in domestic currency fail to decline in the devaluing coun­
try and import prices fail to decline in the revaluing 
country. The overall effect is price increases in coun­
tries with a depreciating currency, which in turn add to 
"world" inflation.
The Mundell-Laffer ratchet hypothesis has been strong­
ly criticized, and empirical evidence points against the
2hypothesis.
3.3.3. The implications for macroeconomic policy of mone­
tary linkages.
Central to the evolving theory of the small open econ­
omy is the concept of monetary equilibrium. According to
1) For an overview see J. Wanniski, "The Mundell-Laffer 
Hypothesis, A New View of the World Economy", Public 
Interest, 39, Spring 1975.
2) For empirical refutal, see M.E. Kreinin, "The Effects 
of Exchange-Rate Changes on Prices and Volume of For­
eign Trade", IMF, Staff Papers, 24, July 1977, p. 297, 
and M. Goldstein, "Downward Price Inflexibility, Ratch­
et Effects, and the International Impact of Import 
Price Changes, Some Empirical Evidence", IMF, Staff Pa­
pers , 24, November 1977, pp. 569-612.
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the mainstream of the monetary approach the use of monetary
policy for domestic stabilization purposes is constrained
by the fact that the equilibrium level of the demand for
money is outside the control of the authorities, due to the
openness and smallness of the economy. As propositioned by 
2Swoboda: "The full equilibrium effect on incomes, prices
and interest rates of a once and for all change in the do­
mestic assets of the banking system of an open economy is 
directly proportional to the economic size of the country 
relative to the rest of the world. A corollary of this 
proposition is that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
thus defined tends to zero as the country becomes smaller 
and smaller."
This proposition is easily proved, still following
3Swoboda1s line of argument.
We assume:
i) a stable economic system.
ii) being in an equilibrium position, any increase in the 
money stock will lead to a balance of payments deficit.
iii) that reduced international reserves implies a reduced 
money supply.
Say that the central bank starts selling securities, as de­
fined in item iv, section 1.1, to the private banking sys­
tem, or it issues more money, item i in section 1,1.
1) See Frenkel & Mussa (1981), op. cit., p. 256.
2) Swoboda (1973), op. cit,, p. 154.
3) Ibid.
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Relative to the level of foreign reserves the money 
supply expands, which leads to a balance of payments defi­
cit. A prolonged balance of payments deficit diminishes 
the international reserves, which tends to decrease the 
money supply. A reduction of the money stock is needed in 
order to restore monetary equilibrium. Assuming that the 
system in stable equilibrium is restored when the system 
has returned to its original position, which means that 
all real variables and prices have returned to their orig­
inal levels.
So what has changed? The assets of the central bank 
and the private banking system have changed so that the 
initial increase in domestic assets now is matched by a 
decrease in foreign assets.
If this conclusion is accepted, that real economic 
variables are affected only in the very short run by mone­
tary policy, then the costs of giving up monetary inde­
pendence as part of becoming a member of a monetary union 
are small indeed. On the other hand, as previously ar­
gued, it puts the burden of adjustment on fiscal policy.
Another implication for monetary policy is the expec­
tations aspect. As government policies surely will influ- 
ence the exchange rate in some way, it follows that the 
expectations of future policy initiatives must influence 
future exchange rates, cf. the quote of Mussa in chapter
1) Included are ways not initially intended by policy­
makers .
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2. New information about a f say, higher inflation rate 
will signal a possible realignment of the exchange rate, 
which in turn will trigger off capital outflows, and in 
this way such a signal is often the start of a self-ful- 
filling prophecy.
3.3.4. A model of balance of payments policy.
To see how the above discussed economic linkages be­
tween national states constrain economic policy, a two 
targets - two instruments model of balance of payments
policy is introduced.1 This model includes a non-traded
2goods and a traded goods sector.
In most monetary models money wages are assumed to 
be flexible. The main implication of this assumption is 
that devaluations do not have any real long-time effects, 
besides building up foreign reserves. A revaluation on 
the other hand reduced foreign reserves.^
1) This model has its intellectual heritage in J.E. 
Meade, The Balance of Payments, Oxford 1951. Same 
author, Targets and Weapons for Domestic Stabilisa­
tion and the Balance of Payments, HWWA - Hamburg 
1981. H.G. Johnson introduced switching in "Towards 
a General Theory of the Balance of Payments", in In­
ternational Trade and Economic Growth, London 195^.
A main source is Corden (1977), op. cit.
2) For a geometric interpretation see W.E.G. Salter, 
"Internal and External Balance", Economic Record, 
1959, vol. 35, p. 226.
3) A devaluation raises the domestic price level, which 
reduces the real money supply and hereby creates tem­
porary surplus until a new monetary equilibrium is 
found.
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The model presented below concentrates on the effects 
for internal and external equilibrium of disabsorption and 
switching instead of relying solely on disabsorption as the 
monetarist model1 is suggesting.
We have a two country world where each country produc­
es non-traded goods, and two traded goods are exchanged be­
tween the two countries. The implication of this is that 
one country's deficit is the other country's surplus.
Having already shown the implications of monetary and 
fiscal policy for an open economy in the previous section, 
we shall initially treat these two instruments as one in­
strument, and call this instrument disabsorption.
The terms of trade are ignored in this model, cf. the 
previous section about commodity market linkages, as we use 
the small country assumption, which says that the country 
in question cannot influence its ToT, because export demand 
and import supply prices are exogenously given.
The distinction between the traded goods sector and
2the non-traded goods is by necessity arbitrary. However 
the operational use of this distinction is seen when it is 
emphasized that the aim of the model is to distinguish be­
1) Cf. the discussion in chapter 2, where tight credits 
were seen to be the answer for the new monetarists.
2) This distinction is only used as an analytic device be­
cause it probably is impossible to make this distinc­
tion in the real world, where many producers will sup­
ply tradeables as well as non-tradeables.
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tween the sectors of the economy where prices and productiv­
ity are directly influenced by the exchange rate, and the
1sectors where this connection is more indirect.
Another often used assumption is to let money wages be 
rigid downwards. In order to simplify matters we shall lim­
it ourselves to assuming that the prices of nontradeables 
are rigid downwards. This is very much in line with the ar­
guments of the Scandinavian inflation model, cf. chapter 1, 
where it was surplus profits in the tradeables sector which 
were the main source of inflation. Additionally public 
services are supposed to be included in the nontradeables 
sector.
We start our analysis from the situation of internal 
and external disequilibria. In order to remedy this situa­
tion it is necessary to have two instruments available. If 
disabsorption is the only instrument used, the existing in­
ternal disequilibrium could easily be aggravated in the fol­
lowing way:
Say that income is a function of domestic output. If 
the rate of absorption is higher than the rate of domestic 
supply a balance of payments deficit is the likely result.
The monetary implications of such a deficit have been 
discussed above. The main point of this discussion was that 
whether cash balances are run down or new credit is being 
created, such policies can only be sustained as long as
1) See W.M. Corden (1981), in Eltis & Sinclair, op. cit., 
p. 31 .
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there are adequate foreign reserves.
So relying solely on disabsorption to reestablish ex­
ternal and internal balance, a tightening of monetary and 
fiscal policies are bound to reduce excess overall absorp­
tion. Taking into account our assumption about downward 
wage rigidity in the non-tradeables sector, the initial de­
crease in absorption will lead to excess supply of non- 
tradeables and thus aggravate the existing internal dise- 
equilibrium.
Consider now a policy which raises the prices of 
tradeables relative to those of non-tradeables.
Assuming that factors of production are mobile, at 
least in the medium run, a change in relative prices as 
outlined above will provide an initiative for resources to 
switch from production of non-traded goods into the produc­
tion of traded goods.
The effects of such a switch for the non-traded sector 
are that the initial excess supply of nontradeables is di­
minished which, ceteris paribus, will help restore internal 
equilibrium, as it was the initial excess supply of non- 
tradeables which caused instability in output.
For the tradeables sector such a switch of productive 
resources will tend to reduce the initial excess demand for 
tradeables which in turn will improve the external balances.
Looking at the demand side of the economy, the change 
in relative prices between tradeables and nontradeables
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will increase demand for nontradeables.
This will further reduce initial excess supply, and 
will also reduce the initial excess demand for tradeables.
If the switch has been brought about by an exchange 
rate realignment, which is the most likely instrument, the 
success of the switch hinges on domestic balance policy 
after the devaluation has taken place.
In the market for nontradeables the switch eliminates 
the initial effects of the disabsorption policies, which 
reduced total absorption, but induced a surplus of non­
tradeables, which caused unemployment.
On the other hand, a switch without disabsorption 
would not necessarily improve the initial external dise- 
equilibrium. In order to demonstrate that, let us suppose 
that the domestic relative price of tradeables rises as a 
result of the switching policy.
Domestic demand for tradeables will, ceteris paribus, 
decrease. This will influence the balance of payments in 
a positive way. Assuming that the price of tradeables af­
ter the switch is constant, demand for nontradeables will 
increase.
If we further assume that the prices of nontradeables 
are flexible upwards, which seems to be quite a realistic 
assumption, these prices will rise until a new equilibrium 
price has been reached.
The resulting effect for the relative prices of such
1) See chapters 6 and 7 where this point is further elu­
cidated .
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a movement in the price of the non—tradeable will turn out 
to be zero, thus eliminating the benefits of the initial 
switch.
Combining the disabsorption policies with the switch­
ing policies we get a better result, because the switching 
policies eliminate the excess supply of nontradeables which 
was created by the disabsorption. So the disabsorption 
policies improve the balance of payments, while the switch­
ing softens the blow.
The usefulness of this basic policy model in the pres­
ent context is that it shows how a cut in absorption in or­
der to improve the balance of payments need not have dras­
tic repercussions in terms of unemployment effects, when it 
is followed by the right switching policy.
And turning this argument, if the remedies for a 
switch are unavailable, the adjustment in absorption levels 
should originate in the non-tradeables sector, which is a 
further argument for primary reliance on fiscal and budget­
ary policies in the adjustment period, as monetary policies 
are shown to be biased against the tradeables sector, cf. 
the discussion in chapter 2.
The basic policy model with factor mobility.
Let us now introduce factor mobility in our model:
Two production factors, labour and capital are mobile 
between the tradeable sector and the nontradeable sector.
In the foregoing section the crucial point was the be­
haviour of the domestic price-level of non—tradeables. If
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the price was kept constant, the domestic price of tradea- 
bles could, in theory, be raised by the full amount of the 
devaluation. With factor mobility this result is altered 
slightly.
We assume that the nontradeable sector, which is com­
posed mainly of services, private and public, is labour in­
tensive relative to the tradeables sector, and that money 
wages, at least, in the short term are held constant.
A switch increases the domestic price of tradeables,
2which in turn raises profits in that sector.
Having factor mobility the rise in the returns in the 
tradeables sector will attract capital, and to a lesser de­
gree labour as we assumed that the sector was capital in­
tensive. This inflow of capital must per definition come 
from the non-tradeables sector and will continue until 
equilibrium is reached, i.e. when the marginal utility of 
additional capital in each sector equals each other.
Keeping the assumption of capital intensity in the 
tradeables sector in mind, the prices of non-tradeables
1) Cf. the results of R.W. Jones & W.M. Corden, "Devalua­
tion, Non-Flexible Prices, and the Trade Balance for a 
Small Country", Canadian Journal of Economics, IX, no.
1, Feb. 1976, pp. 150-161, and B. Hindley, "The Ex­
change Rate and Protection", Journal of International
Economics, vol. 4, 1974, pp. 156-61.
2) We neglect possible J-curve effects, which anyhow are
only of a transitory nature.
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must rise less than the prices of tradeables. This because 
profits are a smaller part of total costs in the non—trade­
ables sector than in the tradeable sector.
By adding factor mobility to the model, only slight 
changes are found in the final outcome of a disabsorption 
policy combined with a switch.
A switch affects prices of both sectors positively, at 
least in the short to medium term, but as factor intensi­
ties are different in the two sectors, the price rise will
be higher in the more capital intensive sector, because of 
our initial assumption that the tradeables sector was the 
more capital intensive.
Two main findings emerge from this basic policy model 
based on the absorption approach.
One is that a balance of payments cannot be solved by
a switch (devaluation) alone, but must be accompanied by an
increase in absorption, which is seen as the main tool for 
adj ustment.
-]However as already Meade pointed out, the necessary
absorption implies either a reduction in government spend-
2ing, a reduction in labour's real wages, or a combination 
of both.
The other finding which seems important, and hence de­
serves to be discussed in more detail, is the apparent link
1) J. Meade, op. cit.
2) The question of money illusion and exchange rate rea­
lignments is further elaborated upon in chapter 5.
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between current deficits and budget deficits. As is shown 
below, it is not solely the absorption approach which fo­
cuses on the link between the current account deficit and 
the budget deficit. Also the monetary approach to the ex­
change rate has a clear mention of this link. Let us 
start by defining the current account deficit.
3.3.5. Current account deficits and budget deficits.
In the context of the absorption approach a current 
account deficit in an open economy is defined as the dif­
ference between total national income and the value of
consumption and investment by domestic households, firms
1and the government sector.
The implications of this are that in an open economy 
aggregate domestic spending can exceed national income, 
the difference being the current account deficit.
The gap is covered by foreign saving, which in turn 
is made available for domestic uses by the issue of for-
1) This is merely a restatement of the familiar national 
account identity, where the national income, or aggre­
gate supply (Y) is equated by the value of aggregate 
demand, which in turn is composed of private domestic 
consumption (C), private and public investment (I), 
and government spending (G) plus exports minus im­
ports (X - M). So we get the identity: Y = C + I +
G + (X - M). C + I + G is what Alexander (1952, op. 
cit.) calls absorption, and (X - M) is the balance on 
the current account.
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eign claims on future income.
Consequently, a current account deficit can be explained 
by the factors which:
a) induce an excess domestic spending over current national 
income, and symmetrically
b) the factors which induce a reduction in aggregate demand 
relative to GNP in foreign countries. We shall concen­
trate on the first item.
In order to demonstrate this potential link between
budget deficits and deficits on the current account we choose
to use ordinary accounting identities.
In an open economy domestic investment can differ from
2the rate of domestic savings because capital is imported. 
Schematically savings and investment in an open economy can 
be equated in the following way:
1
Savings_________________________ Investment
Private savings Private investment
Government savings Public investment
(i.e. budget surplus)
Foreign savings (Foreign domestic
investments)
Total savings Total investments
1) National income is used here as a generic term, i.e. we 
do not make a distinction between the various national 
income aggregates.
2) The impact of capital imports on the tradeable and the 
non-tradeable sector is geometrically present in
3) Following Jai Hoon Yang, "Budget Deficits and Trade Defi­
cits" , The Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, October 19 78, p. 10.
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By rearranging these accounting items we get the following 
identity:
Government budget deficit = Private savings + Public sav­
ings + Foreign savings (for domestic use). (A)
If private savings are defined as the excess of private 
savings over private investment, and public savings are 
defined accordingly, the size of the government budget 
deficit must equal the aggregate of private, governmental 
and foreign savings.
Foreign savings, however, which are made available 
for domestic use, must equal the deficit on the current 
account, as we assume symmetry between the capital ac­
counts and the balance of trade.
So we can rewrite expression (A) into the expression
below:
Government budget deficit = Private savings + Public sav­
ings + Balance of trade deficit. (B)
If private savings decrease, or remain unchanged, a 
government deficit must be offset by a corresponding bal­
ance of trade deficit. Public saving is supposed to be 
negative as the initial condition was one of a government 
budget deficit. The assumption that private savings are 
decreasing or remain unchanged seems to be valid, as pri­
vate households in times when real income is constant or 
falling tend to adjust their savings ratio instead of ac­
cepting a fall in private consumption. Although statis­
tics are poor in the area of private propensities, it has 
been reported by the OECD,1 that in the case of Denmark
1) OECD, Economic Survey, 1982, op. cit.
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the households' savings ratio fell by 1.5 to 2 percentage 
points in 1980.
Expression (B) shows that with this assumption about 
private savings behaviour, a link between government budg­
et deficits and current account deficits has been estab- 
lished, based on the absorption approach.
3.3.6. Current account deficits and budget deficits, a 
monetary approach explanation.
2Using the monetary approach to balance of payments,
and keeping the implications of economic linkages in an
3 4open economy m  mind, it is possible to show the link
1) This link could also have been established using the 
Keynesian equilibrium condition. We assume that do­
mestic and foreign price levels are set at unity.
Then: Y = C + I + G + X -  M (C)
Public and private investment are both contained in
I ,. Total domestic savings are then:
S = Y - C - G (D)
Let If be foreign investment, and split S up into Sg 
and Sp, which respectively stand for government sav­
ings and private savings. T is net tax revenues. 
Government sector savings can then be expressed as:
Sg = T - G (E)
We then arrive at
Sp + (T - G) - Id = X - M (F)
Looking at the left-hand side of equation (F) it is
seen that any improvement in the trade balance X - M
must be accompanied by a rise in private savings, a
rise in governmental savings, or a decrease in domes­
tic investments.
2) See i.e. Frenkel & Johnson, 1976, op. cit.
3) See section 3.3.
4) Not surprisingly, as the monetary approach can be per­
ceived as being a monetary "mirror image" of the real 
economy, which the absorption approach mainly is aimed 
at.
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between current account deficits as a pure monetary phenome­
non. One assumption is crucial for the argument: We must
assume that persistent governmental budget deficits have pos­
itive repercussions on the money supply.
Using the familiar two country model, the chain of cau­
sality is straightforward.
In the open economy an initial excess supply of money 
will induce firms and households to start to dishoard their 
perceived surplus money stock, by spending it on goods, as­
sets and/or services. This will have a spill-over effect on 
the foreign sector proportionate to the degree of openness in 
the economy. Such an excess supply of money would in a flex­
ible exchange rate system lead to a realignment of the ex­
change rate, eventually.
In our fixed-exchange rate system the aggregate domestic 
excess spending over current real income, or actual output, 
will result in a temporary deficit on the current account.
In the deficit country the international reserves are eroded, 
which will reduce the money base, thus having a self-equili­
brating function, by reducing the excess demand.
Enter capital imports. Since all items on the balance 
of payments must in the end equate each other, the deficit on 
the current account is balanced by a surplus on the capital 
account. If the demand for foreign currencies is perfectly 
matched by the supply of foreign currencies at the going ex­
change rate and the going domestic interest rate level, there
1) As a result of double entry bookkeeping. See i.e. B.J. 
Cohen, Balance of Payments Policy, New York 1974, or the 
interesting "Balance of Payments Concepts, What Do They 
Really Mean", by D.S. Kemp in Review of the Federal Re­
serve Bank of St. Louis, July 1975, p. 14.
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1is no immediate concern.
However the origins of the capital inflows are of in­
terest. By examining the sources of the capital imports, 
it is possible to make an educated guess whether these in­
flows actually stem from the deliberate investment action 
of foreign private or public investors, i.e. autonomous in­
vestments, or they are induced by the financing needs of
the governmental sector, i.e. net accommodating inflows.
2We shall argue, that if the capital inflows are the 
results of net purchases of domestic official assets by 
foreign institutions, then the inflows serve to support the 
exchange rate by strengthening the official foreign re­
serves . If this argument is accepted the initial trade 
deficit can be interpreted as being the effect of an excess 
supply of money.
The chain of causation would then look like this:
Governmental budget deficit - monetary accommodation of the
3budget deficit - current account deficit.
If the government budget deficit was a result of a de­
liberate policy by the government in order to counteract 
shortfalls in demand, the rationality of such an action 
cannot be questioned, although the expansionary effects of
1) The analysis of extended use of external debt finance 
is found in chapter 7.
2) As does J.H. Yang, op. cit., amongst others.
3) Empirical support for this hypothesis is presented in 
chapter 9 where Danish and German savings and invest­
ment data through the last decade are analyzed.
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the deficit1 probably will turn out to be smaller than ex­
pected.
However if the deficit is unplanned, and the debt is­
sue not used for public capital formation, however defined,
2then such a current deficit must represent an unwarranted 
disequilibrium. In order to correct such an unwarranted 
current account deficit, the old elasticities approach 
would have called for an exchange rate realignment. As is 
demonstrated above, such a realignment would probably only 
have a limited scope of success. Instead an increase in 
public, or private, savings would seem to be the appropri­
ate instrument.
3.3.7. The central question of monetary integration: Ex­
ternal and internal equilibrium
In the policy model it was demonstrated, that in the
3absence of some kind of switching instrument, external and 
internal balance would best be achieved by a higher degree 
of public saving.
In the next chapter the criteria for the optimal and/ 
or functional currency area are discussed.
A high degree of factor mobility between the regions 
of the currency area is supposed to solve the problem of a 
fixed-exchange rate.
1) Empirical data, chapter 8, where main parameters for 
the EMS countries are compared, show that Denmark, 
which had the highest growth rate for public debt, only 
scored modestly in terms of employment and real econom­
ic growth.
2) Cf. R.I. McKinnon (1981), op. cit.
3) We s till assume fixed eitchange rate*».
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The question is now whether a small open economy can 
externally finance its balance of payments in the adjust­
ment period, or whether policies for structural change 
should be implemented as soon as possible. And a related 
question which should be asked is whether a reliance on 
the first option will make the final adjustment more dif­
ficult.
2 .Ingram, m  a study of economic integration between 
Puerto Rico and USA, argues that financial integration 
will provide a vast amount of equilibrating capital move­
ments which can be used to finance deficit countries' bal-
3ance of payments problems. With the point made by
4Corden in mind, that a current accounts deficit is the 
sum of excess investment over savings in the private and 
the public sector, and hence, that the financial position 
of the private sector is a problem for the private sector, 
while the public financial position is a matter of public 
concern, then Ingram's point seems only to be valid for 
the private sector financial position. A relevant ques­
tion is then how long-time capital movements can sustain a 
level of real absorption, which is too high for external 
balance. At some point in time the region must experience 
a fall in real income in order to restore equilibrium. It 
is very useful here to make a distinction between financ­
ing and adjustment. Financing means that the adjustment
1) In order to spread the adjustment costs over a long 
period.
2) J.C. Ingram, Regional Payments Mechanisms: The Case
of Puerto Rico, N.C. 1962a.
3) Ingram, op. cit., explicitly states that the essential 
financial integration should be for long term securi­
ties, which in itself would have an equilibrating ef­
fect.
4) see page
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process is spread over a longer period, and a valid point
1is made by Ishiyama: "It is not clear however whether
the ease of financing always implies a smaller total ad­
justment cost for an area, in which a payments deficit 
has occurred."
The traditional argument that financial integration 
can eliminate the costs of a fixed exchange rate is based 
on the "monetary-fiscal policy mix approach", which 
briefly states that a country with full employment, and a 
current account deficit, can cover this deficit by a suf­
ficiently high domestic interest rate.
A high interest rate will in turn lower private in­
vestment, which means a raise in the unemployment rate. 
Enter an expansive fiscal policy in order to maintain a 
desired level of aggregate demand. Potential crowding 
out of private investment is then countered by special 
allowances in order to boost private investments.
In theory it should then be possible to maintain a 
desired consumption-investment mix in spite of the cur­
rent deficit.
The implications of this policy mix approach are
2that a country should be able to maintain any level of 
real wages and factor incomes it likes, and to sustain 
this indefinitely by borrowing from abroad.
1) Y. Ishiyama, "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, A 
Survey", IMF, Staff Papers, vol. 22, 1975, p. 356.
2) Cf. the critique of Corden (1972), op. cit., of the 
policy mix approach.
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Such an interpretation is obviously wrong. Indeed it 
is questionable if the policy mix approach can be applied 
to the small open economy with satisfying results. Econom­
ic linkages in the money, goods and capital markets, as 
demonstrated in the foregoing section, are evident con­
straints .
1Corden sees further three weaknesses by following a 
strategy of using external finance, and we can add a 
fourth. If the amount the country needs to borrow grows at 
a higher rate than the availability of financial resources, 
the country may end up bidding up its own interest rate. 
This argument is valid for a large economy, but hardly for 
a small one, as it is real amounts that count.
Secondly, the more a country borrows, the less credit­
worthy the country becomes, which means loans with higher 
fixed and variable costs. If the country in question has a 
low growth rate, despite the capital inflows, it will end 
up with having a higher growth rate of the debt burden, 
which will imply that more and more is going to be borrowed 
in the future, in order to sustain the preferred level of 
real income, and in order to service the debt.
Thirdly, one may ask whether the existing exchange 
rate is so important, that consumption should be sustained 
now at the cost of a potential higher cut in future con­
sumption. And fourthly, a persistent policy which tends to 
squeeze the tradeables sector and expand the non-tradeables
1) Cf. W.M. Corden (1972), op. cit., p. 30-31.
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sector, will seriously impede future growth and thus make 
the period of adjustment more costly.
So in the medium to long run a continuous financing
strategy does not seem to give the answer to the central 
problem of internal and external balance, which is the re­
sult of the strong currency option of having a fixed ex­
change rate.
On the other hand, it accentuates the need for new 
strategies of deflation, which are not biased against one 
particular sector, and which have just as big an effect on
prices and earnings as the present biased ones.
The bias of the present adjustment policies are for­
mally evaluated in chapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Micro- and macroeconomic conditions for monetary integra­
tion.
This chapter presents a, somewhat critical, analysis 
of the necessary micro- and macroeconomic preconditions 
for monetary integration, which have been put forward in 
theory during the last two decades.
We conclude that none of these theories seem to offer 
a realistic solution to the central problem of internal 
and external equilibrium for a country with a fixed ex­
change rate target.
The only realistic tool is the burdensome process of 
coordination of national economic policies. An analysis 
of this issue is hence the subject for chapter 6.
Recent experience in the EMS stresses the need for 
policy coordination.
The French experiment of relatively expansionary fis­
cal policies and the resulting trade deficit vis-à-vis, 
especially, Germany, shows the limits for domestic policy 
autonomy.
In the foregoing chapter we discussed the implica­
tions of the rather basic point that the openness of an 
economy sharply reduces the probability of achieving real, 
and lasting, economic gains by manipulating the inflation 
rate.
1) We concentrate on the theoretical discussion of the 
60's and the 70's about international adjustment and 
monetary reform. It is in this framework the theories 
on optimal currency areas should be seen.
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1Indeed, Tower & Willet suggest that as exchange rate
2illusion and openness must be inversely correlated, a very 
high degree of openness will make adjustment under flexible 
exchange rates and fixed exchange rates very similar.^
And, as mentioned earlier, the central problem of mon­
etary integration is the achievement of internal and exter­
nal balance when the use of the exchange rate realignment 
tool is restricted. A high degree of financial capital mo­
bility will ease the adjustment problem, as especially
4Ingram and Scitovsky have pointed out, but not solve the 
problem, because internal imbalance caused by underutiliza­
tion of domestic production factors, eventually will spill 
over to the external balance via a government budget defi­
cit, thus prolonging the adjustment process and aggravating
1) E. Tower & T.D. Willet, The Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas and Exchange Rate Flexibility, Princeton 1976, p. 
72.
2) We define exchange rate illusion as the inability of 
domestic economic agents to feel the effects of an ex­
change rate realignment on the purchasing power of do­
mestic money. For a further discussion see chapter 5.
3) This point is elaborated upon in chapter 5.
4) J.C. Ingram, 1962a, 1962b, op. cit., and T. Scitovsky, 
"The Theory of Balance of Payments Adjustment", Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 75, 1967, pp. 523-531, and 
same author, Money and the Balance of Payments, Chicago 
1969.
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the level of adjustment.
As we argued in the previous chapter, and as Corden,
2and Tower and Willet also have stressed, in the long run, 
a current account deficit cannot be offset by capital in­
flows. Accepting this point, an over reliance on the mone­
tary fiscal policy mix as a long-run policy option is ruled 
out.
As the current account deficit only can be improved if 
real domestic expenditure is reduced, cf. our interpreta­
tion of the absorption approach, then domestic macroeconom­
ic policies are constrained by the position of the current 
account, as originally stressed by Tower and Willet:^
". . . in highly open economies expenditure changing 
policies become the only tool for altering the balance 
of payments, which is to say that macroeconomic poli­
cies become subservient to the balance of payments 
constraints."
4Moreover, Whitman has in two articles emphasized that ac­
tive adjustment is vital for a small open economy in an ex­
change rate area, as the fall in the area's exports and de­
cline in overall economic activity often will originate 
from a common cause. That is that the factor that causes
1) W.M. Corden (1972), op. cit.
2) Tower & Willet (1976), op. cit.
3) Ibid., p. 18.
4) M.v.N. Whitman, International and Interregional Pay­
ments Adjustments: A Synthetic View, Princeton 1967.
Same author, Place Prosperity and People Prosperity,
The Delineation of Optimal Policy Areas, New York 1972.
-1
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the overall decline in the country's external balance may 
also lower the real return on investments, which in turn 
will end up in the direct investment component of the cap­
ital account and make it more difficult to finance further 
deficits.
However an important factor which must be mentioned
when the ability and desirability of external finance is
1discussed, is smallness. As Thygesen has pointed out, 
small countries sometimes act as free riders in interna­
tional capital markets because the absolute amounts small 
countries use to finance their external deficits are neg­
ligible .
"Contrary to what textbooks international economics 
may teach, policy autonomy is sometimes greater for a 
small than for a large country. The United Kingdom 
and Italy reached the limits of their ability to fi­
nance external imbalances around 1976, when the IMF 
was called upon to review domestic policies and pro­
vide conditional lending. This was at a time when 
British and Italian external imbalances and debts 
were relatively small compared^with those of Denmark. 
Absolute amounts matter . . . "
1) N. Thygesen (1980), op. cit., p. 27.
2) Cf. this quote of Thygesen to the following of Cooper: 
"even a small country can borrow in a private interna­
tional capital market for a prolonged period only if 
the proceeds are used for investments which are suffi­
ciently productive, not only to pay interest on the 
debt, but also to satisfy creditors that further lend­
ing is appropriate." Cooper (1968), op. cit., p. 183.
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However, as Thygesen also points out,1 such a process 
alters the composition of domestic demand and output, and 
is therefore not sustainable in the long run, and moreover 
"it imposes severe constraints on monetary management and 
requires tight control on movements of private capital".^ 
But the "central problem" of internal and external 
equilibria when the exchange rate alignment option is se­
verely restricted, is still largely unsolved by sheer re­
liance on capital mobility.
The aim of the present chapter is therefore to pre­
sent an analysis of necessary micro and macroeconomic con­
ditions which must be met if monetary integration can be 
seen as successful.
In the first three chapters the explicit framework 
for analysis was that of the national state.
This individualistic angle of attack is relaxed in 
the present chapter and the next two. Thus we move from 
the angle of national self interest and welfare to a more 
collective oriented, or global approach.
The many economic criteria for the workings of a cur­
rency area, which are found necessary by literature are 
here divided up into two main categories, as does Revelas.^ 
The necessary conditions in the first category are
mainly concerned with the adjustment capabilities of the
1) N. Thygesen (1980), op. cit.
2) Ibid., p. 28.
3) K. Revelas, Optimale Währungsraume und Währungsunionen, 
Eine theoretische empirische und wirtschaftspolitische 
Analyse, Berlin 1980.
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national economy in the context of microeconomic disturb­
ances. These conditions are factor mobility, openness 
(or the share of tradeables in production) and diversifi­
cation.
In the second category we find conditions for mone­
tary integration, which are mainly concerned with macroe­
conomic disturbances.
The main difference between the two categories is 
that the criteria mentioned in the first category are 
necessary, or even vital, for the politically acceptable 
functioning of a proposed currency area, while the fac­
tors mentioned in the second category below are concerned 
with the question about how welfare costs are minimized 
in the adjustment period.
If the main criteria of the second category, which 
are similarity in rates of inflation and a close resem­
blance in policy attitudes, are unity or close to unity, 
the relative importance of the criteria mentioned in the 
first category will be decreasing.
A considerable body of literature emerged during the 
60's and 70's relating the influence of cyclical and mi­
croeconomic disturbances with respect to stabilization 
policies to the pros and cons of flexible versus fixed
exchange rates. Much of this literature, as previously
1mentioned, focused on the global rather than the nation­
al scope. However we shall show that this literature is 
still relevant for the discussion of desirable character­
istics of a proposed currency area.
1) Cf. chapter 1.
- 95 -
4.1. Necessary criteria for monetary integration of the 
first category.
Traditionally the optimality of a currency area is 
judged with reference to the familiar short-term objec­
tives of economic policy: employment stability, price
stability and balance of payments equilibrium. Removal 
of a trade deficit through market forces under fixed ex­
change rates requires, as previously shown, a relative 
decline of money income in the area in question. If the 
surrounding world shows some degree of inflation, the
area's prices need only decline relatively. No absolute
1decline is required, as Haberler was the first to show.
Downward inflexibility of money wages and prices is the
main reason why the exchange rate tool is necessary to
smooth out adjustment. In the absence of downward flex-
2ibility of money wages the welfare costs of deflation 
to the level of prices and wages abroad are minimized if 
the following criteria are met:
1) See G. Haberler, "Adjustment, Employment and 
Growth", in W. Fellner (ed.), Maintaining and Re­
storing Balance in International Payments, Princeton
1966.
2) We assume that real wages are flexible, cf. Corden 
(1972), op. cit., "if real wages are not flexible a 
devaluation will be followed so quickly by an ad­
justment of wages and other factor prices designed 
to maintain real values, that the effects of the de­
valuation will be quickly negated".
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4.1.1. High mobility of factors of production.
A high mobility of factors of production was Mundell1s 
original proposition in order to solve the "central" problem 
of monetary integration. Mundell does not explicitly make a 
distinction between the production factors of labour and 
capital, which is, as shown later, a major point of criti­
cism.
2Mundell's main point, as elucidated by Ishiyama is the 
following: Assuming that two regions A and B have a high
degree of mutual intermobility of production factors, a 
shift in demand of goods from region B to the goods of re­
gion A can be counterbalanced by a change in the exchange 
rate. If region A coincides with country A and region B co­
incides with country B, a depreciation of currency B, and 
appreciation of currency A will relieve unemployment in 
country B, and control inflation in country A. This is the 
normal case for flexible exchange rates.
The novelty of the Mundellian approach is now that re­
gions A and B do not necessarily, or always, belong to coun­
try A and B.
If the shift in demand does not correspond to the 
boundaries of the national economies (we assume multisector­
al national economies), the following dilemma is bound to 
arise: Expansive economic policies by country A and B in
order to solve the employment problem in their depressed re-
1
11 R.A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas", 
American Economic Review, No. 51, Sept. 1961.
2) Y. Ishiyama (1975), op. cit.
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gions are bound to ignite inflation in the prosperous parts, 
and vice versa deflationary policies in order to check infla­
tion in the prosperous regions will aggravate the unemploy­
ment in the depressed regions.
As Mundell points out, a flexible exchange rate might 
solve the external balance problem between the two countries, 
but it does not bring about a simultaneous solution to the 
problems of inflation and unemployment in the prosperous and 
the depressed regions respectively. Since countries do have 
many regions, each with different mixes of production fac­
tors, interregional balance of payments problems are not 
cured by the realignment of national currencies. Instead 
Mundell stresses the point that a high degree of mobility of 
production factors will solve the adjustment problem between 
regions as well as between countries. The logical answer 
that each region should have its own currency is refuted be­
cause of these two reasons:
a) With a high number of national currencies the function of 
money as a medium of exchange is negated by the increas­
ing costs of currency conversion, and
b) A small currency area will have a similar small exchange 
market which will allow speculators to manipulate the 
market.
That a high degree of factor mobility provides regions
with a nearly automatic adjustment in cases of internal dise-
1quilibria is doubted by, amongst others, Onida, who shows in
1) F. Onida, The Theory and Policy of Optimum Currency Areas 
and Their Implications for European Monetary Union, Ley­
den 1972.
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a little simplistic model that the adjustment merely is a 
trade balance adjustment. Internal levels for equilibrium 
are not taken into account.
Several levels of income are compatible with trade
balance equilibrium, as there are national differences for
1 2the preferred position on the Phillips curve. Fleming 
criticizes the factor mobility argument because there is 
no distinction between labour mobility and capital mobility.
If we examine the concept of capital mobility alone 
and its equilibrating effects it has been demonstrated by 
several authors^ that capital mobility can worsen internal 
equilibrium as well as equilibrating internal disequilib- 
ria.
Suppose that there is a shift in demand from the 
goods of country A to those of country B, as first shown 
in Mundell's original example.
Having a fixed exchange rate between the two regions, 
a balance of payments equilibrium is first restored when 
the economy is deflated in country B, and/or inflated in 
country A. In Mundell's original theory, it was assumed 
that differentials in unit factor costs were causes for 
disequilibrium, although the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem
1) Although Presley, J.R. and G.E. Dennis in Currency 
Areas, London 1976, show that an inverse relationship 
between inflation and unemployment is quite complicat­
ed to prove in most European countries.
2) J.M. Fleming, "On Exchange Rate Unification", Economic 
Journal, vol. 81, 1971.
3) See i.e. Onida (1972), op. cit., and Fleming (1971), 
op. cit.
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states that foreign trade equalizes factor prices.
Assume now that the deflation in country B would de­
crease the propensity to invest in country B, and the in­
flation in country A would symmetrically increase invest­
ments in country A above the rise in savings. The result 
would then be that capital mobility in this way would ag­
gravate existing internal disequilibria instead of miti-
1 2 gating existing differences. Fleming concludes:
"Altogether it will be seen that mobility of capital 
among the members of the group is as likely to ag­
gravate as to mitigate the losses and friction that 
would otherwise result from the inability to adjust 
par values in the face of disequilibria arising from 
members of the area."
Labour mobility, which was presented by Mundell^ as
the primary determinant of the optimum currency area in
order to smooth adjustment, seems only to be a long-run
solution. With highly mobile capital a high degree of
labour mobility would reduce the total unemployment costs
4of a given amount of real adjustment. Tower and Willet 
see labour mobility as reinforcing capital mobility in 
the adjustment process. The longer time in which adjust­
ment can take place, the more useful the concept of la­
bour mobility will be. A counterargument to this would
1) Fleming (1972), op. cit.
2) Assuming implicitly autonomous investments.
3) Mundell (1961), op. cit.
4) Tower & Willet, op. cit., p. 32.
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be that such a trend of outward movements of labour would
increase the existing debt per capita ratio, thus making
final adjustment more expensive for the remaining. Lanyi,
1Scitovsky, Dunn, Kenen and Corden have criticized the
concept of labour mobility vehemently.
2Lanyi stresses that it is not lack of interregional 
mobility which is crucial, rather than the lack of inter­
industrial mobility. As a consequence labour mobility is 
of little consequence for the adjustment of interregional 
imbalances. Kenen^ points out that if labour intensities 
differ markedly amongst the regions, migration of labour
will only have a very limited effect.
4Scitovsky and Dunn criticize the concept from the 
more practical angle, and add that the costs of such move­
ments, both political and economical, cannot be ignored. 
The former author uses an Hecksher-Ohlin type analogy in a
1) A. Lanyi, The Case for Floating Exchange Rates Recon­
sidered, Princeton 1969, T. Scitovsky, "The Theory of
Balance of Payments Adjustment", Journal of Political 
Economy, 75, August 1967, R.M. Dunn, "Flexible Ex­
change Rates and Oligopoly Pricing, A Study of Canadi­
an Markets", Journal of Political Economy, 75, August
1967, P.B. Kenen, "The Theory of Optimum Currency Are­
as", in Mundell and Swoboda (1969), op. cit., and W.M. 
Corden, 1972, op. cit.
2) Lanyi (1969), op. cit.
3) P.B. Kenen (1969), op. cit.
4) Scitovsky, op. cit.; Dunn, op. cit.
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later article, where he points out that labour mobility 
sets limits to divergencies of (labour) costs between re­
gions. Management . . . will not concede and labour will 
not press too hard for wages that would push costs beyond 
these limits, the former for fear of diminishing profits, 
the latter for fear of diminishing employment."
Ingram, however, in his study of Puerto Rican adjust-
2ment policies in the 50's, shows that labour mobility had 
important effects even when there was full financial inte­
gration between Puerto Rico and the U.S. A similar solu-
3tion is found in Vanderkamp who shows that emigration 
from Canada had a positive effect, as unemployment de­
clined when emigration grew. Still, migration is an irre-
4versible policy tool. So we may ask whether labour mo­
bility is a sufficient factor to solve the central problem 
of monetary integration.
To rely solely on labour mobility as an adjustment 
factor in the short to medium run would run into difficul­
1) See his Money and the Balance of Payments, Chicago
1969.
2) J.C. Ingram, Regional Payments Mechanisms: The Case
of Puerto Rico , University of North Carolina, 1962.
3) J. Vanderkamp, "The Effects of Out-Migration on Re­
gional Employment", Canadian Journal of Economics, 
vol. 3, Nov. 1970.
4) Cf. H. Giersch: "Outmigration may actually be the
worst of all possible solutions to a balance of pay­
ments problem, since it is likely to be irreversible 
and to lead to a waste of capital invested in the in­
frastructure and a destruction of the environment 
through depopulation", in his "The Case for a European 
Regional Policy", in European Economic Integration and 
Monetary Unification, EC Commission, Brussels 1973.
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ties because of the long-run nature of the tool. And even
more complicated seem the implications of relying solely
on labour mobility, when the very concept of labour is dif-
1ferentiated. According to Presley & Dennis:
"A further complication arises once it is recognised 
that all units of a factor are not identical. Differ­
ent units of labour have different skills and abili­
ties. One would suspect the more mobile units of la­
bour are also the younger, and perhaps the more pro­
ductive elements of the labour force. If this is so, 
mobility in the long run may produce disturbances to 
the competitive relationship between countries."
Under fixed exchange rates labour mobility acts as a 
substitute for deflation, which otherwise would be neces­
sary in order to adjust to a change in relative competi­
tiveness. However, the political usefulness of such a 
"grapes of wrath policy" is doubtful, without even thinking
about how an explicit emigration policy could be implement-
2ed in real life. Corden notes:
"Can it really be imagined that a UK depressed area 
problem could be solved by the large scale migration 
of British workers to Germany? It is conceivable, but
1) J.R. Presley & G.E.J. Dennis, Currency Areas, London 
1976.
2) W.M. Corden, "The Adjustment Problem", in L.B. Krause & 
W.S. Salant (eds.), European Monetary Integration and 
its Meaning for the United States, Brookings 1973.
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when Britons are reluctant even to move from Scotland 
or Tyneside to the south, though the language is al­
most the same, it takes some imagination to conceive 
of labour mobility solving the central problem of mon­
etary integration."
And it should be added, that even if labour mobility could 
solve the problem, it would remind very much of the tail- 
wagging- the-dog situation, where exchange rate variations 
of demand management would be the more appropriate tools.
In the optimal currency area theory, internal fixed 
exchange rates are off-set by internal factor mobility, and 
external flexible exchange rates are off-set by money illu­
sion.
1De Cecco compares this way of reasoning with a set of 
Chinese boxes where the last and tiniest box is money illu­
sion. The effects and nature of money illusion in the cur­
rency area context are analyzed in chapter 5.
4.1.2. Product diversification.
2Kenen's argument that highly diversified economies 
are a necessary precondition for a currency area^ is based
1) M. De Cecco, "La teoria aree monetarie ottime e l'uni­
ficazione monetaria europea", Note Economiche, 4 ed. 
1971 .
2) P.B. Kenen, "The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, An
Eclectic View", in R. Mundell & A.K. Swoboda, Monetary 
Problems of the International Economy, 1969.
3) Cf. Kenen's own definition: " . . .  diversity in a na­
tion's product mix, the number of single product re­
gions contained in a single country, may be more rele­
vant than labour mobility".
". . . a  well diversified national economy will not 
have to undergo changes in its terms of trade as often 
as a single product national economy."
" . . .  when in fact it does confront a drop in demand
for its principal products, unemployment will not rise 
as fast as it would in a less diversified economy."
All quotes from Kenen, ibid.
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upon the assumption that the main cause for balance of pay-
1ments imbalances is microeconomic demand disturbances. So 
a country that spreads its risks, i.e. is well diversified, 
has a higher chance of avoiding shocks originating from cer­
tain segments of the market.
A decrease in export demand for goods produced in one 
segment of the market will not have serious implications for 
employment, because in a well diversified economy, each seg­
ment of the market only provides a fraction of total employ­
ment.
"From the standpoint of external balance taken by it­
self, economic diversification, reflected in export di­
versification, serves, ex ante, to forestall the need 
for frequent changes in the terms of trade and there­
fore, for frequent changes in national exchange 
rates."2
Applied to the real world Kenen's diversification argument
is difficult to operationalize. If the most diversified
area is also the optimal currency area, then it follows that
3the world would be the most suitable candidate. McKinnon 
comments that the more diversified an economy is, the larger 
it would be, and the smaller would be the foreign trade sec­
tor, and in this way it leads to the opposite conclusion of 
McKinnon's own criteria of openness, which is discussed be-
1) Cf. Ishiyama, op. cit., p. 353.
2) Kenen, op. cit., p. 49.
3) McKinnon, R.I., "Optimum Currency Areas", American Eco­
nomic Review, vol. 53, Sept. 1963.
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low. However as also Ishiyama points out the main differ­
ence between Kenen's and McKinnon's criteria is that Kenen 
assumes external export shocks, while McKinnon as we shall 
see is concerned with internal shocks.
4.1.3. Degree of openness.
McKinnon was the first to point out that the degree of 
openness of a currency area would influence the degree of 
deflation necessary to correct a given balance of payments 
deficit.
In chapter 3, the concept of openness was analyzed 
from the angle of efficiencies of macroeconomic stabiliza­
tion policies. The present discussion should be seen in 
the context of the currency area debate, which in the pres­
ent case can be summed up as why an open economy should em­
ploy a fixed exchange rate.
McKinnon's argument for fixed exchange rates and open-
2ness is based on the absorption theory, and can be divided
1) Ishiyama, op. cit., p. 354.
2) Cf. the following quote from McKinnon (1963), op. cit.: 
"In a highly open economy operating close to full em­
ployment, significant improvements in the trade balance 
will have to be accomplished via the reduction of do­
mestic absorption, i.e. real expenditure. In the ex­
treme case where the economy is completely open, i.e. 
all goods produced and consumed are tradables with 
prices determined by the outside, the only way the 
trade balance can be improved is by lowering domestic 
expenditure while maintaining output levels. Changes 
in the exchange rate will necessarily be completely 
off-set by internal price level repercussions with no
improvement in the trade balance............if we
move across the spectrum from closed to open economies 
flexible exchange rates become both less effective as a 
control device for external balance and more damaging 
to internal price level stability."
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into three separate conditions. Two assumptions are cru-
■ i 1 cial:
i) The principal needs for exchange rate adjustments arise 
from microeconomic demand and supply conditions and
ii) Externally, price stability is a precondition.
The first of McKinnon's arguments focuses on price stability.
Assuming a high foreign elasticity of import supply 
and export demand which is plausible because of given world 
market prices, and a low elasticity of domestic import de­
mand and export supply, a change in the exchange rate will 
eventually lead to price instability.
The domestic price of tradeables would change in the 
same proportions as the price of foreign money, being an 
open economy, such shifts in prices will influence the 
overall price index dramatically. If domestic stabiliza­
tion policies are to be successful in such a case, the 
price of nontradeables would have to decrease symmetrically 
with the rise in tradeables. Such a contraction would, 
needless to say, have severe consequences in terms of lost 
output and employment. A destabilization of the domestic 
price level would furthermore imply that the role of money 
as a store of value would be reduced in step with infla-
1) Cf. Ishiyama (1975), op. cit.
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txon.
2 3And as Triffin & Grubel, and Whitman later did dem­
onstrate, excessive domestic inflation in a highly open 
economy tends to spill directly over in increased imports 
before spilling over into prices, which again is the basis 
for triggering off a "vicious circle". On this background, 
a number of open economies trading extensively with each 
other will find it advantageous to form a currency area in 
order to maintain price stability.
The second criterion is about the existence of money
1
1) Cf. McKinnon (1963), op. cit. "One of the aims of mon­
etary policy is to set up a stable kind of money whose 
value in terms of a representative bundle of economic 
goods remains more stable than any single physical 
good. Indeed it is the maintenance of this stable val­
ue which gives money its liquidity properties. The 
process of saving and capital accumulation in a capi­
talist system is greatly hampered unless a suitable nu­
meraire and store of value exists. It may be still 
more difficult if a more desirable money is available 
from another source, e.g. from a larger currency area."
2) R. Triffin and H.G. Grubel, "The Adjustment Mechanism 
to Differential Rates of Monetary Expansion Among the 
Countries of the EEC", Review of Economics and Statis­
tics , Nov. 1962, vol. 44.
3) M.v.N. Whitman, "Economic Openness and International 
Financial Flows", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
1, Nov. 1969.
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illusion. In an open economy, money illusion is, under­
standably, deemed to be next to absent, as import prices 
weigh heavily in the overall price index.
In order to restore a "sound" level of money illu­
sion thus making exchange rate variations a viable op­
tion, open economies should have a fixed internal ex­
change rate and a flexible external one.
The third criterion in McKinnon's chain of argument 
is based on the nature of demand and supply elasticities.
In an economy where a large proportion of goods is 
tradeables, the impact on imports, which we assumed to 
have a low elasticity of demand, of an exchange rate rea­
lignment will logically be small. It follows then that a 
realignment in order to remove a giveji balance of pay­
ments deficit will have to be larger the more open the 
economy is, given the Marshall-Lerner condition is ful­
filled.1
There are some critical points in McKinnon's reason­
ing. The assumption of stability in the rest of the
1) Which briefly can be written as:
„m „x - „m „xE, E, > E E d d s s
where: E™ is elasticity of import demand relative to
the domestic price.
XE^ is elasticity of export demand relative to 
foreign prices.
E 1 is elasticity of import supply relative to 
foreign price.
E is elasticity of export supply relative tos domestic prices.
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world is rather optimistic, and has been severely criti-
1cized. And McKinnon admits in a side remark, without
elaborating further that "the idea of openness would have
to be modified when the area was large enough to affect
2external prices". And in a later re-issue of the arti­
cle on optimum currency areas,^ he adds "All the above 
comments assume the absence of chronic differential rates 
of inflation. Freely floating exchange rates are always 
preferable to fixed rates in the presence of substantial 
monetary instability." This leads us over into the sec­
ond category of conditions for monetary integration, 
which mainly cope with macro-economic disturbances.
4.2. The second category of conditions for monetary in­
tegration.
4.2.1. Similarity in rates of inflation.
Section 4.1 focused especially on the effects of mi­
croeconomic disturbances in a currency area, and we found
that a currency area would be seen as functional, if not 
optimal if:
a) the capacity of adjustment is so large that a return 
to internal and external equilibrium is possible de­
spite fixed internal exchange rates, and
b) the potential capabilities of the exchange rate to 
change real economic variables already is constrained 
because of openness and diversification.
1) By amongst others Corden (1972), op. cit.
2) McKinnon (1963), op. cit.
3) McKinnon (1969), op. cit., p. 234.
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In this section disturbances of a macroeconomic nature are 
analyzed.
A brief definition of the term is needed before plung­
ing into the analysis.
1According to Revelas, macroeconomic disturbances cov­
er divergencies in important macroeconomic parameters 
amongst the participants of a currency area, which are main 
culprits in destabilizing external equilibrium.
The interaction between internal and external balance 
is explicitly neglected because only the external balance 
of a participating country has an overall effect on the 
performance of the whole currency area.
The importance of an equal propensity to inflation in­
side a currency area was originally put forward by
2 3 4Haberler and elaborated by Fleming and Magnifico.
1) Revelas (19 80), op. cit.
2) G. Haberler, "The International Monetary System: Some
Recent Developments and Discussions", in G.N. Halm
(ed.), Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange 
Rates: The Bvirgenstock Papers, Princeton 1970.
3) J.M. Fleming, "On Exchange Rate Unification", The Eco­
nomic Journal, vol. 81, London 1971, pp. 467-488.
4) G. Magnifico, European Monetary Unification, Princeton 
19 71, and Gaps in National Propensities to Inflation 
and European Monetary Unification, Paper presented at 
List Society, Basel 1972.
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As the position of the external balance, as previous­
ly stressed, is of vital importance in the context of mon­
etary integration, attention should be paid to the diver­
gence in national inflation rates, as this divergence is 
an important factor in the development of the external 
balances of participating member states.1
A country belonging to a currency area with a higher 
than average inflation rate cannot, in the long run, at 
least, sustain a fixed exchange rate, when domestic com­
petitiveness is decreasing as a result of the higher price 
level.
There are three commonly accepted factors which in­
fluence the inflation performance of a given country seen 
from a "cost-push" point of view, and thus can be seen as 
determinants for a country's propensity to inflation.
These factors are: Wage policies of labour unions, pro­
ductivity developments in domestic industries and the de­
gree of internal competition.
2Magnifico adds to these factors the following two: 
Regional structure and inflationary expectations, which 
are both cost induced factors, and where the latter hardly 
is a new criterion.
Assuming a limited degree of labour mobility, differ-
1) It is not here the intention to participate in the de­
bate whether divergence is the cause for exchange rate 
realignments, or just an intermediary variable.
2) G. Magnifico, op. cit.
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ences in regional economic structure will result in a rela­
tive worse employment/inflation trade-off for countries 
with a high degree of regional differences than for coun­
tries with a more homogeneous structure. The reason for 
this is that economic policy in the case of a country with
weak and strong regions must be either less contractive or
1more expansive than would otherwise have been the case.
The potential importance of similarity in inflationary
expectations as a condition for a viable currency area is
explained from two variables:
Firstly, historical inflation rates will form a basis
for future inflationary expectations, when labour contracts
are concluded. This is the wage-price spiral.
A currency area where the commitment to the fixity of
the exchange rates is seen to be firm will accordingly in-
2fluence expectations. Secondly, the historical inflation 
rate influences the availability of production factors on 
the supply side.
A long period of inflation and hence reduced private 
investments in productive capital, will make the private 
sector react more sluggishly to expansionary impulses, be­
cause of a reduced acclerator function caused by bottle­
necks in the productive sector.
The usefulness of the criterion of similarity in the 
national propensity to inflate is questionable.
1) Cf. the nearly identical point made by Mundell.
2) See Vaubel (1978), p. 38, op. cit.
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A counterargument is that identical propensities to 
inflate would make the creation of a de jure currency area 
superfluous, as identical national inflation levels already 
would indicate a de facto currency area.
The whole argument ultimately rests on the perceived 
importance of the Phillips curve trade-off. If there are 
nationally desired positions on the Phillips curve as 
Hirsch1 suggests, adjustment to common inflation standards 
will be costly.
If on the other hand, the Phillips curve is steepen-
2ing, as is suggested by Parkin, then the problem is more 
easily solved.
4.2.2. The degree of policy integration.
3Several contributions to the literature on monetary 
integration stress the importance of policy integration.
It is not only commonness of real economic character­
istics which is important for the viability of a currency 
area, but also similarity in attitude to important policy 
issues.
1) F. Hirsch, "The Political Economics of European Mone­
tary Integration", World Today, vol. 28, Oct. 1972, and
"European Monetary Union, A Rebuttal", Banker, vol. 122, 
Nov. 1972.
2) M. Parkin, 1972, op. cit.
3) See i.e. Haberler (1970), op. cit., Ingram (1969), op.
cit., and Tower and Willet (1976), op. cit., and same 
authors, "The Concept of Optimum Currency Areas and the 
Choice Between Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates", in
G.N. Halm (ed.), The Biirgenstock Papers, Princeton
1970.
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A corollary to this is that some kind of institution­
alized policy coordination, which is deemed necessary for 
the convergence of national inflation rates, would play an 
important role as a benchmark for the individual partici­
pant, when costs and benefits by joining a currency area 
are evaluated.
The criteria discussed in the context of the various 
contributions to the optimal currency area theory are all 
necessary preconditions, but hardly sufficient to solve 
the "central" problem of reconciling internal and external 
balance in participating nations, when the exchange rate 
is fixed.
So a framework for coordination is needed, to smooth­
en out the adjustment and also to act as a benchmark in 
order to measure how much policy autonomy must be given up 
when joining a currency area. The next chapter, on ad­
justment policies, will analyze this issue further, and in 
chapter 6, a loosely knitted framework for coordination of 
national economic policies is presented.
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Chapter 5
Adjustment policies in a currency area. A clarification 
of some central issues.
Experience from realignments in the "Snake" and of the 
parities in the EMS suggest that timing is vital. Some of 
the realignments have indeed been clumsy, and have provided 
speculators ample apportunities forplacing one way bets. The 
gains of the speculators are matched by corresponding losses, 
by the central bank, c.f. chart below.
Chart 1.
Distrtibution of gains and losses by capital outflows pre- 
ceeding an anticipated devaluation of the domestic currency.
Effects for:
1)
Abroad
Contracts in Foreign importers
Domestic cur- delayed payments,
rency Foreign exporters
earlier payments. 
Contracts in a Domestic importers
earlier payments for 
imports.
Domestic exporters
delayed payments 
from abroad.
Home
0
Central Bank
foreign cur­
rency
0
+=gains/0=neutral/-=losses.
1) Cf. J. Hoiberg-Nielsen, Danmark i en internationaliseret 
verden. Konsekvenser og effekter for dansk okonomisk politik 
af /kin na financielle intecnration. Unpublished dissertation. Arhus
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As can be seen in the chart, the central bank (i.e. 
the taxpayers) always shoulders the losses involved with 
uncertainties about the exchange rate.
With this distribution of the costs of exchange rate 
uncertainty in mind, we shall below question the validity 
of some issues of monetary integration which for long have 
been taken for granted by most teoretical contributions.
Is the strict division of, on one side, fixed exchange 
rate systems and on the other side, flexible exchange rate 
systems impossible from an operational point of view?
Which are the main effects and repercussions of de­
valuation, and connected to this issue, are small open 
economies more vulnerable to vicious circles of inflation 
than larger, more closed economies? These questions are dis­
cussed in the present chapter, and it is argued in the last 
part of the chapter that as both countries and individuals 
will try to avoid a deterioration in their respective finan­
cial positions, a payments deficit will always be sought to 
be passed over to somebody else.
On the international level, i.e. inside a currency area, 
a deficit is likely to end up in the country which is least 
willing to deflate and or control domestic inflation.
On the domestic level, a deterioration in a sectors 
financial position is likely to be passed over to the public 
sector, in form of an increase in the budget deficit.
The aim of the present chapter is then to analyze, 
somewhat critically, the concepts of adjustment and liquidity 
in an international monetary system. These two concepts 
were together with confidence, what we might call "the holy
trinity" in the debate in the late 60's on international 
monetary reform.
We are not going to present a re-run of this debate. 
Instead, the argument is that the economic-political en­
vironment of the 70*s with a changing constellation of 
power and a climate of inflation have rendered the old 
dist inctions of adjustment with fixed and flexible ex­
change rates more or less obsolescent.
The context of the study is, as said in the intro­
duction, small open economies, with a balance of payments 
deficit.
We divide the adjustment-process into policies which 
stabilize, and policies which finance deficits. Lastly 
the derived effects of devaluation, vicious circles, are 
discussed.
The whole question of changing the price of one cur­
rency in terms of another, whatever the means are, is then 
confronted with the so-called "tail-wagging-the-dog" argue 
ment, which states the futility of monetary and fiscal 
measures that try to correct an imbalance of a few percent 
of GNP by a costly underutilization of production factors, 
which can have profound social repercussions, instead of 
simply financing the deficits with funds from the (ever?) 
liquid international financial markets, which became the 
significant feature of the 70's, partly due to the new 
constellation of surplus/deficit nations.
As shown in the foregoing chapter no automatic adjust 
ment factors inside a proposed currency area like the EEC
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are to be relied on, at least in the short run. This 
because of the "second best" nature'*'^  of the currency 
area opposed to the optimal conditions, as presented 
in theory.
Furthermore it was shown that the monetary approach 
tends to ignore the composition of the imbalance. If a 
deficit on the trade and services account is counter­
weighed by the necessary accomodating capital inflows,
this will not directly cause imbalance according to the
2 )monetary base concept.
However, the resulting foreign indebtedness do have 
unexpected side-effects, and causes restrain on policy, 
which is part of thescope for the present study, cf the 
introduction.
3 )Corden sums up the essential implication of the 
claim of the monetary apporach that deficits present no 
problem, as they are self correcting through stock adjust­
ment, in the following way: "Isuppose that one might ask
how anything in the economy can be a problem. If everyone 
does what he wants to do, and knows what he is doing, and 
adjusts to changing circumstances, where is the problem?
1) M.DeCecco (72) op.cit.
2) See M. Kreinin & L.H.Officer, The Monetary Approach to the 
Balance of Payments. P.73. Princeton 78.
3) W.M.Corden, Inflation, Exchange-rates and the World Economy. 
Chicago 1977.
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Cordens answer to the question is that all economic 
agents make mistakes in the adjustment process, as adjust­
ment is a painful process, which on the political side is 
constrained of the fact that governments want to be re­
elected, and therefore cannot always go /"by'the book".
In sum the problem is the costs of adjustment and the 
issue is how to minimize these costs in a consistent way.
In a narrow sense adjustment refers to the process in 
which a situation of disequilibrium is changed, as such a 
situation cannot last forever, by the usual definitions at 
least.
This does not pose problems in itself, but as there are 
different options for adjustment, and a possibility of choice 
between them, of which some are more consisent with the aim 
of currency unification, the range of externalities by 
joining a currency area broadens. Traditionally the adjust­
ment process have been divided into adjustment to monetary 
changes and adjustment to real changes.
A balance of payments deficity may be caused by autono­
mous inflation or induced by a shift in international demand^^.
On an operational level this distinction between monetary 
and real disturbances is difficult to use. This because real 
disturbances can be interpreted as initiated by monetary dis­
turbances and vice-versa.
1) A classical example is H.S. Houthakker & S.P. Magee, Income 
and Price elasticities in World Trade. Review of Economics and 
Statistics. May 1969, where the authors try to shew that incane elasticities 
of demand for exports of different industrial countries are different.
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Instead we shall use the time dimension which ad­
mittedly is very unhandy too, what is short term and long 
term. So the important measure is to distinguish between 
policies to stabilize payments imbalances in the short 
term, and policies aimed at removing imbalances in the 
long run. This makes the distinction between measures of 
financing and measures of correcting deficits. To have a 
yardstick for the optimal adjustment process Snider^ 
states this as one which removes external equlibrium without:
a) Restricting the freedom of international payments, trade 
and investments, and/or
b) -interfering with domestic policies for full employment,
a stable price level, and economic growth.
2 )As Snider notes himself: "That the .... international 
system falls short of providing an optimum adjustment process 
in the above sense is abundantly clear."
However, like most ideal types, even if it does not 
exist, it has a clear definitorial value, which is worth 
keeping in mind.
We shall start by discussing measures to correct deficits 
by realignment of the exchange-rate.
5.1.
Realignments of the exchange rate.
The role of realignments of the exchange rate is of crucial 
importance, as the EMS is not to be interpreted with a system 
with an irrevocable fixed exchange rate, as the Werner plan 
suggested.
IF Snider, op.cit.
2) cf. The statement of th e Ccrrmission: "Success must not be confused with-an
absence of changes of central rates. If exchange rate adjustment became smaller and less frequent over time; the system could be regarded as a success.
The European Monetary System. EC Ccmnission, No 3.1979. pp 78-79.
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The question of realignment of exchange rates is in 
somewhat contrast to a strict interpretation of the monetary 
approach, where, as previously noted, a correct domestic 
monetary policy will make exchange-rate policy unnecessary, 
and perhaps even counter-productive.
A devaluation from a position of deficit, which is the 
normal thing, is brought into effect from an excess supply 
of money initially. To sterilize this excess supply a dev­
aluation is an instrument, which has an instant effect, com­
pared to the time it would take selfequilibrating factors to 
do the job.
In the following we shall relax this assumption about 
the difference between adjustment with fixed and with flexible 
rates.
In a world with large inflation differentials nominal and 
real exchange rates will differ rapidly, which in a fixed 
system will require heavy intervention in the exchange-markets, 
and in a flexible system, daily changes of the exchange rate 
towards a rate of equlibrium will be the rule.
And as the fixed-exchange rates during the 70's have not 
been really fixed, and the flexible rates have not been truly 
flexible, the ‘distinction seem more confusing than clarifying.
For a country with a balance of payments deficit, the real 
choice, at least in the short run, will be either to allow dev­
aluation to lower the real money stock by increasing the price 
level, or to keep on financing the deficit from external sources, 
instead of cuts in the nominal money supply. The common feature 
for deficit countries in the "Snake" and in the EMS, seems to 
be a random mix of the three. If the deflationary impact of 
such policies is too devastating, so that this kind of con­
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traction is resisted, then two other options are available.
One to call for reflation of the leading currency in the 
currency area, the other being more capital imports ... 
Originally a monetary regime based on:
a) Fixed exchange-rates meant a high degree of certainty, 
that is minimization of transaction costs. And..
b) Flexible exchange rates implied that the country in question 
had a certain degree of monetary independence, which meant 
insulation from foreign disturbances.
As Johnson notes on the system with fixed r a t e s ^ :
"The international monetary system did after all permit 
changes of exchange rates in both direction, and it would 
have been possible, in principle to confine most or all 
inflationary pressure of the United States by a series of 
revaluations of other countries currencies against the dollar."
His answer is that the eruopean countries did not have 
the political muscle to do such a thing.
2)Take the example of Germany and Switzerland , which
have pursued internal price stability with a higher degree
of success than their trading partners.
Until 1980 Germany had a substantial rise in nominal
2 )
exchange rates but was able to hold real exchange stable
The shortage of D-Mark created by the current account ~
surplus was effectively offset by official invervention to
supply the market with funds. In this way the real exchange
1) Harry G. Johnson, Money, Balance of Payments theory 
and the International Monetary Problem, p 18. Princeton 77.
2) See chapter 8.
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rate did not have to react to the shortage. The
degree to which intervention affects the real exchange
rate is determined by the way the intervention is financed.
This means that funds must come from domestic sources, 
which tends to raise the real interest rate. The question
is now how long such a policy can endure.
Recent developments in literature, expecially those
of Dornbusch and Frenkel^ adopting a mix between monetary
approaches and international finance theory, suggest the
futility of monetary autonomy for the national state, even
2 )under flexible rates. Dornbusch finds, among other things, 
that independent monetary policies affect only nominal variables, 
thus simply postponing or slightly altering inflation and ex­
change rate paths.
Frenkel^, from a "money-expectations exchange-rate 
linkage-point of view", suggests that monetary independence, 
even in the short run is largely illusionary, and states the 
basic assumption:
"Being a relative price of two assets (moneys) the equi­
librium exchange rate is attained when the existing stocks 
of the two moneys are willingly held.
It is reasonable, therefore, that a theory of the de­
termination of the relative price of two moneys could be 
stated conveneiently in terms of the supply of and demand 
for these moneys."
1) Rudiger Dornbusch, "Expectations and Exchange rate Dynamics^, 
Journal of Political Economy, Dec.1976, 1161-76.
J.Frenkel, "A Monetary approach to the exchange rate". 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. May 19 76, 200—61.
2) Dornbusch op.cit.
3) Frenkel; op;cit.
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In the following we shall elaborate on these points, 
and in addition to the point that policy independence 
under flexible exchange rates seems to be futile, it is 
also shown that the certainty of fixed exchange rates is 
questionable; seen from the experiences of the last decade.
So the distinction between the two exchange-rate regimes in 
a world with high inflation rate differentials seem to be 
loosing its value.
5.2.
Fixed and floating exchange rate systems. A new interpretation.
Assume a group of countries forming a currency area.
To maintain par values each country is assumed to intervene 
in the exchange markets.
Starting from an initial condition of external dis­
equilibrium, a country with a balance of payments deficit 
must be provided with captial imports, (which for imports 
of private capital would make a high internal interest 
rate necessary to induce private importers to take foreign 
credits), in order to maintain its central rate by inter­
vention in its own market.
Agents in the markets can now start guessing about the 
degree of confidence in the arrangement. When is the im­
balance deemed excessive from the point of either the deficit 
country or the surplus country? The country in surplus is 
buying foreign exchange, which in turn will increase the 
domestic money supply as we assume that sterilization policies 
from the central bank does not take place, or is only ef­
fective in the short run.
The surplus country has a higher degree of freedom 
for action, so if it Chooses to follow a policy which tries
- 125 -
to avoid a realignment, such a venture can probably 
succeed in the short run, but it will increase the cer­
tainty that the deficit country must devalue. The time 
before an adjustment will become necessary depends upon 
the confidence in the exchange rate arrangement, and the 
liquidity of the financial marketsT
So the cost of having a fixed exchange rate which is 
not reallyfixed is the cost of financing capital imports, 
the adjustment of the relative quantities of money and the 
domestic disturbances stemming from the higher price level 
following a devaluation. The impact is a function of the 
openness of the economy and the nature of money illusion.
Under flexible exchange rates, daily oscilliation in 
the exchange rate towards a converging equilibrium position 
will probably not have a very different effect on the ex­
change markets than the fixed rate, which initially did not 
change, but quickly came to be seen as needing some change.
Due to a depreciating currency the deficit country, 
which saw a decline in its real money stock under fixed 
rates now sees the same contractionary effects under flex­
ible rates due to a higher price level.
In the surplus country the real money stock is in­
creased by an appreciating currency, rather than the rise in 
the nominal quantity of money in the fixed rate system.
Assuming that there is a higher degree of downward 
wage rigidity in a surplus country-^, the deficit^country 
is again carrying most of the adjustment cos,t, as large 
price increases will decrease the real quantity of money in
1 ) Assuming that wage claims are moderated in a devaluing country l-var’^niaa jobs are threatened, cf Arne J. Isachsen, Norwegian economic 
policies in the last decade." in Marcello DeCecco (ed) 1983.op;cit.
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order to reduce aggregate demand. How much aggregate
demand is reduced depends on the inital deficit. According
1) 2) to Cooper , and before him; Hirschman , devaluation from
a starting point of deficit does more than switching de- 
mandfrom import substitution goods, it also reduces real 
national income and may lead to a fall in aggregate demand.
Devaluation gives with one hand by raising export 
prices, and takes with the other by raising import prices.
So if imports exceed exports the net result, ceteris paribus, 
is a net reduction in real income, which must be proportion­
al to the ratio of the initial trade deficit to domestic 
production.
We can conclude that there is, at least in the longer
run, an unavoidable trade off in situations of disequili-
3)brium, between :
a) A depreciation which reduces the real money supply by 
increasing prices, and ..
b) Allowing a decrease in the real money stock, by cutting 
nominal money supply.
4)"The only relief in such a situation, according to Makin , 
comes if a country can avoid both, which can happen for 
surplus countries able to find deficit countries foolish 
enough to attach national prestige to the relative price of 
their money."
1+2 ) R.N.Cooper, Devaluation and aggregate demand in aid-receiving 
countries, in J.D.Bhagwati et al, Trade, balance of payments and 
growth. Amsterdam 71, and A.0.Hirschman, Devaluation and the trade 
balance: A Note, Review of Economics and Statistice, No 31; 1949,pp 50-53.
3) This on a strict theoretical level, as is shewn in the end of this 
chapter, continuing finance and political pressure to make the surplus 
country reflate are also realistic options.
4) J.H.Makin, Fixed vs Floating. Columbia Journal of W.B. vol XIV, no 4,79.
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The question about the distribution of the adjustment 
burden is discussed further in the next chapter on co­
ordination of monetary and fiscal policies in a currency 
area, but here it should be noted that protectionist mea­
sures^ is the possible political alternative, as surplus 
countries can acquire reserves for a long time without
being under the same adjustment pressure as a deficit
2)country usually is under , thus avoiding adjustment.
The main reason for the above argument that fixed 
rates and floating rates in reality amounts to the same
V.thing, by leaving most of the adjustment burden on the 
deficit country, is that many writers do not seem careful 
to distinguish between what we can call credibly fixed, 
and stable, but adjustable exchange rates. To find the 
border-line between the two terms is impossible, and makes 
the operational value of the distinction subject to some 
doubt.
The roots of the matter is the confidence aspect, and 
brings us to the degree of political unity which is an es­
sential precondition for the working of a stable exchange
3)rate system.
Because it is the degree of political will, which in
4)turn determines how well national economic policies are 
coordinated, because the consistency between national 
e conomic policies determines how "fixed" internal excange- 
rates are inside a currency area.
1) see e.g. C.F.Bergsten, Reforming the Gatt, the use of 
trade measures for balance of payments purposes. Journal of 
International Economics vol 7, No.1.
2) For an interesting elaboration on this point see L.Girtcn & D.roper,
The evolution of Exchange rate policy, in Putnam & Sykes (eds) The Monetary 
Approach to International Adjustment. The authors state that central banks act as if the gold standard still existed, in order to maintain faith in . 
their monies.
3) cf Walther Hallstein: "Die wahrungssystem ist der Prüfstein der Gemeinshaft"
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As vaa until now mainly have discussed the adjustment aspect
in terms of the well tried context of fixed versus floating
rates, we now briefly turn to the question of derived effects
of devaluation^. The prevailing view on devaluation is
2 )summed up by Johnson , saying that devaluation can be ex­
pected to raise output if there are unemployed resources in 
the economy, and will raise prices domestically if there are 
no unemployed resources. The main effect i.s expenditure 
switching, a potential overheating of the economy can be 
contained by expenditure reducing policies.
The underlying assumption for the argument is a flex­
ible labour market which in the short term seems to be very 
unlikely, judged from recent experiences.
• A newer, and perhaps more realistic view on devaluation,
which also fits better with the vicious circles hypotheses,
3)is the view presented by Krugman and Taylor , who dissent from
the view presented above.
Instead of merely switching demand from imports to
import substitution and lowering export prices, provided
that the law of one price is not effective, devaluation also
have a strong contractionary effect.
4)The reason is the following:
1) In the short run balance of payments deficit is struc­
tural, that is, both imports and exports are not very 
sensitive to price changes for a given level of domestic 
output.
1) cf the following arguments about vicious circles.
2) Johnson Harry G, Elasticity, absorption, Keynesian Multiplier,
Keynesian policy and Monetary approaches to devaluation theory,
A simple Geanetric exposition. American Ec.Rev.vol 66 (1976) p 448
Footnotes oont.
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ii) As a consequence, any favourable short run effects
of devaluation on the trade balance come primarily through 
economic contraction rather than substitution.
iii) Devaluation not only reduces output and emplyment, 
but redistributes income from labour to capital as well.
iv) Thus devaluation is a costly cure, and a devaluation 
big enough to reduce the balance of payments substantially 
in the short run may be unacceptable. In such a case the 
government should beg or borrow to meet the short term 
deficit and work towards eliminating its structural dif­
ficulties by expansion of traded goods production in the 
medium run.
Krugman & Taylors approach^ is purely Keynesian, but 
the results are very similar to the results of the previous 
discussion about a working distinction between floating 
and fixed exchange rates. Here we concluded that the main 
effect of devaluation was that, by raising prices, it would 
diminish the real money stock, which in turn would increase 
the demand for nominal money at any level of output. The 
main effect is therefore contractionary.
The policy recommendation from Krugman & Taylor^ is 
the opposite of the traditional, as devaluation in their 
framework should be accompanied, in many cases, by measures 
to increase demand.
3) P:Krugman & L.Taylor, Contractionary effects of devaluation.
Journal of International Economics 8' (1978) 445-456.
4) K & T , op cit
5) do. op cit.
67 do. op.cit.
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However such an experiment of expansive policies 
on behalf of the government are most unlikely to be 
implemented in the first stage of a monetary unification 
prgcess, where price stability and not output stability 
is the higher goal; in order to have national inflation 
rates converge.
5.3.
Vicious circles.
Next item is the question of vicious circles in the 
adjustment process. Are small open economies more prone 
to enter a series of vicious circles?
Although the idea of vicious circles is not a new * 
one. Haberler^ described the inflation-exchange-rate 
spiral in 1937, it is first in the last decade that many 
industrial countries have experience periods of accelerat­
ing price-inflation, unemployment and a depreciating 
nominal exchange-rate.
1) G ;Haber1er, Theories of international trade with its 
application to commercial policy. N.Y. 1937.
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The mechanics of a vicious circle is quite simple.
The effect of a devaluation is rapidly passed through 
to domestic prices, with classical money illusion playing 
a central role, and back again to the exchange rate.
This succession of events is part of the adjustment 
process and the crucial thing is, whether this is followed up 
by accommodating policies, to soften the contraction of the 
economy.
From an analysis of what constitutes the vicious circle 
theory, we shall below try to determine whether small open 
economies are more exposed to and more vulnerable to vicious 
circles than larger more closed economies. This in turn will 
tell us something about differencies in adjustment costs 
between large and small/open and closed economies. We divide 
the vicious circle argument in the phases. 1)
A once and for all increase in the money stock will be 
assumed. No further monetary growth to accomodate the shock. 
The process of adjusting the economy to such a shock is 
divided into three phases.
Phase 1 contains the initial shock with its derived 
effects. In Phase II wages and prices are adjusting, and 
in Phase III, the economy is moving back towards a new 
steady state.
Phase I
The Domestic monetary expansion reduces the domestic 
interest rate in order to clear the money market. The
1) cf. M.E.Bond, Exchange rages, Inflation and vicious 
circles. IMF, Staff papers, vol. 27, No 4, 1980.
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interest rate will decline and this will narrow the interest
rate differential, and cause outflows of capital, which in -
turn will induce a devaluation of the domestic currency.
The following expenditure switch from import to
import substitution goods and a higher foreign demand for 
domestically produced goods will, according to Cooper &
Hirschman^, also have an expenditure reducing role. The 
relative size of the traded-goods sector and the size of 
the initial deficit will determine the needed fall in real 
balances in order to clear the money market. As most 
small economies also have a high degree of openness, the 
deflationary effect must be greater for a small country.
The degree of diversification,cf. Kenen chapter 4, is 
essential too, as a short run equilibrium in the commodity 
market, induced by the switch effect of the exchange rate 
can be obtained more easily if there is a high degree of 
import substitution. However, high degree of import sub­
stitution is a large country assumption.
Furthermore, because of the openess of a small country 
J-curves are more likely to emerge, as the change in the exchange rate 
passes through the economy much faster than, itwould do in a 
large economy with a small foreign sector.
A rather isolated factor which must be included is the 
question of the size of the initial devaluation. A seem­
ingly too high devaluation could induce capital inflows 
to finance the deterioration of the current account because 
of speculations about a later appreciation.
1) Cooper & Hirschman, op;cit.
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This phase is the critical in the process. As­
suming classical money illusion, the lowering of real 
wages is not felt immediately. This causes excessive 
demand for domestic goods and services. On the supply- 
side the costs of imported inputs are rising, and to­
gether with nominal wage increase, they are passed on 
into prices.
The resulting increase in the price level, which 
is assumed to take place more rapidly than prices abroad, 
"re-switches" demand from domestically produced goods 
to foreign goods. The result is a deterioration of the 
trade account, which in turn leads to another devaluation. 
Phase III
The fall in income and employment will lead the 
economy to a new steady state, but only if there is real 
wage flexibility, downwards. If not, the economy will 
find itself in a new state with higher unemployment than 
before.
Such a state is clearly unsatisfactory and raises 
the question of monetary accomodation, made necessary as 
a result of political pressure.
An accomodating policy may work in the short run at 
least, but the most possible outcome is another phase of 
stagflation, like the one described in phase II.
According to B o n d ^ :
"The new steady state is achieved when the adjustment 
process restores the economy to its initial real equilibrium, 
with all price increases in terms of domestic currency, 
domestic inflationary expectiations, and exchange rate 
depreciation occurring at the same rate, the expected
Phase II
1) Bond.op.cit.
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future value of the exchange rate equal to the long run 
equilibrium value of the actual exchange rate, and the 
current account in balance."
These are pretty tough conditions.
Looking at empircal results to see whether small 
open economies are more prone to vicious circles, there 
are many indications to support such a view.
Results from Kreinin^ on the pass-through effect
2 )from exchange rate changes- to import prices, and Robinsons
results for the effects on the export side do show that small
countries are more likely to experience heavy repercussions
in terms of price effects of an exchange-rate change.
Price elasticities of demand for exports and imports
3)are calculated by Stern for total elasticities and by
4)Deppler and Ripley for manufactures.
The evidence from these sources again supports the 
hypothesis that small countries have lower long run elastici­
ties (and possible much lower short run elasticities) than 
larger countries. This implies that small countries are 
more vulnerable to J-curves than large countries, and hence 
vicious circles will have a more profound effect the 
smaller and open the economy is. The costs in terms of 
unemployment must therefore be higher for small countries 
than for large countries.
1) M.E.Kreinin, The Effect of exchange rate changes on the 
prices and volume of foreign trade. Staff Papers vol 24,1977 pp297-32£
2) P.W.Robinson et al., The influence of exchange rate changes on prices 
A study of 18 industrial countries. Econanica,vol 46(1979) pp 27-50.
3) R.M.Stem et al. Price Elasticities in International Trade London 76
4) M.C.Deppler & D.M.Ripley, The World Trade Model, Merchandise Trade.
Staff Papers, vol 25, (1978).
Financing Deficits
The above discussed options for adjustment either via the 
exchange rate or by monetary contraction are based on the 
belief that distrubances must be accomodated in current 
real domestic absorption.
Another way of adjusting is by using the time dimension. 
A country can pay for more expensive imports by selling 
assets abroad or by foreign borrowing, in short, by im­
porting capital.
In such a case the distrubances are accomodated 
through a reduction of future domestic absorption.
In the last decade most european nations have relied 
on the option of accomodating disturbances in the current 
real domestic absorption.
To match balance of payments surplusses, corresponding 
deficits must be found somewhere else in -.the system .
The distribution of these deficits can take two ex­
treme forms, with many hybrid forms in between
1) Every country would incur a deficit on the current 
account based on the balance some base year. Under such a 
system each country would increase its borrowing in the 
international financial markets by the amount of its "fair" 
share of total deficit vis a vis the surplus countries.
2) The other extreme is the N'th currency distribution:
All countries, except one, the N'th country would retain 
their original current account balances while the N'th 
country would absorb the deficit.
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5.4
1) See R.Z.Aliber, Policies toward the Opec oil and wealth, 
Kiel 78.
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If there is a general consensus that an overall 
external deficit on the aggregated balances of payments of 
a currency area is justifiable, then discussion about a 
necessary distribution of this deficit is consistent.
The danger is that countries individually may try to 
improve their position.
The way of doing this, c-f. the foregoing section, 
would be by changing the exchange rate or competetive 
deflations, or a mixture of both.
Such policies would never improve the overall 
balance of payments position for the currency area taken 
as a whole, in the short run at least, but would only 
affect the internal distribution of deficits.
In an ideal world the first form of deficit distri­
bution would be chosen, but in reality a distribution 
close to the N ’th country variant seems to be the rule.
In aggregate the problem of financing deficits does 
not pose any conceptual difficulties. The surplus countries 
must accumulate assets on deficit countries, as they can­
not consume their receipts. On the individual country 
level the financing of deficits poses problems by way of i, 
matching the supply of credits to the damand for credits.
First the supply of credits: It cannot be taken for
granted that the suppliers of funds, say the Saudis, are 
burning to get assets denominated in Dkr. So there is a 
problem between the proportion of the actual deficits and 
the desired composition of portefolios in surplus 
countries. This brings in the intermediaries. As the 
balance of payments per definition always balance ex post # 
the important thing is the conditions by which balance is
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achieved.
If balance is achieved by finance on reasonable terras 
accompanied by an acceptable stability of the exchange 
rate, in order not to encounter the ‘derived unweldoie effects 
described previously, then such a policy would be close 
to our definition of optimum adjustment.of deficits.
In the example we shall assume that all receipts in 
the surplus countries are saved, so that increase in 
receipts does not give rise to increased imports. Further­
more we shall assume that "preservation-of-scarce-resources" 
policies are neglected. This could be justified by saying 
that the following example is for the short to medium run, 
and energy preservation is a long-term issue.
In the example we implicitly assume that the oil 
payments are the esbject, but other transfers for "rent" could 
also be assumed.
We start with the impact on the public sector, thereafter 
the effects on the households and the firms are examined.
The subject for our interest is the "willingness" to hold 
debt.
The inflationary and/or deflationary impact created by 
the transfer of real income could be offset elsewhere in the 
public sector. Lowering of indirect taxes would be a pos­
sibility.
Assuming public expenditure is maintained, a budget 
deficit would arise. The size of the deficit would per 
definition equal the deficit on the current account, as we 
assumed that only the public sector was "willing" to accept 
the deficit.
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Either by an expansion of the money or by bond 
issue or a mixture of both could this deficit be financed, 
provided that surplus countries would hold a combination 
of money and government bonds, at the going exchange 
rate and/or interest rate.
On the demand side the question is whether such an 
accomodating policy is appropriate for a small open economy.
Because if some countries in a (semi) fixed exchange 
rate area are deflating, and some are not, the burden of 
adjustment will fall on the countries not deflating, or only 
deflating moderately.
When the first oil shock came, the direct effect of 
the price increase was probably less serious than the in­
direct effects owing to different monetary responses from 
national governments.
When restrictive policies were adopted by some countries 
as responses to potential high inflation rates other countries 
did not reflate quickly enough. This meant that the initial 
shock had a double impact.
Exports from "slow deflators" were reduced because of 
ression abroad. Imports increased because of accommodating 
policies, so the trade gap worsened even more.
To return to the problem of "willingness" to accept 
a deterioration in the financial position by running a 
balance of payments deficit, we shall examine how an external 
deficit affects different sectors in the national economy.
How can such a deficit be distributed, and how can the 
results be interpreted for international distribution.
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If the households take the debt position, the deficit 
on the current account will be matched by a deterioration 
of financial positions of the households. The response 
of the households will depend on the nature of money 
illusion. The most likely outcome is a reduction of real 
expenditure in order to restore desired cash-balances.
On the aggregate level reduced expenditure will lead to 
lower real income.
Equilibrium is first restored when savings have been 
reduced which probably first will happen at a lower level 
of demand and out-put,cf the normal Keynesian multiplier 
effect.^
Finally we discuss the case where firms take on the 
deficit. This deficit either decreases profits and/or 
increases the overall indebtedness of the sector.
To accommodate this, firms may act like individuals 
by reducing expenditure in order to hold their cash bal­
ances at desired levels. This leads to lay-offs and a 
decline in the investment rate.
Another option is to raise prices. If the firm is in 
a sheltered sector this can have inflationary effects for 
the exposed sector,c.f. the Scandinavian model, and may 
drive firms out of the market. Consider now the effects 
for the public sector, the households and for the firms 
in a dynamic interrelationship.
1) Normal stabilizers such as unemployment benefits 
and tax cuts nor included in this discussion.
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If the initial shock hit the households first, 
the shock can be transferred over to the firms by 
successful wage claims. The firms would then react 
by reducing their expenditure, hereby creating unem­
ployment, or could pass over the impact to the house­
holds and the public sector by price rises. This 
leads us to vicious circles, and could go on until the 
deficit is "willingly" accepted by one or more sectors. 
Domestically as well as internationally the problem is 
the distribution of the deficit and the acceptance of 
a deterioration in the financial positions.
On the domestic level, however, the problem will 
surely land in the public sector sometime because of 
automatic transfers.
The increase in unemployment benefits and the 
decrease in tax revenues due to deflation will invariably 
lead to an increase in the mublic deficit.
Internationally, that is in an exchange rate area 
with no formalized financial institutions, there is no­
body willing to accept the deficit, which can lead to 
competitive deflations if coordination of policies do 
not take place, or if political support for the system 
is on a low level.
Alternatively the deficit will have to be carried 
by the members the currency area which have the lowest 
capability of controlling domestic inflationary pressure.
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Chapter 6
The coordination of national economic policies inside a 
currency area.
A small open economy participating in a larger cur­
rency area is by definition a policy taker instead of a 
policy maker. This in contrast to the traditional theory 
of economic policy, which is a policy of choice.
The extent to which policy makers can influence eco­
nomic parameters is discussed in the present chapter on 
the basis of the "policy neutrality or worse" proposi­
tions of the new classical economists. We conclude that 
policies do have a structural as well as a distribution- 
ary impact, and with this point in mind the dilemmas of 
policy coordination are analyzed in the context of the 
traditional Meades model.
Policy conflicts between countries arising from in­
come targets incompatible with balance of payments equi­
librium are shown to be a result of an inconsistency be­
tween policy targets and policy instruments.
A more balanced policy mix for the coordination of 
fiscal and monetary policies in the medium run is then 
introduced.
By relying on common budgetary and monetary rules it 
should be possible for a group of countries to coordinate 
national medium-term policy objectives, in order to avoid 
badly timed and badly managed exchange rate realignments 
inside a currency area.
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6.1. The issue.
"We note how, as order declines, the calls for coor­
dination become more strident and desperate."**
The coordination of national economic policies inside 
a currency area is, as underlined in the former chapters, 
of vital importance. However in order to discuss the is­
sue of coordination it seems to be necessary to specify 
explicitly what is meant by economic policies, their ef­
fects and the differences in impact, according to country 
specific parameters, before turning to the main questions 
of organizing principles for coordination of economic pol­
icies .
The structural implications of fiscal policies aimed 
to stabilize cyclical swings in the economy are not the 
•focus of this chapter, but will be dealt with in extenso 
in chapter 7.
Various constraints, of external as well as of inter­
nal nature, are assumed throughout the analysis.
The well-known constraint of a small open economy in 
initial disequilibrium, the implications of increasing po­
litical hardship of raising additional taxes as results of 
recession and changing political consensus, and the, in 
the present context, obvious constraint of belonging to a 
currency area, which, as Meade pointed out initially, em­
1) Jan Tumlir, "International Economic Order, Rules, Co­
operation and Sovereignty", pp. 1-2, in P. Oppenheimer 
(ed.), Issues in International Economics, Oriel Press 
1980.
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phasizes demand management/financial policies, as the option 
of exchange rate adjustments, is severely restricted.
Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system the 
dollar was the n-th currency, and the rest of the partici­
pants of that system had either to bring their monetary ex­
pansion in line with that of the dollar or to use fiscal 
measures to check demand. Such a behaviour could, with some 
amount of good will, be called a coordination policy. How­
ever a more accurate term would be that of U.S. stabiliza­
tion leadership and pure adaptive stabilization policies 
elsewhere. In the following we shall argue that the demand 
for more international coordination of stabilization poli­
cies, which has been voiced as essential by economists1 from
2all camps, and whose cry, according to Vaubel, "was magni­
fied by the international organisations (OECD, IMF, BIS, EC)
1) Examples are: McCracken & al., op. cit., C.P.
Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the Interna­
tional Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and Free
Rides", in Hommage a F. Perroux, Grenoble 1978, W.M. 
Corden, "The Coordination of Stabilization Policies", in 
A. Ando, R. Herring & R. Marston, International Aspects 
of Stabilization Policies, Boston 19 77.
2) R. Vaubel, International Coordination or Competition of 
National Stabilization Policies, mimeo, Florence 19 79.
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which saw a chance of increasing demand for their product", 
has a somewhat different meaning for the small open economy, 
constrained by the earlier mentioned variables, and accord­
ingly, this will influence the perceived distribution of 
costs and benefits of belonging to a currency area for such 
a country. Another paradox of the coordination of national 
economic policies on an international level is the belief 
that policies can be agreed on internationally, which could 
not find support in national parliaments. The idea that a 
supranational body, or supranational decision-making, should 
be able to implement policies, where national bodies have
given up, that is policy-making without politics, is com-
1mented on by Tumlir in the following way: (from the belief
that progress of mankind is directly correlated by the num­
ber of mistakes it can make) "with one . . . sovereignty we 
would be limited to only one big mistake at a time".
Another intangible problem of international coordina­
tion of economic policies or the centralization of decision­
making, which it in fact amounts to, is the changing concep­
tions of national interest.
2The differences in time horizons, i.e. elections do
1) Jan Tumlir, op. cit.
2) Although the existence of electoral cycles is hotly de­
bated, empirical studies tend to support their exist­
ence, cf. E.R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, 
Princeton 19 78, and M. Paldam, "Is There an Electoral 
Cycle? A Comparative Study of National Accounts", The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 81, no. 2, pp.
323-342.
- 145 -
have repercussions on the international level, where eco­
nomic constraints agreed on in order to increase the via­
bility of a monetary arrangement, could have consequences 
for the amount of support voters give a political leader­
ship. Compare the following statement: "While some pol­
iticians believe that their constituency is more exten­
sive than their country, some even have a global follow­
ing, ultimately the national constituency decides whether
1the politician will retain power."
On the international level it must be kept in mind
that the participating national states do not have iden-
2tical preferences, nor do they all start from a position 
of equilibrium in basic parameters; i.e. price stability, 
full employment, external balance, etc., and neither does 
it include the basic fact that the process of economic 
coopera-tion involves nation states which have different 
historic traditions, and in turn are competing for power, 
leadership roles and influence, in order to promote and/ 
or defend their perceived interests.
On this background it is not surprising that the 
small open economy entering a currency area will be a 
policy taker and not a policy maker, both in the formula-
1) R.Z. Aliber, "Monetary Rules and Monetary Reform", in 
his The Political Economy of Monetary Reform, Chicago
1977.
2) Or identical Phillips curve trade-offs, for believers 
of the Phillips curve.
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tion of national economic priorities and in the implementa­
tion of successful stabilization measures.
This, as will be discussed later, is in contrast to 
the traditional theory of Economic Policy, which is a theo­
ry of choice. So the coordination aspect tends more to be 
that of successful adaption of the policies of the dominant 
partner in the currency area, than that of choice.
The room for manoeuvre is thus limited: A high real
interest rate is assigned to secure the financing of the 
external deficits and to protect the international re­
serves .
The effects of having a fixed exchange rate link to 
another currency with a higher degree of price stability 
will be felt with varying intensity throughout the economy, 
and deflationary impulses will be checked by a more expan­
sive fiscal policy. However as fiscal incentives never 
were meant to operate for too long, a long adjustment proc­
ess with reliance on tight monetary policies, will eventu­
ally diminish fiscal effectiveness, when long-run infla­
tionary expectations are fuelled by ever increasing budget 
deficits.
The main question is then to ask whether monetary tar­
gets and/or exchange rate targets should be set in competi­
tion with fiscal policies or be coordinated with a declared 
fiscal stance.
An over-reliance on the Mundell-Fleming policy mix of­
ten results in a policy conflict. How to overcome this 
conflict is the aim of the present chapter. However, be­
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fore proceeding so far, it is the intention to analyze the 
role and usefulness of stabilization policies in the light 
of the propositions of the "new macroeconomics".
6.2. The role of economic policy and the coordination 
without clearly stated goals.
On the background of the stagflation which has been 
experienced by most Western economies, serious doubt has 
been expressed in the ability of government to select op­
timal combinations of instruments in order to secure the 
familiar medium-term goals of economic policy: output
stability, price stability and external balance through 
fine-tuning of fiscal, financial and monetary policies; 
the use of the exchange rate in the present context is 
ruled out.
The turn from what has been coined neo-Keynesian pol- 
icy-optimism to the term of policy neutrality is the out­
come of such lost faith in government's ability to affect 
real variables through policy action. Indeed interference 
can even make matters worse, as policy actions, according 
to one school of thought, often seem to have an adverse 
effect, or none at all. This "policy neutrality or worse"
proposition, as advanced by the protagonists of the "new
1classical macroeconomics", can be summed up in the fol-
1) See Milton Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy", 
American Economic Review, vol. 58, March 1968, pp. 1- 
17. Robert E. Lucas, "Expectations and the Neutrality 
of Money", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 4, April 
1972, pp. 103-24. E.S. Phelps and J.B. Taylor, "Sta­
bilizing Powers of Monetary Policy under Rational Ex­
pectations", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85, 
February 19 77, pp. 163-190. B.T. McCallum, "Price 
Level Stickiness and the Feasibility of Monetary Sta­
bilization Policy with Rational Expectations", Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 85, June 1977, pp. 627-634, 
and "Price Level Adjustments and the Rational Expecta­
tions Approach to Macroeconomic Stabilization Poli­
cies", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 10, 
November, pp. 418-436.
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lowing statements:
1. Uncertainty of the effects of policy due to incalcula­
ble time lags, makes it questionable to use stabiliza­
tion policies except for certain simple rules.
2. The rational expectation hypothesis sterilizes effects 
of policy, as economic agents can take evasive action.
3. So only totally unanticipated policies will have a
real and lasting effect. This is the surprise supply
1function and
4. Debt neutrality, which states that the financing mode 
of stabilization policies is of no consequence. So it 
does not matter whether public spending is financed by 
taxes, borrowing or money creation.
The first three of these propositions will be discussed in
the present chapter.
However in order to avoid total semantic confusion a
working definition of stabilization policies is offered.
2Following Buiter the traditional distinction between sta­
bilization policies and structural policies should be 
abandoned. Stabilization policies are policies that in-
1) As phrased by W.H. Buiter in "The Macroeconomics of 
Dr. Pangloss", The Economic Journal, vol. 90, March 
1980, pp. 34-50, and more elaborately in "The Role of 
Economic Policy After the New Classical Macroeconom­
ics”, in Macroeconomic Analysis, by D. Currie & D. 
Pell (eds.), London 1981, pp. 233-278.
2) W.H. Buiter, "The Role of Economic Policy After the 
New Classical Macroeconomics", in Currie & Pell, op. 
cit.
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fluence and hopefully minimize deviation of output and em­
ployment from their full employment levels, and structural 
policies alter the level and composition of full employment 
output— and employment. Policies which alter the relative 
size of public and private sectors or change a nation's in­
vestment/consumption mix are thus structural policies. 
However it is increasingly difficult to separate the ef­
fects of the two types of policy.
In the real world every policy action will have both 
stabilization as well as structural consequences, providing 
that the statements of policy neutrality are refuted.
"This is of course, quite consistent with ill-informed 
policy-makers considering only either the stabiliza­
tion, or the structural consequences of their actions, 
and ignoring half the implications of their policies. 
Some of the most serious dilemmas in economic policy­
making occur when a policy that is desirable for its 
short-run stabilization effects has undesirable long- 
run structural implications, or vice-versa."^
Until now we have treated stabilization policies as one in­
strument.
2Tinbergen's solubility requirement states that sever­
al policy goals require an identical number of policy in­
struments .
Mundell's^ original contribution was then, that stabi-
1) Buiter, ibid.
2) J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy, Amster­
dam 1952.
3) R.A. Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fis­
cal Policy for Internal and External Balance", IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 9, pp. 70-77.
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lization policies could be dichotomized into the two inde­
pendent instruments: monetary and fiscal policy, as these
instruments were supposed to have differential impacts, 
but would affect the two targets simultaneously. This 
again gave rise to the assignment problem. Which instru­
ment should be used for which target? According to the 
principle of "effective market classification" the instru­
ment should be allocated to the target where it exerts the 
greatest relative impact.
So we can identify two independent forms of stabili­
zation policies:
a. Monetary policy, which is the control of high-powered 
money, and
b. Fiscal policy, which here is narrowly defined as defi­
cit financing.
1Although McCallum states that the theorem of policy neu­
trality holds for all aspects of stabilization policies, 
we shall here primarily discuss the impacts of monetary 
policies, as deficit financing is treated elsewhere, and 
as the mainstream of analysis has been centered on mone­
tary policy.
So let us turn to the first of the four statements 
about policy neutrality made by the "New Classical Macroe­
conomics". The first statement was:
1. The uncertainty of policy-outcome and the preference 
for certain simple rules.
This proposition does not explicitly state policy 
neutrality, the main concern is that the effects of policy
1) McCallum, op. cit.
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action are more or less unpredictable due to time lags and 
variability in expected outcome. The argument is briefly 
stated as follows; which in turn is admittedly inconsist­
ent with the theorem of rational expectations, that as 
real world governments do not have perfect foresight about 
future events and as the world cannot be assumed to be a 
stationary system, then government should refrain from 
further increasing uncertainty by seeking to implement 
policies, when the nature of their outcome is doubtful.
It is therefore more prudent to have simple, and hence 
easier to predict, rules to rely on.
This proposition is the one originally advanced by
1Friedman. His constant growth rate of the money supply
is the archetype of such a fixed simple rule.
However real world events seem to have caught up with 
the predictability aspect of this particular rule, if it 
is assumed that a fixed growth rate of the money supply is 
having a direct influence on the exchange rate.
The dollar/sterling exchange rate in the turbulent 
days of the Carter administration is an example of the un­
predictability of the money supply as indicator for the
exchange rate, and has been commented on by Forsyth &
2Edwards: " . . .  the relationship between domestic mone­
tary policy and the exchange rate has proved to be much
1) M. Friedman, op. cit.
2) I. Forsyth & F. Edwards, A Policy for Sterling,
Chatham House 19 79, p. 8.
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more complex than the monetarists had predicted. In partic­
ular there have been divergences from the normal relation­
ship which though they might have been temporary, were of a 
scale that had serious domestic consequences. Over the 
three years to 1979, UK monetary growth averaged not much 
more than 10% per annum with little variation between the 
years. However over that same period sterling fell from 
#2.02 to £1.56 and then rose to $ 2 . 3 2 .  These fluctuations 
in the sterling exchange rate in recent years cannot simply 
be explained in terms of the pace of monetary growth."
Of course it can be argued that Forsyth & Edwards do 
not take the potential fluctuations of the growth rate of 
the dollar supply into consideration, but the main point re­
mains, that in a multiple currency world, a steady rate in 
domestic money growth does not guarantee a stable exchange 
rate, and furthermore, as argued earlier, the exchange rate 
is not necessarily determined in and by the money market.
2. The rational expectations argument, which was first
1introduced by Muth for the theory of the firm, and applied
2to macroeconomics by mainly Lucas and Sargent & Wallace.
1) Muth, J.F., "Rational Expectations and the Theory of 
Price Movements", Econometrica, vol. 29, July 1961, pp. 
315-39.
2) R.E. Lucas, "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money", 
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 4, April 1972, pp. 103— 
24, and T. Sargent & N. Wallace, "Rational Expectations 
and the Theory of Economic Policy", Journal of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 4, April 1976, pp. 1-44.
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In Muth's original paper from 1961, it was stated that the 
average expectation of firms concerning, say, the future 
price of a commodity would be a function of the expecta­
tions of all relevant economic agents. These expectations 
were in turn based on a correct, universally agreed econom­
ic theory. The actual future price would then become a
sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. The most radical inter-
1pretation of this is the one of Shiller: "Future varia­
tions anticipated at time t are true mathematical expecta­
tions of the future variables conditional on all variables 
in the model which are known to the public at time t."
The bearing of this on macroeconomic policy is that 
the private sector is able to respond to current and antic­
ipated future policy actions. In order to promote policies 
which should affect real variables private economic behav­
iour must be anticipated by the government in order to im­
plement effective policies towards private economic agents 
who in turn would take (evasive) action based on rational 
expectations, etc.
The promising aspect of the rational expectations mod­
el is that it offers an operational concept of the interac­
tion between private sector behaviour and government behav­
iour, and their mutual expectations to each other.
However two main points of critique can be raised
1} R.J. Shiller, "Rational Expectations and the Dynamic
Structure of Macroeconomic Models", Journal of Monetary 
Economics, January 19 78.
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against the proposition of policy neutrality based on the 
rational expectations theorem.
Firstly, how do private agents acquire knowledge about 
the true or correct structure of the economy, or alterna­
tively, how do private economic agents acquire identical, 
not necessarily correct, knowledge about the state of the 
economy? These questions are not answered by the extensive 
literature on the subject.
Secondly, if rational expectations in a somewhat prim­
itive setting is assumed, then the resulting forecast will 
in principle be like a least square linear extrapolation to 
some point in the future. Such a result rests on the as­
sumption that all private agents have identical perceptions 
about the desirability of the action of the government.
Now, in any distributive policy undertaken by the gov­
ernment some will see the state as the traditional benevo­
lent despot while others may see it as an all consuming
1Leviathan. In such a situation with perceptions of gov­
ernment action ranging from one extreme to another in a 
"good-bad continuum", the resulting least square extrapola­
tion would have no meaning.
The third statement of the New Classical Macroeconom­
ics is the following:
3. Only the surprise supply function matters.
This proposition is the logical extension of the for­
mer statement of rational expectations. The implication
1) To use Buchanan's term used in G. Brennan & J.M. 
Buchanan, The Power to Tax, Cambridge 1981.
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for the government of rational expectation behaviour by 
private economic agents is then that government should 
act irrationally by way of shocks and surprise.
The proposition that "only shocks work" has been 
suggested both for deficit spending as well as for the 
control of the nominal money supply. We shall concen­
trate here on the latter. We shall argue that even an­
ticipated money is bound to have the intended effects 
at least in the following two ways:
a) Through wage contracts. If the labour market is 
organized in a system with negotiated multi-period 
wage contracts without full compensation for alter­
nations in the real wage rate then an even antici­
pated increase in the nominal money supply will 
have real effects. This provided that the labour
market sticks to such an agreement. This point has
1been proved by, amongst others, Fischer and in a
2slightly different connection by Grossman, who 
finds that " . . .  although both parties can improve 
their expected outcomes by making the arrangement, 
one of the parties usually will find his actual 
outcome would be better if he was not bound by the 
arrangement".
1) Fischer, S., "Long Term Contracts, Rational Expec­
tations and the Optimal Money Supply Rule", Journal
of Political Economy, Feb. 1979, pp. 191, 205.
2) H. Grossman, "Risk Shifting, Layoffs and Seniori­
ty", Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 4, Nov.
1978, pp. 661-86.
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b) A second channel through which an anticipated increase 
in the money supply will affect real variables is via 
the inflation tax. Any portfolio holder tries to max­
imize the return of his portfolio. Assets which are 
bad hedges against inflation will be substituted for
more inflation-proof assets. This is the so-called
1Tobin effect, which we in Buiter's interpretation
2shall contrast with the views of Afxentiou whose main 
concern is the altered income distribution stemming 
from an increase in the money supply.
First Buiter:
"Anticipated future money growth, to the extent that 
it is associated with anticipated future inflation, 
will move desired portfolio composition away from as­
sets that are poor hedges against inflation. E.g. in 
many money and growth models money and capital are 
the only two stores of value. With no market deter­
mined interest rate attached to outside money balanc­
es, an increase in the anticipated rate of inflation 
will reduce the demand for money, stimulate capital 
formation and thus over time boost productive capaci­
ty and actual output. Whenever output is a function 
of some anticipated real rate of return variable, ei­
ther in the short run (via the supply of labour) or 
in the long run (via the capital stock), anticipated 
future money will have real effects."
1) W. Buiter, "The Role of Economic Policy", in Currie & 
Pell (eds.), op. cit.
2) P.C. Afxentiou, Anti-Government Sentiments and Their 
Policy Implications, note missing.
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Then Afxentiou:
"In countries with high unemployment rates, a con­
traction of government spending together with a move 
towards a balanced budget must be accompanied by in­
creases in the supply of money in order to prevent 
unemployment from rising. And provided the objec­
tive is to lower unemployment the money supply must 
be increased further. The required increases in 
money supply are made possible by the purchase of 
government bonds by the central bank at prices that 
are high enough to prompt people to substitute cash 
for bonds in their portfolios. Since bondholders as 
wealthmaximizers are always prepared to exchange 
their bonds for cash provided the price of bonds is 
raised, such transactions represent a direct and 
unilateral transfer of monetary wealth from the cen­
tral bank to them. Bonds are known to be held most­
ly by banks or by near banks, and to the extent that 
they are privately held they are held mainly by the 
rich. Thus the initial impact of increases in the 
supply of money amounts to a transfer of wealth ei­
ther to the rich, or to institutions which are 
largely owned and controlled by the rich."
The two examples of anticipated stabilization policies 
were shown to have direct effects on the real economy, as 
well as having structural effects. A formal presentation 
of this is presented in the next chapter.
What conclusions are then likely to be drawn from 
the above discussion of the proposition of policy neu­
trality as made by the new macroeconomists?
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, real 
world events had given rise to doubt about governments' 
ability to steer the economy on an acceptable course, but 
this policy pessimism does not necessarily imply policy 
neutrality or worse propositions.
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A conclusion to share is the one voiced by Buiter, 
which says:
"After all policy neutrality would be most welcome 
when the conduct of policy is erratic, confusing or 
incompetent. No such easy escape is available to 
the policymaker. Policy can stabilize and it can 
destabilize, it can promote growth and prosperity 
or destroy it."
So assuming that policies do matter, we can proceed 
to the next link of the chain, that is the coordination 
aspect.
6.3. Which goals for coordination?
In the "Snake" and in the EMS the institutional co­
ordination of policy has been, and is still, the weak 
point. Because there is no formal decision about which 
specific goals the exchange-rate area is set up to pur­
sue .
If there is no clearly defined goal for coordina­
tion, centralized decision-making seems superfluous, as 
the important thing is to decide realistically what one 
wants to achieve, and then how to achieve it.
The only vague formulation of responsibilities for 
policy coordination between the participating member- 
states is found in §3.6 of the Brussels Communiqué which 
briefly states:
"When a currency crosses its threshold of diver­
gence this results in a presumption that the au-
1) W.H. Buiter, "Monetary, Financial and Fiscal Poli­
cies Under Rational Expectations", IMF Staff Papers, 
vol. 27, Dec. 1980, pp. 785-811.
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thorities concerned will correct this situation by 
adequate measures, namely:
a) Diversified intervention.
b) Measures of domestic monetary policy.
c) Changes in central rates.
d) Other measures of economic policy.
. . .  In case such measures, on account of special 
circumstances are not taken, the reasons for this 
shall be given to the other authorities, especially 
in the concertation between central banks. Consul­
tations will, if necessary then take place in the 
appropriate community bodies, including the council 
of ministers."
-|This formulation is very vague, and as Thygesen com­
ments, even in a double sense:
"Firstly the nature of the adjustment action is not 
well defined, indeed, it is not mandatory to take 
action at all, and secondly, it is very difficult 
to assess a priori how often currencies will in 
practice reach their ECU threshold. Yet this flex­
ibility may turn out to be a considerable asset, by 
enabling the EMS to* modify and sharpen its proce­
dures if and when the need arises."
Some years later, with the present divergence of mone­
tary trends inside the EMS, need has arisen, but new 
initiatives have not been put forward. Indeed where the 
first two realignments went off smoothly, the last rea­
lignments have proved difficult. Furthermore, some cur­
rencies did reach the threshold of divergence several 
times without any corrective measures being taken.
1) N. Thygesen, EMS, Options and Precursors, K^benhavn
1979.
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And as Thygesen notices later:
"It would be naive to suggest that coordination of 
monetary policies can in itself hold together the 
EMS. But it seems equally certain that if the par­
ticipants do not develop the minimal machinery and 
rules of conduct for such coordination, they will 
be ill equipped to deal with the increasing strains 
that are bound to arise in the EMS from time to 
time— both when a central^rate adjustment is called 
for, and when it is not."
In the absence of such rules of conduct for the coordi­
nation of policies, an ad hoc-ery approach is taking 
place amongst central-bankers. This does not solve the
n-th currency problem, as a hegemonial country is not
2recognised, and neither is a set of formalized rules.
The present state of the art with Germany as at
least a primus inter pares is commented on by Gillibert 
& Monti:
"This is not the only, nor the most desirable of 
solutions of the n-th currency problem, but it had 
the force of inertia behind it. How long and how 
far it will continue . . . remains to be seen. And
yet this is the aspect that needs to be watched
first and foremost if we want to assess the chances 
of survival of the EMS. If this is how things 
stand, that is, if durable integration within EMS 
depends on the extent to which each member country 
succeeds in imitating German economic policy, then 
at first sight the greater the gap between a coun­
1) Thygesen, op. cit.
2) Especially with a new French government and eventual 
British membership.
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try1s current economic policy and that of the German 
model, the greater will be the cost of adjusting to 
membership of the agreement.
Such a state of affairs as that described above is
clearly unstable and unsatisfying, if the ultimate goal
2is a viable monetary union. Swoboda makes the sensible 
distinction between a viable currency area and the opti­
mal currency area, where the coordination of economic 
policies increases the viability of a currency area. Vi­
ability is here defined as the possibility of reconcil­
ing, at least within tolerable margins, internal and ex­
ternal balances under fixed exchange rates for a given 
group of countries or regions.
What can be put instead of this unsatisfying ar­
rangement? The obvious answer to solve the n-th currency 
problem is the establishment of a European central bank. 
This at least in theory. This bank should according to 
Parkin^ have "a single attainable objective of achieving
1) Gillibert & Monti, "Weak Currencies and the Weakness 
of the EMS", The Three Banks Review, Aug. 1981.
2) A.K. Swoboda, "Policy Conflict, Inconsistent Goals, 
and the Coordination of Economic Policies", in H.G. 
Johnson & A.K. Swoboda (eds.), The Economy of Common 
Currencies, London 19 73.
3) M. Parkin, "In Search of a Monetary Constitution for 
the EC", in Fratianni & Peters, op. cit.
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a growth rate of the aggregate money supply, approximating 
to the rate of real growth of output".
However fascinating such a proposal may be, it proba­
bly raises more problems of a political nature, than it 
seems to solve, because member states' fiscal policies 
will be affected.
A preliminary conclusion is the straightforward one, 
that, as the EMS and the Snake grew out of community de­
sire to include national economic policies in the integra­
tion process, and as the actual undertakings of fixing ex­
change rates were initiated because of external events, 
explicit rules were never agreed on. This probably would 
have meant endless delays in the respective schemes.
And even if rules had been agreed on, these would 
certainly have a different impact from country to country. 
Strong currency countries with an obligation to intervene 
in the exchange markets at fixed points invariably in­
crease their domestic monetary base as they cannot auto­
matically let their currencies appreciate. In such a case 
the strong currency country will call the agreement "a ve­
hicle of inflation" while the weak currency country would 
complain of the sufferings from the deflationary impact of 
an overvalued exchange rate.
Furthermore the impact of rules is differentiated ac-
1cording to the countries' "propensity to export shocks".
1) Aliber (1977), op. cit.
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"The more likely a country is to export shocks, the 
more likely that its trading partners might wish to 
constrain its policies by rules. The less likely a 
country is to export shocks, the less interested 
other countries will be to constrain its behaviour. 
Consequently the major beneficiaries of the reduc­
tion in uncertainty from imposition of rules are 
likely to be smaller countries, while the costs or 
constraints are likely to be felt by the larger 
countries."^
It can be added for clarification that small coun­
tries' ability to export shocks is at least on par with 
that of large countries, relatively, but it is absolute 
amounts which matter. And this is an important explana­
tory variable why large countries seem to avoid such 
constraints, which in theory would even out the present 
skewed distribution of costs and benefits of belonging 
to a currency area, cf. chapter 1.
Until a clearer understanding is reached amongst 
the participants of a currency area the previously quot­
ed statement of Gillibert & Monti, that only the best 
imitators of German economic policies and performance 
will see a reduction in adjustments costs, seems to be 
valid, looking at EMS experience. Seen from the per­
spective of the small open economy, the immediate range 
of options for actually making an imitation is limited, 
which is the subject for discussion in the following 
section.
1) Aliber (1977), op. cit.
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6.4. The limited range of policy options for the small 
open economy.
Consider the following two approaches to economic 
policy as the only "valid" ones, or as two ideal types, 
in the Weberian sense:
a) The theory of economic policy1
2b) Endogenous policy making
Accepting this proposition, the aim is here to show how 
actual behaviour seems to be more in line with proposi­
tion b than with proposition a, and that a currency area 
probably would function much better by relying more on 
proposition a!
We first turn to discuss a "mainstream" presenta­
tion of the theory of economic policy.
a) The theory of economic policy.
This is a theory of choice. The ranking of priori­
ties for the economic policy is the logical outcome of 
the political process. The theory of economic policy is 
then used to implement the desired ranking of economic 
goals. The level of sophistication of the technique of 
maximizing the desired goals in terms of resources is
1) As presented by: J. Tinbergen (1952), op. cit., and
later Bent Hansen, Finanspolitikens Ekonomiska 
Teori, Stockholm 1955.
2) Examples of this line of thought can be found in:
A. Lindbeck, "Economic Policy Making with Endogenous 
Politicians", American Economic Journal, Jan. 1976.
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very, high in available literature, but the basis of the 
theory seems to be the following: The economy is present­
ed as a more or less definite model, where some variables 
are supposed to be controllable, and are hence instru­
ments. Other variables are of a more uncontrollable na­
ture and are the exogenous input for the model. Finally 
the political goals are introduced. The aim of the exer­
cise is now to find the combination of instruments which 
maximizes the desired ranking of political objectives.
To achieve the greatest possible welfare only two 
real constraints are taken into consideration, existing 
production factors and technological factors.
If society has several, and perhaps conflicting, ob­
jectives the economist then advises how much of one ob­
jective it is necessary to give up in order to have more 
of another. Politicians are supposed to make the weighing 
of the objectives and to formulate a workable rank order.
This way of thinking is in essence the original lib­
eral one, that politicians are concerned with values and 
economists are concerned with facts. The implication is 
the isolation of the two systems from each other.
To outline the framework further, it is convenient to 
start from the basis of Tinbergen, where each independent
1) See i.e. R.S. Pindyck, Optimal Planning for Economic 
Stabilization, Amsterdam 1973, or A.E. Bryson & Y.C.
Ho, Applied Optimal Control, Optimization Estimation 
and Control, Washington 1979.
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policy objective must be assigned an independent policy in­
strument. As an example, the level of demand which gives 
price stability cannot be expected also to provide full em­
ployment and external equilibrium and desired level of eco­
nomic growth, etc. The well-known Tinbergen proposition is 
then that a number of policy targets only can be achieved
simultaneously, if there are, generally speaking, as many
1instruments as targets. To complicate things, instruments 
can be objectives and vice versa. And instruments are of­
ten mistaken for variables which are part of the causal
2 3link between instruments and objectives. An example is 
the desirability of a higher rate of investment in the pri­
vate sector in order to secure the objective of higher eco­
nomic growth. Even if a higher rate of level of private 
investment is a means to fulfill the objective, it is not 
an instrument in the more narrow formulation, because it is 
not under the direct control of government. An instrument 
in such an example would be different taxation rates de­
pending on end use of money.
The main conclusion to draw, for our previously stated 
ends, is that the theory of economic policy is a tool to 
direct the economy in a desired direction, which is based 
on an objective weighing of suitable alternatives.
1) J. Tinbergen (1952), op. cit.
2) See i.e. N. Kaldor (ed.), Conflicts in Policy Objec­
tives , Cambridge 1971.
3) Cf. Graham, op. cit.
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The other approach to economic policy is:
b) Endogenous policy making.
This way of approaching economic policy making is 
more difficult to operationalize. The main contrast to 
the "a" approach is that instead of choice, this approach 
is a constant process of wheeling and dealing inside a 
vaguely defined area of what is possible politically. 
Decisions are taken under pressure, and alternatives seem 
few, or non-existent. The optimal decisions here are the 
ones which restore "equilibria" by having different 
sources of political pressure sterilizing one another, 
without looking much at longer term consequences. By 
trying to let political demand functions meet available 
supply of policies, with the government acting like an 
intermediate, or playing the auctioneer's role in a mar­
ket process, we are already in the domain of public
1choice theory, so even though the two theories may seem 
to be worlds apart, they are actually complementary to 
each other.
The b-approach defines the constraints which hinder 
the optimization of the a-approach.
So as the freedom of action consequently is de­
creased in the a-approach, the b-approach seems to be the 
more interesting. The following example from Denmark il­
lustrates this point of a decreasing range of options.
1) See i.e. D.C. Mueller, Public Choice, Cambridge 1979.
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Say that there are only two major policy objectives: 
Full employment and external equilibrium. The ranking of 
the two objectives is here indifferent.
In 1980 the Danish balance of payments deficit was 
Dkr 20 billions, or approx. 4.5% of GNP. If no corrective 
measures are taken the deficit on the balance of payments 
will reach a level of Dkr 40 billions^ in 1982, which is 
6% in current prices of GNP.
To reach external equilibrium from such a position a 
drastic reduction of domestic demand would be needed. As­
suming identical import propensities in all sectors, the 
total reduction of domestic demand would be within the or­
der of Dkr 90 billions, or 23% of total domestic demand.
With unchanged productivity, unemployment would have
2to rise by further 17%, in real terms by approx. 400,000 
people, or 20,000 unemployed for each Dkr billion reduced 
demand. Such an option is of course outside the politi­
cally possible.
3A lasting improvement could probably be achieved by 
a drastic 10% real devaluation, which would produce an
1) Figures from Government Finances, June 1981, 
K0benhavn.
2) See Economic Council, June 1980.
3) Suggested by Economic Council 19 79, as the Dkr was, 
and is, following a path of real appreciation. This 
was first demonstrated by N. Blomgren-Hansen & J. 
Pedersen, "Arbejdsmarked og Betalingsbalance", 
National^konomisk Tidsskrift, No. 3, 1977.
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output/employment path superior to the one achievable by 
tightening fiscal policy.
Such an option is preliminarily ruled out because of 
the commitments in the EMS, and also because of the ef­
fects on the large outstanding debt.
1A more realistic option, according to Zeuthen, is 
an export led growth by way of decreasing effectively the 
import rate. Such a move implies a shift of resources 
from the domestic sector to the competition sector, which 
again implies a rise in private investment. Judging from 
the figures in chapter 8, an already depressed investment 
rate makes this option difficult. The Danish interest 
rate has traditionally been so high that the private sec­
tor was induced to borrow abroad, which helped finance 
the deficit on the balance of payments. A lower interest 
rate would stop this inducement, and people would start 
repaying their foreign debts. In order not to see the 
international reserves disappear, or even worse conse­
quences, the public sector would have to finance the 
whole deficit, Dkr 20 billions, debt servicing on foreign 
debt Dkr 5 billions, and perhaps half the long-term pri­
vate component of the foreign debt, Dkr 15 billions. All 
in all Dkr 40 billions in a year. According to the Gov­
ernor of the Central Bank this would be nearly impossi-
1) H.E. Zeuthen, "Strukturtilpasning og ligevaegt pa
betalingsbalancen", National^konomisk Tidsskrift, No.
3, 1980.
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ble.
So the real choice in this example is to maintain a 
restrictive monetary policy in order to secure the financ­
ing of the current account, and to have lax fiscal policy 
to offset the impact. This is the Mundell-Fleming assign­
ment principle.
This limited choice of options is commented on by the 
Danish central bank governor:
"Is it possible now to maintain an independent dis­
tribution and welfare policy? In the longer run this 
is not possible. . . . real external constraints 
which are consequences of the increasing degree of 
economic integration in the Western world seriously 
limit our choice. The logical question is whether 
there are alternative possibilities. There are not 
many, and they are not very attractive. One possi­
bility is to seek a higher level by increasing self- 
sufficiency and imposing import controls. This would 
imply a drastic decrease in the standard of living, 
and increase potential tensions in our society."2
Such a sinister point of view is understandable, if one is 
solely looking at the constraints, in this case only con­
sidering the b-approach.
Instead of mere adaption however, there should be op­
portunity in any form of economic cooperation to influence 
events instead of mere adaption, or acceptance of events.
1
1) E. Hoffmeyer, "Internationale Bindinger pa Dansk
0konomi", National0konomisk Tidsskrift, No. 3, 1980.
2) Ibid.
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That is, to be able to implement real policy initia­
tives in order to find a more favourable medium and long 
term trajectory for the economy than the present rather 
unsatisfactory one, i.e. to rely more, than is the present 
case, on an a-type approach to economic policy, as the 
present option of relying on restrictive monetary policies 
and more or less accommodating fiscal policies has un­
wanted repercussions.
6.5. A framework for policy coordination inside a curren­
cy area.
Traditionally coordination of economic policies has 
been seen as an internationalization of the "assignment 
problem", where instruments are assigned to those targets
for which they have a comparative advantage.
1Komiya stresses the point that if the coordination 
process is seen as an assignment problem, then it is im­
portant to distinguish between those matters which should 
be dealt with exclusively by the national governments, and 
those matters which need to be coordinated. Decisions to 
set national targets for economic growth, unemployment and 
inflation should in the view of Komiya be regarded as mat­
ters lying outside the domain of international coordina­
tion .
Such an approach to coordination of economic policies 
is very much in contrast to the view that openness of an
1) R. Komiya, "Is International Coordination of National 
Economic Policies Necessary?", in P. Oppenheimer 
(1980), ed., op. cit., p. 32.
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economy makes it increasingly difficult to sustain a "di­
vergent" money income on a national level. In chapter 3 
we analyzed the impact of monetary, capital and goods mar­
ket linkages on the open economy and found that nearly all 
forms of economic activity would be affected by, and af­
fect, events abroad, because of the existence of large 
spill-overs from national stabilization policies.
A classical, or a neo-classical, economist would 
probably see international policy coordination as a non- 
event, because mainstream economic theory would prescribe 
decentralized decision-making, and adjustment through the 
markets.
1 2 However as Head originally suggested, and Vaubel
later has elaborated upon, price and output stability can
be seen as an international public good.
"An economic unit increasing consumption or invest­
ment spending, or accepting a substantial money wage 
cut in a situation of unemployment equilibrium, can 
by no means appropriate to itself, through private
1) J.G. Head, "Public Good and Public Policy", Public Fi­
nance, No. 3, 1962.
2) R. Vaubel, International Coordination or Competition
of National Stabilization Policies? A Welfare Econom­
ic Approach, Paper presented at colloquium on: New
Economic Approaches to the Study of International In­
tegration: Application of Economic Analysis to Polit­
ical Decision Making, EUI, Florence 1979.
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pricing, the full social benefits in the form of mul­
tiplier and real balance effects on the incomes and 
profits of other economic units. With signs changed, 
a similar argument applies to the inflation case. 
Again in the case of suboptimal growth, the full ben­
efits in terms of rising real wages fre'in growth pro­
moting behaviour, such as thrift, risk bearing, divi­
dend and wage restraint, are seldom anything like 
fully appropriable from the point of view of the eco­
nomic unit which must bear the full cost of such be­
haviour. In all these cases it would be possible for 
the community, by means of cooperative action, to 
compensate potential losers from socially desirable 
changes, and still enjoy a net benefit with some mem­
bers better off, and none worse off. Such coopera­
tive efforts will seldom be forthcoming in the ab­
sence of coercion and the inefficiency due to non-ap­
propriability will therefore persist. In a broad but 
very real and important sense then, domestic and in­
ternational economic stability, domestic and interna­
tional allocation of resources in accordance with 
consumers * wishes and an optimal rate of growth can 
all quite properly be regarded as public goods, for 
adequate provision of which public policy must be re­
lied upon” (italics in original).^
2Vaubel argues that although price and output stabil­
ity can be seen as an international public good, then it 
does not follow that internationally negotiated decision 
making is superior to independent and competitive decision 
making, because it is a complicated task to make an opera­
tional distinction between the two kinds of externalities, 
real income and distributional, which is vital for the ap-
1) J.G. Head, 1962, op. cit.
2) R. Vaubel, 1979, op. cit.
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proach.
So he suggests that competition between national sta-
2bilization policies in fact is preferable to coordination, 
because competition provides the public good of knowledge 
and discovery,^ and he gives the following example:
". . . i f  Switzerland and Germany had been prevented 
from pursuing their disinflationary stabilization pol­
icies over the past few years, citizens in Italy, the 
United Kingdom and elsewhere might not have realized 
as clearly that inflation in their own countries was 
and is due to the inappropriate monetary policies con­
ducted by their own governments, and consequently the 
public pressure on these governments to reduce infla­
tion would have been much weaker."^
Vaubel's theory is based on free floating exchange 
rates, and in a world with flexible exchange rates such an 
approach no doubt would be optimal.
However in a fixed exchange rate currency area, which 
is the main underlying assumption for the present work, the
1) For a discussion of the role of externalities in the
public goods theory see R. Vaubel, Strategies for Cur­
rency Unification, Tübingen 1978, pp. 75-79.
2) R. Vaubel, 1979, op. cit.
3) This statement is derived from Hayek, cf. "In the long
run the existence of groups ahead of the rest is clear­
ly an advantage to those who are behind", in his Con­
stitution of Liberty, London 1960.
4) R. Vaubel, 1979, op. cit., p. 17.
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reason why "citizens in Italy, the United Kingdom and else­
where" realize clearly the level of domestic inflation, is 
probably the same fixity of exchange rates combined with 
the existing inflation rate differentials. So one could 
turn the argument the other way around, and claim, at least 
in the very short run, that it is the fixed exchange rates 
and not the diverging inflation levels which are the main 
concern for the "citizens".
1Using game theory, Niehans. and Hamada show that non- 
cooperative decisions can lead to outcomes inferior to 
those realizable with coordination.
Coordination of national economic policies can be mod­
eled on a game tree with respect to either cooperative or 
non-cooperative games. In a cooperative game the national 
decision-makers make binding agreements about future poli­
cies, which might be different from the ones they them­
selves would have implemented. This is coordination. If 
on the other hand the agreements are of a more loose char­
acter, so that the agreements can be adapted according to
1) See i.e. JQrg Niehans, "Monetary and Fiscal Policies in 
Open Economies under Fixed Exchange Rates, An Optimiz­
ing Approach", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 76, 
Aug. 1968, pp. 89 3-920, Koichi Hamada, "A Strategic 
Analysis of Monetary Interdependence", Journal of Po­
litical Economy, vol. 84, Aug. 1976, pp. 677-700,
Koichi Hamada, "On the Political Economy of Monetary 
Integration", in R.Z. Aliber (ed.), 1977, op. cit., 
Koichi Hamada, "Alternative Exchange Rate Systems and 
the Interdependence of Monetary Policies", in R.Z. 
Aliber (ed.), National Monetary Policies and the Inter­
national Financial System, Chicago 19 74, and more re­
cently, Koichi Hamada, "Macroeconomic Strategy and Co­
ordination Under Alternative Exchange Rates", in R. 
Dornbusch and J.A. Frenkel (eds.), International Eco­
nomic Policy: Theory and Evidence, Baltimore 1979.
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individual immediate interest, the game is coined non-coop­
erative .
A non-cooperative game has basically two variants: 
the Cournot-Nash solution and the Stackelberg solution.1
In the Cournot-Nash solution each player ignores the 
effects of its decisions on the other, and takes the other 
players' decisions for given. The Stackelberg solution is 
based on asymmetry, and this is the game which comes near­
est in its implication to the coordination principle based 
on competition, as advocated by Vaubel.
In the Stackelberg solution the game is dominated by 
one player, which because of its dominant position, is able 
to anticipate the reaction functions of the other players.
By taking the other players1 reactions to its own de­
cisions into account, it can bend these decisions to its 
own benefit.
In his "Strategic analysis . . . "  Hamada shows that 
non-cooperative decisions of national actors are likely to 
generate inferior outcomes compared to near Pareto-optimal 
outcomes realizable with coordination, while the outcomes 
under the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg assumptions, show
1) For an exhaustive explanation of these terms see i.e. 
J.W. Friedman, "Cournot, Bowley, Stackelberg and 
Fellner and the Evolution of Reaction Functions", in B. 
Balassa & R. Nelson (eds.), Economic Progress, Private 
Values and Public Policy: Essays in Honour of William
Fellner, Leiden 19 77.
- 177 -
that the Stackelberg leader always reaps more benefit than 
the other players when a leader-follower setting is as­
sumed.
The original work of Niehans showed that a failure
to reach an agreement by the main economic actors, a non-
cooperative outcome, resulted in his model in a recession
in world economic activity. Finally it is worth mention-
2ing Cooper, who reaches two main conclusions in his study 
on the perceived need for coordination:
a) That international coordination tends to speed up ad­
justment and reduces the chances of cyclical divergen­
cies of national equilibria.
b) That coordination becomes more necessary when a high 
degree of goods and capital market integration exists.
6.6. Coordination of policies in a two country model.
In chapter 4 it was demonstrated that the different 
criteria for the functional working of a currency area 
were necessary preconditions, but not sufficient to solve 
the central problem of monetary integration: the achieve­
ment of internal and external balances.
If economic disintegration inside a currency area is 
to be avoided the adjustment process must be sped up, in
1) J. Niehans (1968), op. cit.
2) R.N. Cooper, "Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in In­
terdependent Economies", Quarterly Journal of Econom­
ics, vol. 83, no. 1, Feb. 1969, pp. 1-26. It should 
be noted that Cooper's results are not based on game 
theory.
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order to reduce the costs of having only one single curren­
cy, or the equivalent fixed exchange rate.
In order to show which goals realistically can be co­
ordinated and why policy conflicts might arise, a simple 
analytical model is presented, based on comparative statics
as used originally by Meade and later by, amongst others,
1Dornbusch & Swoboda.
Policy conflict between internal and external balance
in a two country model can, simplified, be divided into
four different disequilibrium situations, which are shown
below in the original Meade scheme. We assume two coun-
2tries, Sigma and Delta.
State Country Delta Country Sigma
1 deflation deflation
‘ 2 deflation inflation
3 inflation deflation
4 inflation inflation
1) See J.E. Meade (1951), op. cit., and A.K. Swoboda and 
R. Dornbush, "International Adjustment, Macroeconomic 
Policy, and Monetary Equilibrium in a Two Country Model 
of Income Determination", in M.B. Conolly & A.K.
Swoboda (eds.), International Trade and Money, London 
1972, and A.K. Swoboda, "Policy Conflict, Inconsistent 
Goals, and the Coordination of Economic Policies", in 
H.G. Johnson & A.K. Swoboda (eds.), 1973, op. cit.
2) See J.E. Meade (1951), op. cit.
One could also focus on budget balances in the two 
countries, then the taxonomic scheme would look like 
this:
State Delta Sigma
1 deficit deficit
2 deficit surplus
3 surplus deficit
4 surplus surplus
The analysis would be similar.
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The available policy instruments are, cf. chapter 3, 
absorption and disabsorption, where the first reduces ex­
penditure and the latter increases expenditure.
Internal balance is defined as a specific target 
value of real income. External balance can be defined 
conveniently as no change in reserve levels.
Country Delta has a surplus on its balance of pay­
ments, and correspondingly Country Sigma is in deficit.
Policy conflicts between internal and external bal­
ance will arise for country Delta in states 3 and 4, and 
for country Sigma in states 1 and 3.
Both countries will simultaneously experience a con­
flict in state 3.
A state 2 situation is the most simple, according to
1Meade. Here it is sufficient if both countries adjust 
their interest rates, downwards in Delta and upwards in 
Sigma. This will relieve the disequilibrium on the cur­
rent account.
The conflicts in states 1 and 4 are tractable. In 
state 4 both countries must try to contract in order to 
check inflation. This they can do either by raising the 
tax rate or raising the interest rate. Say that Sigma 
raises its interest rate in order to improve the balance 
of payments position by inducing capital from Delta as an 
effect of the interest rate differential.
The capital outflow from Delta will not reduce in­
1) J. Meade (1951 & 1981), op. cit.
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flation in the short run, as a time lag is to be expected 
before domestic investment will be affected.
In Sigma the rise in the interest rate will eventual­
ly work through to domestic investment, consumption and 
employment, and the initial inflation is soon succeeded by 
a corresponding deflation.
This is the state 3 problem, where expenditure poli­
cies cannot solve the dilemma.
Sigma cannot lower its interest rate, and neither can 
Delta without the reemergence of the original balance of 
payments disequilibrium. This situation with the surplus 
country having a potential inflation problem and the defi­
cit country experiencing degrees of deflation^ is accord-
2ing to Meade a very likely outcome of a bad coordination 
of income targets, and it certainly does remind one of the 
real problem of adjustment in the EMS,^ with the rift be­
tween so-called weak and strong currencies.
The state 3 situation arises because income targets 
in the two countries, Sigma and Delta, are incompatible
1) As the analysis is based on comparative statics, it is 
not possible to include the more realistic situation 
of persistent inflation or deflation.
2) J. Meade (1951), op. cit.
3) When the EMS started, a large part of German litera­
ture was preoccupied with the (realistic) assumption
that EMS would turn into a vehicle of German infla­
tion.
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with the balance of payments requirement, which is shown
graphically on the preceding page.1 In figures 3 and 4
the incomes of Delta and Sigma are shown on the x and y
axis respectively.
The income level of Delta is Y , and the income lev-a
el of Sigma is denominated Y, .D
Let us start with figure 2» which shows the easy 
case of coordination of income targets.
The line tt represents the combinations of income 
levels in the two countries, which will preserve a bal­
ance of payments equilibrium. All points above line tt 
show a balance of payments surplus for country Delta, 
while correspondingly points below signify a deficit.
Line Y'-Y' represents the desired target level of real
c l  c l
income for Delta, Y/-Y/ is the target income for Sigma.
b  d
The areas 1-2-4 correspond to states 1-2-4 for Coun­
try Sigma, while 1 ’ — 2 1 — 4 ’ correspond to states 1-2-4 for 
Country Delta.
In figure 3 the two income target lines intersect 
the tt line in point 0, which shows that equilibrium at 
point 0 can be found by expenditure policies in country 
Sigma and Delta respectively. The state 3 situation does 
not exist in figure 3 because the three target lines
Y'-Y', Y/-Y/ and tt all intersect in the point 0, so it a a b b
1) With the model partially adopted from Dornbusch & 
Swoboda (1972), op. cit., and Swoboda (1973), op. 
cit.
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is impossible for Delta to experience inflation and sur­
plus while Sigma is experiencing deflation and deficit.
In this case the income targets of the two countries are
compatible.
In figure on the other hand, a state 3 situation 
is shown in area 3.
Expenditure policies in the two countries cannot 
bring about internal and external balance simultaneously, 
because, as is shown below, the income targets of the two. 
countries are incompatible, with the instruments availa­
ble .
Say that the two countries in figure 4 follow expen­
diture policies aimed at internal balance. The income
levels will then be Y' and Y ¿ , and they will meet ina b 2
point 0, as previously.
However, at point 0, Delta is in a balance of pay­
ments situation while Sigma is in deficit.
In such a situation Sigma will lose reserves, in­
duced capital flows are for the moment unrealistically 
neglected, and Delta will gain reserves.
If this situation is prolonged, it will result in 
some degree of deflation in Sigma, and symmetrically, a 
degree of reflation in Delta. Eventually equilibrium can 
be found somewhere along the line segment 0,P, which is 
part of the tt-combined balance of payments line. The 
burden of adjustment because of incompatible targets for 
real income, is borne by either of the two countries ac­
cording to different divisions of line segment 0,P.
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In point K the adjustment burden falls more heavily 
on Delta, which has to increase its income target by line 
segment Y'-Y", than Sigma, which has to reduce its incomecl cl
target Y'-Y".D D 1According to Swoboda, policy conflict between coun­
tries, arising from income targets incompatible with bal­
ance of payments equilibrium is a result of an inconsist­
ency between policy targets and policy instruments.
A sustained disequilibrium of the state 3 situation 
implies a failure of coordination of national income tar­
gets, or the need for an additional policy instrument.
Because in the state 3 situation we have three tar­
gets for national economic policy, internal equilibria in 
Sigma and Delta and a balance of payments of equilibrium, 
but only two instruments, expenditure policies in Delta 
and in Sigma.
As an expenditure switching policy in this context, 
which could shift the tt-line from 0 to 0, is ruled out, 
a higher degree of harmonization of policies is required.
6.6.1. The rationale for medium-term expenditure policy 
making inside a currency area.
Below it is argued that the case for an independent 
fiscal policy in a small open economy is very weak. In 
the medium to long run asymmetry between fiscal stance 
and monetary target/exchange rate target will be increas­
ingly difficult. As a consequence fiscal and monetary
1) A. Swoboda (1972), op. cit.
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policies should, at least for the medium and long term, 
be seen as one instrument instead of two. If a strategy 
of disinflation is to be implemented it is essential to 
create, for the medium term, an environment of stability. 
The way monetary targets/exchange rate targets seem to be 
set in competition with fiscal policy is clearly not a
workable solution. Consistent budget deficits and tight
monetary policies are not an optimal combination. So it 
is here the aim to discuss the setting of a medium finan­
cial target, with more symmetry between the two comple­
mentary instruments of economic policy. Traditionally 
the issue of financial crowding out has been examined in 
the light of a too lax fiscal policy.
However for a small open economy like the Danish,
where a larger part of foreign borrowing now is done by 
the government sector, a real level of interest several 
percentage points above the foreign rates cannot eternal­
ly be defended by the old dogma that it is necessary for 
balance of payments reasons. Monetary policy, being more
flexible than fiscal policy in the short term, should be
1relied upon if a potential crowding out is felt, cf.
2Wilson:
"Why should it be thought worthwhile to investigate 
in such detail a situation where a public deficit is
1) The role of crowding out is discussed and analyzed in 
extenso in the next chapter.
2) T. Wilson, "Crowding Out, The Real Issues", BNL Quar­
terly Review, No. 130, 1979, p. 235.
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to be financed year out and in without any increase 
in the amount of money? If crowding out should oc­
cur on a scale that was thought to be undesirable, 
the remedy would be the rather obvious one of in­
creasing the money supply."
Returning to our policy conflict between Delta and 
Sigma, the inconsistency between income targets could be 
remedied if each defined a compatible medium financial 
target, based on accepted rules for the assignments of 
expenditure policies.
However as was argued in a preceding section, coor­
dination of national economic policies should not be 
seen as a panacea for international acceptance of poli­
cies which could not be agreed upon on a national level.
A corollary of this is that a coordination of fis­
cal and monetary policies, in the form of a medium-term 
financial target, should first be agreed upon national­
ly, before an international coordination can take place.
6.6.2. Assumptions about a more balanced policy-mix for 
the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
in the medium term.
The case for a medium-term financial target hinges 
basically on three propositions, which we must take for 
granted. These are:
i) That the containment of high inflation rates is giv­
en priority relative to the other medium-term goals of 
economic growth and employment,1 and that the control of
1) See mainly: OECD, Monetary Targets and Inflation
Control, Paris 1979.
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monetary aggregates are interdependent instruments if in­
flationary expectations are to be controlled.1
ii) That the divergent public expenditure trends inside a 
currency area are unsustainable, as the difference in do­
mestic allocation of resources has inflationary implica­
tions. As a consequence of this government expenditure 
and taxation should, in the longer term, be brought into 
balance with available resources.
iii) That the financing of budget deficits has a bearing 
on inflationary expectations, as a high governmental sec-, 
tor indebtedness eventually will bring pressure upon the 
government to "monetize" the deficit, which will undermine 
both monetary and fiscal effort to check inflationary 
pressure.
For a country which has a high degree of external 
debt, i.e. Denmark, a medium-term financial target will 
allow gradual adjustment as opposed to the potential dras­
tic real income transfer from debt servicing, which might 
be a plausible outcome if the external debt is allowed to 
grow with the same speed as during the last decade, and 
if international recovery is further delayed.
Are these propositions realistic as building blocks 
for the eventual coordination inside the European monetary 
system? By examining already publicized national medium- 
term budgetary targets (see figure 5) the answer is in the 
affirmative. The only thing needed is some form of insti­
tutional coordination; this will be discussed below.
1) Cf. the discussion in chapter 2.
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Figure 5. Medium-term budgetary targets for EMS members.
Country Time Horizon Policy Target
Germany 1981-85 Reduction of federal deficit 
from DM 34 bill, to DM 17.5 
bill.
France 1976-80 No current target.
U.K. 1980/1-84/5 Reduction of PSBR from 5.7% 
of GNP to 2% of GNP, imply­
ing a fall from 45% of GNP 
to 41% in 82/83.
Italy 1981-83 Freezing of PSBR at 1980 
level.
Belgium 1979-82 Reduction of government bor­
rowing to 5% of GNP, and a 
zero volume growth of cur­
rent spending (unemployment 
benefits and debt interest 
excluded).
Denmark 1980-93 General objective to reduce 
the central government defi­
cit, restriction of public 
spending. External balance.
Netherlands 1978-82 Reduction of public sector 
deficit from 5.25% to 4 - 
4.5%.
Source: OECD Secretariat.
As can be seen from figure 5, all the members of the
1EMS have already implemented some form for, however
1) France had from 1976 to 1980 the target of reducing 
the government deficit from 3% in 1975 to 0.5%. In­
formation from Ireland missing.
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loosely defined, medium-term financial target.
However, in order to make these targets credible, thus 
forcing inflationary expectations to decline, these targets 
need to be institutionalized so that a homogeneous set of 
monetary and budgetary rules can emerge, which can be used 
and accepted by all participants. Such a task is, needless 
to say, beyond the scope of the present work, but we can 
define some guidelines and some constraints for such an ex­
ercise .
6.6.3. Guidelines for common budgetary and monetary rules.
The basis for any coordination of national economic 
policies and the following international compatibility is 
to have nearly identical budgeting procedures.
As it is now, very different definitions of what a 
budget consists of are found inside the EEC. See figure 6 
on the next page.
In Italy and in the United Kingdom the definition of
1) Although the findings cannot be said to be decisive, a 
negative relationship is found between growth perform­
ance and public sector expansion. The following rela­
tionships were tested: Government expenditure on goods
and services/GNP growth, Government employment/GNP 
growth, Government expenditures on goods and services, 
government employment/inflation performance. Figures 
from 14 OECD countries were used from 1970-1980. The 
lack of decisiveness stems from the fact that the nega­
tive relationship could be a function of lower overall 
growth.
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the budget seems to be the broadest, as all branches of 
government and government affiliated expenditure are in­
cluded. In most other cases budgets of public corpora­
tions are left outside the budget, which then leaves a 
wide spectrum of activities outside the budget.
The column about borrowing constraints shows a var­
ied picture, and perhaps it is a tautology to consider
restraints on borrowing, as a parliament always has the
1power, in some way, to amend the legislation.
However some kind of limit must be assumed to work, 
at least in the short term, when there are legal con­
straints on borrowing. Looking at the planning horizon, 
most countries have a systematic planning procedure of 
expenditures as well as revenues some years ahead. Only 
Denmark has adopted the rather illogical system of plan­
ning expenditure four years ahead, while revenues are
planned on a yearly basis. The consequence, as also
2shown by Gr^nnegard, is that the government is consist­
ently overoptimistic about yearly economic growth fig­
ures, in order to minimize planned deficits.
1) Cf. J.M. Buchanan & G. Brennan (19 81), op. cit.,
J.M. Buchanan & R.E. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit: 
The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, New York 1978.
2) Gr0nnegard, op. cit. (1982), shows that the actual 
expenditure increase relative to planned revenue is 
significant. Worst in 1974/75-75/76 when planned 
growth was estimated to be -2.6% and the actual out­
come was 8.1%. In 1980/81 the planned expenditure 
growth was 0%, the actual figure was 4.4%.
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Without digressing into the basics of public finance 
it seems evident that the Dutch and German planning prin­
ciples come quite close to the ideal of a medium-term 
strategy for equilibrating income targets inside a curren­
cy area.
Both budgetary principles are tuned to the savings
surplus of the private sector, in principle, and both
budgets are divided into two components: a cyclically
1neutral component and a cyclical impulse component.
The former part typifies the long-run growth path of 
the economy, while the latter ensures that short-term cy­
clical impulses in order to correct sudden disturbances do 
not spill over into the medium term.
The obvious advantage of budgetary systems like the 
one mentioned above is that:
a) They take revenues and expenditure into consideration 
for an extended period.
b) And by dividincr the budget into two components, short- 
run measures are, in principle, separated from the 
longer term growth objectives.
c) By taking the private sector savings ratio into ac-
1) This is the German version. The Dutch version is
nearly identical. Here short-term variations around 
the structural budget norm can go on up to a predeter­
mined limit, where "emergency brakes" come into func­
tion.
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count a link is established to the balance of pay­
ments . ^
The next step in the analysis of necessary operat­
ing procedures for a coordination of financial policies 
in the medium term is to focus on rules for monetary 
growth and/or exchange rate targets, having examined the 
budgetary/fiscal side.
The techniques central banks use when they deter­
mine their monetary targets are alchemy for the outsider.
3However as a rule of thumb a target is made up of 
the following components: the amount of productive po­
tential + desired change in capacity utilization + some 
defined inflation constant minus the expected change in 
the velocity, which in turn will allow for the cyclical 
position of the economy.
Such a rule of thumb is of course a crude approxi­
mation. In Thygesen (1978) three steps in setting a
4monetary target are introduced.
1) This is in fact a Keynesian influenced system. When 
private sector investment recovers, countercyclical 
fiscal policy should decline. See the analysis of 
gross investment and government financial savings in 
Denmark and in Germany in the last decade in rela­
tion to the development of the balance of trade ac­
count. Chapter 9.
2) Cf. the discussion in chapter 3.
3) See OECD (1979), op. cit.
4) N. Thygesen, International Coordination of Monetary 
Policies - With Special Reference to the European 
Community, Memo No. 62, Kjzfoenhavn.
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Firstly, using a realistic estimate of future GNP, 
which conveniently could be derived from the advocated 
budgetary target, dividing it with the average money 
stock, the resulting measure for velocity gives an indi­
cation of the direction of the policy. This conjecture 
is based upon the assumption that an, at least, medium- 
term stability in the demand for money exists. In order 
to remedy this defect, a better estimate for the demand 
for money function could be used, preferably based on a 
more refined technique than our rule of thumb. This is
the second level.
1Thirdly, this evolving monetary rule should be 
tuned to a price target, set up by the government.
Instead of relying on a monetary target, smaller 
countries, like Denmark and Belgium, choose to fix their 
exchange rate stability. The rationale for this, as 
previously discussed, is the high degree of openness and 
indexation of the economies, which would make deprecia­
tions feed through to domestic prices.
Denmark does not officially publish a monetary tar­
get, but the Netherlands use a monetary rule, despite 
the fixed exchange rate link to DM, which briefly says 
that long-term monetary growth should equal long-run na­
tional income growth in volume terms adjusted for una­
voidable^ price increases.
1) Cf. Thygesen (1978), op. cit.
2) E. Van Dunnen (1981), op. cit.
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Having discussed possible rules for budgetary and mon­
etary control, the next question is how to control such a 
scheme by the contracting parties, or more pessimistically, 
can such a scheme be controlled?
Two main problems for control immediately arise:
1) The increasing relative price of public consumption, 
due to differences in sector productivity, and
2) Indexation of transfers to prices and wages.
We shall start by discussing the importance of the latter 
problem.
Indexation of income transfers to some definition of 
the price level has the disadvantage, in the present con­
text, that economies subject to inflationary shocks, might 
have extreme difficulties in keeping to the agreed medium- 
term financial strategy. In this way the supposed cure to 
the disease actually makes the patient worse off.
No doubt indexation was first introduced for reasons 
of equality in income transfers, now however the differenc­
es in indexation schemes amongst the EMS participants seem 
to generate more inequality amongst the participants.
In figure 7 (next page) the differences in indexation 
inside the EMS area are shown.
It is not surprising that Germany and the Netherlands 
seem to have the lowest degree of indexation, while weak 
currency countries like Italy, Denmark and Belgium have a 
nearly full indexation. In addition to the differences in
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indexation, the share of social security transfers in total 
government current spending differs significantly amongst 
the EMS countries. See table 8 below.
Table 8. Share of social security transfers in total gov­
ernment current spending.
Country 1970 19 80
Germany 38.6 37.6
France 48.4 52.7
U.K. 26.4 27.6
Italy 43.9 38.3
Netherlands 44.1 49 .4
Belgium 42.6 44.1
Denmark 32 .3 33.2
Sources: DIW, Wochenbereicht 3/82, Die Öffentlichen
Haushalte im internationalen Vergleich, and OECD, 
Yearbook of National Accounts.
Ceteris paribus, the role of indexation of income 
transfers plays a minor part, relatively, in countries like 
Denmark and the UK, because the larger part of current gov­
ernment spending in these two countries is concentrated on
1goods and services plus government debt interest payments. 
Consequently, in the case of Denmark, the common explana­
1) For the more thorough analysis of this point, see chap­
ter 8.
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tion that the high level of transfers is the culprit for 
the explosive growth of the public sector, must be ques­
tioned. For comparison see table 10, where the shares of 
total government expenditure in GDP/GNP are calculated 
for the EMS countries.
The next problem in this discussion of adequate con­
trol over budgetary targets is the tendency to wage in­
creases in the public sector without any clear link to 
productivity increases, however defined. In table 9 a-& 
b this tendency is shown.
Table 9 a. The share of government current expenditures 
on goods and services in the value of total 
consumption.
Country 1970 1980
Germany 22.7 27.0
France 18.6 19.7
U.K. 22.1 26.3
Italy 18.0 21.1
Netherlands 22.2 23.0
Belgium 18.6 22.9
Denmark 26.5 32.4
Source: OECD, National Accounts 1951-1980, Paris 1982.
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Table 9 b. Share of government current expenditure on
goods and services in the volume of total con­
sumption.
Country 1970 1980
Germany 22.7 23 .9
France 21 .5 19.7
U.K. 24.8 25.4
Italy 18.0 18.7
Netherlands 23.7 22.8
Belgium 20.9 21 .7
Denmark 28.1 33.6
Source: OECD
By comparing the two tables we can see that the table 
with volume does not show significant growth, except for 
Denmark.
Looking at the value of total consumption the picture 
changes. Here all countries score a significant rise, 
again with Denmark somewhat out of the trend.
It may be a coincidence but the Netherlands (see ta­
ble 7) which has government sector wages linked to average 
private sector wages had the smallest absolute increase in 
both accounts.
Turning to the question of monetary control, the im­
mediate problem is closely connected to what kind of mone­
tary target one wants to control.
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Inventions in the financial markets make it increas­
ingly difficult to control only one narrowly defined tar­
get.
Recent American experience seems to show a high degree
of complementarity in the different definitions of monetary
targets. I.e. when one target seems to decrease, a wider
definition of the target would increase. To remedy this,
1Meade has been arguing for a carefully chosen price index 
as a target, or the growth rate of money value of national 
income.
2Another problem, as first described by Vaubel, is
that pre-announced monetary targets have been associated
with policy conflicts. When real exchange rates rise, as
3the result of a (too?) restrictive monetary target which 
target should then be abandoned? The exchange rate target 
or the target for monetary growth?
1) See J.E. Meade, The Intelligent Radical's Guide to Eco­
nomic Policy, London 19 75. Although Meade's contribu­
tion seems to reconcile the rationale behind both mone­
tary and exchange rate targets, it has not yet been ac­
cepted by policy makers.
2) R. Vaubel, "International Shifts in the Demand for Mon­
ey, Their Effects on Exchange Rates and Price Levels 
and Their Implications for the Pre-Announcement of Mon­
etary Expansion", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1980, 
pp. 1-44.
3) In Vaubel's analysis the real appreciation of the DM 
was due to currency substitution against the US dollar.
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In such a situation the SachverstSndigenrat recom­
mended a suspension of the monetary target, if the tight­
ness of the monetary policy was leading to significant 
changes in the real exchange rate.
In the context of the small open economy a foreign
price level probably offers a better designator for the
2domestic price level than does a monetary target.
The underlying assumption for this is that if price 
disturbances for an economy arise primarily from changes 
in the general level of foreign prices a monetary target 
would seem to work.
In the small open economy where domestic cost mark­
ups are the dominant source of inflation, a stabilization 
of the nominal exchange rate to a foreign currency, at 
some rational level, would probably offer better pros­
pects for price stabilization.
6.6.4. The final coordination of short and medium eco­
nomic policies in the context of a currency area.
In the section below it is important to distinguish
between ex-ante and ex-post coordination.
The difference between the two terms is that ex-ante
3coordination is "taken with a view also to the way in
1
1) According to Vaubel (1980), op. cit.
2) This point is convincingly demonstrated by M.J. Artis
and D.A. Currie, "Monetary Targets and the Exchange
Rate: A Case for Conditional Targets", in W.A. Eltis
& P.J.N. Sinclair (eds.), op. cit., 1981.
3) Quoting Thygesen (1978), op. cit., p. 2.
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which decisions fit into the prospects and plans of other
countries . . .  In short, coordination implies the fixing
of mutually consistent objectives." Ex-post coordination
1implies the "convergence of national economic trends to­
wards a dominant and common international pattern".
An analogy to car racing gives a clear distinction 
between the two terms.
Ex-post planning is like driving a car forwards by 
relying solely on information obtained from the rear mir­
ror.
Let us now for a short moment return to our Delta- 
Sigma model where a state 3 situation implied an incon­
sistency of national income targets.
In such a case Sigma should try to formulate ex-ante 
a relatively slower growth in its medium-term financial 
target than is the case of Delta's target.
When formulating the medium-term financial target two 
areas for potential policy conflict should be identified:
a) The need for consistency between short-run monetary 
policy and the medium-term desired level of inflation.
b) The need for consistency between short-term fiscal 
policy and the medium-term budgetary objective.
In chapters 2 and 3 it was argued that a restrictive 
monetary policy and a more accommodating fiscal policy 
would have potential long-term adverse effects on the 
economy, and in the next chapter an analysis is presented,
1) Thygesen (1978), op. cit., p. 2.
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which shows how and why such problems arise. However a 
conclusion to be drawn from chapters 2 and 3 was that the 
reliance on tight monetary policies was inconsistent when 
it was combined with large budget deficits, which seem to 
raise long-run inflationary expectations, when the com­
bined effects of lower economic growth, higher interest 
rates are expected to lead to further deficits.
So how do we arrive at a credible medium-term finan­
cial target, where consistency exists between monetary 
and fiscal policy, and what should such a target cover?
Let us first negate the question and see what such a 
target is not meant to cover.
The political discussion about the income level de­
sired in the future, or how national income levels are 
reconciled institutionally are not subjects for the pres­
ent analysis. Our more modest scope is to see how the 
two potential kinds of policy conflict, as listed above, 
can be avoided by suggesting some guidelines which should 
be commonly accepted by the participating states in a 
currency area, besides having a degree of commonness in 
budgetary procedures, which are seen as a necessary basis 
for the guidelines.
Let us start by looking at item b, the consistency 
between short-term fiscal policy and the medium-term 
budgetary target. An ideal type of a world is found when 
fiscal policy works without frictions, the governmental
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budget varies counter-cyclically to booms and recessions 
respectively, and where the markets would discount short­
term imbalances between government sector and private sec­
tor demands for credit as transitory.
Automatic stabilisers would be relied upon as a suf­
ficient instrument for keeping the economy on a desired 
long-run growth trajectory.
When revenues fall, due to recessions, the increased 
level of income transfers and public investments would be 
financed by additional borrowing or monetary finance.
Vice versa, in a boom, a budget surplus would emerge 
1accordingly.
The real world according to, amongst others, the
2OECD presents a somewhat different picture. If stabilis­
ers work for too long, and if they finance, mainly, gov­
ernment consumption, their fiscal effectiveness tends to 
decrease, while interest payments increase.
And secondly, automatic stabilisers very seldom have 
only an economic "raison d'etre".
Political considerations, which by their very nature,
1) Such a world is described in E.F. Infante & J.L.
Stein, "Money Financed Fiscal Policy in a Growing 
Economy", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88, no.
2, 1980, where rational expectations would be formed 
according to a preconceived budget deficit where the 
economy would be in structural balance, because the 
automatic stabilisers were seen to be self-correcting.
2) OECD, Budget Financing and Monetary Control, Paris 
1982.
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differ from economic rationality, play an important role, 
as politicians' time horizons and the cyclical swings in 
the economy do not necessarily overlap.
The implication of this is that automatic stabilisers 
cannot be assumed to be solely assigned to a long-term 
growth objective of the economy, but they are part of a 
political system of distribution. As such they are very 
difficult to change, even when they work against their in­
tended objective, that of counteracting shocks.
1Cairncross, in a recent article, has suggested that 
automatic stabilisers are far from sufficient for recov­
ery, and with the increasing openness of economies it is 
indeed questionable whether automatic stabilisers should 
be expected to cope with supply-shocks, i.e. drastic 
changes in relative world prices, when they were original­
ly designed to cope with domestic demand shocks. The fu­
tility of relying on automatic stabilisers in the light of 
supply shocks was analyzed in the section about openness 
and economic linkages in chapter 3.
However instead of dismissing stabilisers as inade­
quate for short-term stabilization, energy prices which 
are the most "shock-prone" items should be excluded from 
the indexes, which they still are not in some EMS coun­
tries .
1) A. Cairncross, "The Relationship Between Fiscal and 
Monetary Policy", Banca Nazicnale Lavoro, Quarterly 
Review, 1981, p. 379.
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That short-term fiscal policy tends to "overshoot" 
and thus makes a medium-term objective inconsistent, is 
shown in the analysis below in chapter 8, where gross in­
vestment, governmental financial savings and current ac­
count surplus were analyzed for Denmark and Germany. The 
results show that, for Denmark especially, the governmen­
tal demand support was strangely calibrated, because 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy was at several times out 
of line with the investment recovery.
That a private investment recovery was not taken in­
to account in planned fiscal action can only be explained 
by taking the lack of a link to private savings in Danish 
budgetary procedure into account.
When discussing consistency between short-term fis­
cal policy and a medium budgetary target, it is important 
to realise the difference between ex-ante budgetary cuts 
and ex-pcst realised savings. Some ex-ante budget sav­
ings cut easily gets adverse effects. The savings cuts 
in public investments, which in the case of Denmark have 
been drastic, may lead to higher unemployment with re­
sulting increase in income transfers, which again, cete­
ris paribus, will lead to a higher deficit at a lower 
level of employment.
The conclusions we can draw from this are that budg­
etary decisions seem to have a high degree of autonomy in
- 209 -
the short run, an ex-ante tight fiscal stance may bring 
an ex-post increase in the budget deficit.
So the question here is whether an independent mon­
etary policy can achieve the bringing of future infla­
tion under control. Looking at the information in chap­
ter 8, the smaller countries have had difficulties in 
lowering their inflation rates despite restrictive mone­
tary policies. And taking the large budget deficits in 
1these, countries into consideration it is questionable 
whether tight money alone can reduce inflationary expec­
tations, when feed-backs in the way of expectations of 
future lower growth and resulting larger government def­
icits seem to loom high over recovery.
Accepting that short-term rigidities exist in 
short-term public spending, it seems logical that this 
fact should be taken into account when monetary targets 
are set.
2A short-term tight monetary policy might easily 
have adverse effects on an overall financial target, be­
cause the resulting cumulative interest payments and 
debt servicing of the resulting budget deficits, will 
make financing difficult and in this way raise expecta-
1) See chapter 8.
2) See the analysis by T. Sargent and N. Wallace, "Some 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic", Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, fall 1981.
- 210 -
tions that the state eventually will start on monetary fi­
nance .
Summing up our conclusions in order to formulate some 
guidelines for the coordination of fiscal and monetary pol­
icies into medium-term financial targets, the following 
points can be made.
i. In order to compare national income targets, a uniform 
budgeting procedure inside the currency area would be needed.
ii. Such a budgetary procedure could ideally include a 
link to the balance on the current account, by including 
the position of private sector savings, as shown in chapter
3.
iii. When the medium-term financial target is formulated, 
the mix between monetary and fiscal policy is set, so that 
monetary targets and/or exchange rate targets are set in 
accordance with a predetermined fiscal stance, not in com­
petition with intended fiscal policy.
iv. This requires a better coordination of treasury and
central bank policies, but need not infringe on the insti­
tutional independence of some central banks, cf. the fol­
lowing quote from the German Bundesbank: "It is the con­
viction of the Bundesbank that control cf the money supply 
for the sake of combating inflation and ensuring steady 
economic growth can only be successful if the policies and 
behaviour of public authorities, enterprises and trade un­
ions are guided by the same objectives."1
1) Memorandum by the Deutsche Bundesbank, House of Com­
mons, Treasury and civil service committee, 19 80, vol.
2, p. 12.
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v. With the inflexibility of fiscal policy in mind, mone­
tary policy should be oriented for the long term, while the 
fiscal stance should have a short-term autonomy.
vi. Ex-ante planning of the fiscal stance for the medium 
term should rely on projections for both expenditure and 
revenue.
6.7. Coordination of medium-term financial targets inside 
a currency area, the political issue.
By coordinating national medium-term financial targets 
participants, and especially the weaker currencies, in a 
currency area can get a more realistic perception of costs 
and benefits of joining the currency area, and at the same 
time the fixity of internal exchange rates would be more 
credible, thus preventing one way bets.
The treasuries and central banks would have a forum 
for debate, and in this way monetary cooperation would be­
come politicized and dragged out of the realm of techni-
1cians, cf. the quote of Andrew Shonfield, "The plan can be 
characterized as a scheme for European Integration by cen­
tral bankers instead of governments. The hope is evidently 
that central bankers being recognized as techricians will 
be allowed to get on with their job with the minimum of in­
terference from politicians and populace."
Recent experience inside the EMS, where central banks 
and treasuries have been at odds with each other, under­
lines the needs for a more coordinated effort, if badly 
timed realignments are to be avoided.
1) A. Shonfield, Europe, Journey to an Unknown Destina­
tion, 1972, p. 74.
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Chapter 7
The economic effects of an over reliance on tight monetary 
and lax fiscal policies.
If fiscal policy in the short to medium run has a high 
degree of autonomy, as claimed in the preceding chapter, a 
tight monetary policy and corresponding high interest rates 
are assigned the task of combating domestic inflation, as 
well as correcting an external imbalance.
This rather vulgar interpretation of the Mundell-
Fleming policy-mix theory is a typical outcome for the
1small open economy. In the present chapter Keynesian and 
neo-Keynesian frameworks for stabilization policies in 
small open economies are analyzed, and a conclusion is that 
these models do not take longer term effects on economic 
structure of different policy mixes into consideration.
So the main part of the chapter is used for an analy­
sis of the economic effects on economic structure of an 
over reliance on tight monetary policies and accommodating 
fiscal policies. By using a modified Salter diagram, we 
show that capital imports induced by high real domestic in­
terest rates will have serious repercussions on the produc­
tion and consumption patterns of the economy.
Bond financing of government deficits as a result of 
an expansive fiscal policy will in an open economy have on­
ly slight financial crowding-out effects. However it is
1) Empirical evidence is found in the next chapter.
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shown that a very likely outcome of continuing deficit fi­
nance is crowding-out via the exchange rate. Lastly a link 
between stabilization policies and public sector growth is 
sought to be established.
The effects of fiscal policy on the external balance
in a fixed exchange rate framework have been demonstrated
1 2 by, notably, Whitman and Branson.
The former showed that the outcomes of fiscal policy 
in an open economy were determined by the relative slopes 
of monetary and external equilibrium relations, and includ­
ing the domestic bond rate and price-level, the latter dem­
onstrated that if the external balance line is steeper than 
the asset equilibrium relation, an increase in government 
expenditure would lead to a deficit on the current account."* 
The limits to fiscal policy in the form of the govern-
4ment budget constraint can be traced back to Modigliani.
The implication of the government budget constraint was
further elaborated by Blinder and Solow^ and Tobin & Buiter
in examining the crowding-out effect.^
1) M.v.N. Whitman, Policies for External and Internal Bal­
ance , Princeton Paper no. 9, Dec. 1970.
2) W.H. Branson, "A Keynesian Approach to Worldwide Infla­
tion", in Krause & Salant, Worldwide Inflation, Brook­
ings, 1977.
3) We note the similarity to the original absorption ap­
proach, cf. chapter 2 and 3.
4) F. Modigliani, "The Monetary Mechanism and its Interac­
tion with Real Phenomenon", Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Feb. 1963.
5) A.S. Blinder & R.M. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter", 
Journal of Public Economics, Nov. 1973.
6) J. Tobin and W. Buiter, "Long Term Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Aggregate Demand", in J. Stein
Monetarism. North-Holland, 1976.
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Below we shall follow a somewhat different strategy in 
analyzing the combined effects of a tight monetary policy 
and an accommodating fiscal policy. We find that a restric­
tive monetary stance will affect the production pattern of 
an economy and an accommodating fiscal policy will eventual­
ly result in a real crowding-out effect, or crowding-out via 
the exchange rate.
In chapter 2, the apparent minor role of fiscal policy 
as a tool of demand management in the process of monetary 
integration was discussed, and a partial conclusion was that 
an inconsistent combination of monetary and fiscal policies 
would most likely result in a tighter monetary policy than
would otherwise have been the case.
Such a development would in turn make some sectors of 
the economy carry more of the adjustment burden than was 
probably originally intended.
Chapter 6 presented some guidelines for the coordina­
tion of monetary and fiscal policies in the short to medium 
term, this without explicitly dealing with the potential ef­
fects on the economy of different doses of the mixture.
The aim of the present chapter is accordingly to pre­
sent an analysis of the effects of capital formation and 
hence economic structure of different policy mixes in the 
now familiar context of the small open economy.
This analysis is in order to examine whether other pol­
icy mixes could distribute the costs of disinflation more 
evenly, and in a way which does not seem to penalize future
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potential so heavily as the present policy mix seems to do.
1Although the Mundell-Fleming policy mix approach has
been severely criticized for having no corrective effects
on the current account, possibly aggravating it in periods,
2the approach has recently been sought to be rehabilitated.
When the Mundell-Fleming policy approach was presented 
it was very attractive to policy makers, because it seemed 
to offer them a panacea for the internal/external equilib­
rium problem, and it was widely adopted by small open econ­
omies with, especially, external balance problems.
And according to Hoffmeyer and Hansen,^ the Mundell- 
Fleming assignment principle was indeed the cornerstone for
1) As first presented by Mundell in his The Appropriate 
Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and Ex­
ternal Stability, in IMF Staff papers, IX, 1962, p. 70. 
Briefly, this simple rule states that a country suffer­
ing from domestic unemployment and external imbalance 
would have to rely on both expansive and contractive 
policy measures. This would obviously create a con­
flict. Assuming full capital mobility, monetary policy 
would be assigned the improvement of the external bal­
ance, while fiscal expansion would be assigned to the 
unemployment problem.
2) See D.K. Fausten, "A Partial Rehabilitation of the Pol­
icy Mix Approach", Kyklos, vol. 34, 1981, p. 203.
3) E. Hoffmeyer & L. Hansen, "Danish Monetary Policy Dur­
ing the Last Decade", Kredit und Kapital, Heft 2, 1978.
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Danish monetary policy during the last decade.
As the case study of Denmark in the next chapters shows, 
it is, ceteris paribus, difficult to see a degree of real ad­
justment after a decade's use of this policy mix.
Below we shall analyze the economic effects of an (over) 
reliance on tight monetary and accommodating fiscal policy.
First the implication for stabilization policies in a 
small open economy of the Keynesian framework is presented, 
and on this background macroeconomic policies of deflation 
based on newer theories are discussed. Finally the link from 
stabilization policies to public sector growth is estab­
lished .
7.1. Keynesian and neo-Keynesian framework for stabilization 
policies in a small open economy.
The traditional view on stabilization policies in small
1open economies was for a long time influenced by the (near) 
trivial textbook Keynesian quantity model, and the con­
straints of the small open economy were simplified by 
Hansen.^
1) See i.e. A. R^dseth, "Macroeconomic Policy in a Small 
Open Economy", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, No. 1, 
1979, and same author, “Nyare teori om stabiliserings- 
politikk i opne 0konomiar", Sosial^konomen, Oslo, No. 6, 
1979, where the Keynesian tradition is compared with the 
newer contributions of Turnovsky, S.J., Macroeconomic 
Analysis and Stabilization Theory, Cambridge 1977, and 
Calmfors, L., Prices, Wages and Employment in the Open 
Economy, Stockholm 1978.
2) B. Hansen, Finanspolitikens ekonomiska teori, Uppsala 
1955.
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So let us sum up the two models briefly, in order to 
draw some conclusions for stabilization policies.
The well-known "Keynesian textbook" model is based on 
the national account balance identity, with derived multi­
pliers which in turn are functions of import and export 
propensities.
Three main conclusions for stabilization policy are 
normally mentioned, when this model is discussed:
i) The level of domestic activity can be changed by the 
government by expansive or contractive budgets. The only 
serious leakage is the propensity to import.
ii) An expansive policy will erode the current account 
balance because of the increase in imports.
iii) In order to minimize the effects on the current ac­
count the expansionary measures are concentrated to sec­
tors in the economy with a low import propensity.
Complementary to this model, but with a focus on the 
constraints for the small open economy, is the model of 
Hansen.^ This model explicitly assumes the law of one 
price, the small open economy as a price taker, and a 
fixed exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate and 
fixed world prices the domestic price level is the exoge­
nously given.
The figure shows the terms of trade constraints for 
the economy.
1) B. Hansen, op. cit., 1955.
The small open economy and the terms of trade constraint.
me
•D DA X w
- >I
The domestic price level P 1 is given by the world price 
level Pw and the exchange rate e.
The me curve shows the marginal productivity costs for 
the domestic economy. Producers choose the production locus 
x where marginal costs equate the price level.
The dd-curve shows domestic aggregate demand, so the do­
mestic consumption locus will be y.
The line segment yx is in this example the export sur­
plus, but had the demand curve and the marginal cost curve 
been steeper both, or respectively, a deficit would have oc­
curred .
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The conclusions about stabilization policies from this 
simple macro model are the following:
i) The level of equilibrium aggregate demand is determined 
by costs of production, world market prices and the exchange 
rate, which again determine the terms of trade.
ii) The current account is then determined by the level of 
domestic demand and the terms of trade.
If we try to compare the two models we see that:
ia) The first model treats export as an exogenous variable, 
while the export volume in the second model is deter­
mined by domestic parameters.
b) In the first model a policy conflict arises between the 
level of domestic activity and the balance on the cur­
rent account, while an improvement of the terms of trade 
can alter the level of production and the export surplus 
in the second model.
c) In the first model prices and wages do not affect the 
production level explicitly, while in the second model 
prices and wages are determining factors for the level 
of production.
d) In the first model the level of domestic demand is the 
determining factor for the level of production, while 
such a link is not found in the second model.
Instead of seeing the two models as exponents of com-
1) Cf. R^dseth, op. cit. (1979).
- 221 -
peting traditions in economic theory, the newer Hansen mod­
el shows the constraints of the "Keynesian textbook" model 
when exposed to openness.
What these two models do not show, are the longer term 
effects of different mixes of fiscal and monetary policies, 
the effects of different modes of budget financing, and the 
impact of capital mobility expressed in a two sector econo­
my, which then is the aim of the present chapter.
We shall start the analysis by examining deflation 
through a contractionary monetary policy and an accommodat­
ing fiscal policy, because, as explained in chapter 2, this 
seems to have been the typical policy mix for the adjustment 
strategy in some of the weaker currency countries.
7.2. Economic effects of deflation through purely monetary 
policy.
We shall below concentrate on two aspects of medium- 
term effects of a tight monetary policy:
a) The effects on the exchange rate of a monetary contrac­
tion and the derived effects of this in terms of a mone­
tary squeeze on the tradeables sector, and
b) The direct effects on the economy of a monetary contrac­
tion .
We start with item a, and by monetary contraction we mean a 
total reliance on items i & iv as stated in section 1.1.4, 
that is fixing the net issue of money and the net sale of
1) Cf. R^dseth (1979), op. cit., who sees the two models as 
competing interpretations.
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public securities.
A simple way of describing the relationship between mon­
etary policy and the exchange rate is done by Budd & Warburton 
in the following way:1
a) A long-run neutrality of money exists, which equals de­
mand for real money balances with the level of real out­
put. 2
b) Purchasing power parity holds in the long run.
It is assumed that:
31) Output can be divided into tradeables and nontradeables,
2) Although PPP is expected to hold in the long run for 
traded goods, the general domestic price levels need not 
converge.
3) The domestic relative prices depend on:
i) The ratio of productivity in the tradeables and the 
nontradeables sectors,
ii) The ratios of output in the traded and nontraded 
goods sectors respectively.
If we furthermore assume that the nominal exchange rate moves 
to equate the price of traded goods in terms of a common cur­
1) See A.P. Budd & P.J. Warburton, "Monetary Policies and 
Exchange Rates", Recherches Economiques de Louvain, vol.
45, no. 1, 1979.
2) The exact level depends on what could be called a coun­
try's income elasticity of demand for money balances, 
which will vary according to the sophistication of na­
tional financial institutions.
3) Which is, as previously mentioned, a somewhat arbitrary 
division.
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rency, we get the following three variables as main factors 
in determining the exchange rate:2
a) The relative money supply.
b) The relative output level.
c) The relative price level, as determined by items i and
ii.
Let us now se? what happens when a tight monetary policy is 
introduced.
In addition to the previous assumptions we add two:
1) The terms of trade are exogenously given, which is the
.small country assumption, and
2) The country starts from a position v/ith a deficit on the 
external balance. This assumption is crucial for the 
second part of the analysis, where the medium run ef­
fects are analyzed.
If securities are bought by foreigners, or are bought 
by domestic agents, who would otherwise have invested 
abroad, the exchange rate is, ceteris paribus, bound to ap­
preciate.
A monetary contraction with a resulting appreciation of 
the exchange rate will have different effects for the trade-
ables and the nontradeables sector respectively.
1) This is a tricky assumption, and as is demonstrated in 
the next chapter, the real interest rate probably plays 
a more significant role in a fixed rate currency area 
with diverging inflation differentials.
2) Cf. Budd & Warburton, op. cit., 1979.
1
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Using a simplification of Corden's original analysis,
in figure 2, we show how a monetary squeeze will affect the
two sectors adversely, and how, by using a modified Salter
2diagram the resulting capital inflows will aggravate this 
trend, by changing the relative prices.
The role of traded and nontraded goods in the open 
economy has a long ancestry.**
Today this tradition can be split up into two strands, 
the Australian model and the Scandinavian model.
The difference between the two interpretations is em­
bedded in the transformation curve between the two kinds of
4goods, as emphasized by Dornbusch.
In the Scandinavian model, labour is the only produc­
tion factor,  ^ and traded and nontraded goods are produced
1) W.M. Corden (1981), op. cit.
2) As originally devised by Salter, W.E., "Internal and 
External Balance. The Role of Price and Expenditure 
Effects", Economic Record, 35, Aug. 1959, p. 226-238.
3) An early Danish contributor is Carl Iversen, Interna­
tional Capital Movements, New York 1935.
4) A discussion of the two models is found in his Open 
Economy Macroeconomics, New York 1980, chapter 6.
1
5) See references in chapter 2 for this model.
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with constant returns and fixed unit labour requirements. 
This implies that a constant marginal rate of substitution 
exists, and the transformation curve is accordingly a 
straight line.
The relative price is a function of technology alone, 
and is independent of the composition of output in the two 
sectors.
In the Australian model labour is mobile between the
two sectors1 with diminishing returns, which indicates a
2convex transformation curve.
The slope of the transformation curve, see figure 3, 
gives the relative price of nontraded goods in terms of 
traded goods, which implies that the relative price is de­
pendent on the composition of output.
Below we shall try to show that this relative price 
is identical with the real exchange rate.
So for our purpose we choose the Australian model, as 
this model stresses the importance of relative prices.
In the figure, output of nontradeables, where the 
government sector is the main purveyor, and output of 
tradeables are depicted on the horizontal axis, while the 
price is on the vertical axis. The nominal wage is held 
constant and the price elasticity of each good is unity. 
The latter assumption is relaxed in the last part of the
1) Only in the medium to long term.
2) The Australian model has its origin in the works of 
Salter (1959), op. cit., and Corden (72+77+81), op. 
cit., and T. Swan, "Economic Control in a Dependent 
Economy", Economic Record, 1960, vol. 36, p. 51-66.
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analysis. Furthermore we assume a flexible exchange rate.
The SS curves are sloping upwards because at a given 
nominal wage rate there will be diminishing returns to la- 
bour with a given capital stock.
The D-D curves show aggregate demand curves at a given 
nominal money supply.
With a given world price level, the small country as­
sumption, the initial exchange rate will set the domestic
price level at 0-P. With the supply curves S-S and Sfc-St , 
output for nontradeables is set at 0-Q, and output for 
tradeables is set at 0-Q^.
At a chosen initial money supply we get demand curves 
D-D and D^-D^ for the nontradeables and tradeables sectors 
respectively. In the tradeables sector the level of ab­
sorption 0-Q^ implies a deficit on the current account of
Qt'Qt*
Now we introduce a monetary contraction which will 
shift the level of aggregate demand from D-D and D ~Dt to
D ’-D' and D^-D^ respectively.
Such a contraction of the money supply (Mq) will work 
through to the exchange rate via two channels mainly:
1) In chapter 5 it was shown that the distinction between 
fixed and flexible exchange rates was highly arbitrary. 
Had we assumed a fixed exchange rate, increases in in­
ternational reserves would, in this example, sooner or 
later have forced through an appreciation.
2) Dornbusch (1980), op. cit., p. 107, shows how increased 
productivity in the tradeables sector would be the 
right remedy, however productivity growth as a result 
of higher capital investments is difficult to imagine 
in an already squeezed sector.
4
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a) the reduction in investment as a result of dearer money 
will reduce total consumption, and
b) the higher relative interest rate induces capital in­
flows, which, ceteris paribus, will appreciate the ex­
change rate.
The immediate effect is a fall in income in the tradeables 
sector which will work through to the nontradeables sector, 
thus reducing total aggregate spending.
In figure 2 this is shown to be from 0 to somewhere on 
the line segment 0-M, and from to 0t and eventually to
The new equilibrium position is Mfc, and still assuming 
a constant nominal wage rate, the size of the appreciation 
of the exchange rate is dependent on the actual fall in nom­
inal expenditure. If we say that nominal expenditure is a 
function of money supply Mq times velocity V, then V play an 
important role.1
In an open economy with a high degree of financial in­
tegration a given contraction of MQ will result in a smaller 
rise in V than would have been the case in a closed economy. 
Hence the domestic interest rate will rise less for a given 
reduction of M , which in terms of the exchange rate, still 
assuming full capital mobility, will reinforce the apprecia­
tion.
So a given fall in M will have a greater effect on the 
exchange rate with capital mobility than without.
Accordingly, the exchange rate will appreciate more for
1) As specially emphasized by Corden (1981), op. cit., p. 
28.
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a given reduction of Mq , because of foreign capital inflows.
In a situation with an appreciating exchange rate the de­
flationary effects of the appreciation will be seen in public 
and private savings propensities.
The public dissavings will increase because of automatic 
transfers, and the private savings will decrease as a response 
to the contraction in income.
The decrease in savings will in turn widen the deficit on 
the current account.
Points M and are not necessarily permanent equilibria, 
although they are goods market equilibria.
In Corden's1 original contribution, he notes that if the 
labour market was originally in equilibrium, and trade unions 
and individuals expect the contraction to last, then nominal 
wages will have to fall, thus moving the original S-S and Sfc- 
St curves downwards.
Finally the aggregate supply curves will be S*-S' and 
S^-S^, and points L and Lt are new equilibria positions.
Here output and employment have recovered to the levels 
of 0 and 0£.
The nominal wages are lower, but so is the price level, 
only the exchange rate which determines the price level has 
appreciated, which renders the real wage rate identical with 
the one at point 0 and 0t<
7.2.1. Comparison of the effects of a monetary squeeze in the 
two sectors.
On which sector will the contraction of MQ have the
1) Corden (1981), op. cit., p. 24.
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strongest effect?
We still assume that the domestic demand elasticity for 
each good is unity.
Above we have established that the effects of the con­
traction of M0 would be felt through an appreciation of the 
exchange rate in the tradeables sector, and through a de­
cline in investment in the nontradeables sector.
Corden1 argues that a case could be made where invest­
ment is not interest elastic in the short run, which means 
that expenditure is not reduced immediately after a contrac­
tion of M , but where the exchange rate has appreciated as a 
result of the capital inflow.
In such a case the tradeable sector will feel the 
squeeze right away, while there would be no immediate reduc­
tion in expenditure in the nontradeables sector.
In figure 2 the exchange rate and output move to M^, 
while nominal expenditure stays at Ffc.
The level of real expenditure being F£, with a capital 
inflow of Mt~Ft*
Below we shall see how such a capital inflow ultimately 
will change the initial set of relative prices.
2To demonstrate this we use the Salter diagram shovm in
1) Cf. W.M. Corden, op. cit., 1981.
2) The Salter diagram originates from Salter (1959), op.
cit., but it has been used lately by R. Dornbusch, in 
his "Devaluation, Money and Non-traded Goods", American 
Economic Review, 1973, pp. 871-880, and more recently in 
his Open Economy Macroeconomics, 1980, in chapter 6, 
"Home Goods and Traded Goods: The Dependent Economy
Model". Furthermore M. Michaely has used the approach 
in Capital Imports, Economic Structure and Dependence, 
Stockholm 1980. These contributions have been a primary 
source of inspiration for the author, although the usual
caveats apply.
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figure 3, and we relax the assumption of a demand elasticity 
of unity for the two sectors.
In figure 3, the transformation curve, T-C, between the 
two goods is concave from below based on the assumption of 
increasing relative costs. In point A we find the initial 
equilibrium point, which is both production and consumption 
locus.
Tangent to A is line R-P, which then gives the relative 
price between the two goods. The and E£ curves are Engel 
curves, which point out the slope of indifference curves and 
the budget line between the two goods. The Engel curves are 
concave from the right. This is based on the assumption that 
the elasticities are not unity as assumed above, but that 
since tradeables to a large degree consist of commodities and 
nontradeables consist of services and construction, then in­
come elasticity will be below unity for the former, and above 
unity for the latter.
We now introduce capital imports, A-B, which we for con­
venience say are equal to in figure 2. Capital imports
must, because of the simplicity of the model, be assumed to 
be in the form of tradeables.
The new consumption point is B. With the relative price 
of point A, there will be an excess demand for nontradeables, 
which will be determined by the marginal propensity to buy 
nontradeables times the capital import, and an excess supply 
of tradeables.
In order to reach a new equilibrium position the rela­
tive price of nontradeab1es must rise, while the relative 
price of tradeables must fall.
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A new equilibrium position is found at a lower relative 
price for tradeables, point C on the transformation curve T-C.
The relative price change from R-P to R ’-P', R'-P’ being 
the tangent to C, will change production as well as consump­
tion, although the effects on consumption are less clear than 
the effects on production, so we start looking at the latter.
The price increase of the nontradeable goods will shift 
the Engel curve E^ to the right, and new equilibria positions 
are found in points C and D.
With line segments AB=CD, C will be, as previously men­
tioned, the new production locus, and D the new consumption 
point, as D is the intersection of E 2 and R ^ - P ' 1.
With an unchanged transformation curve (i.e. holding pro­
ductivity constant) the production of tradeables will fall, 
while the production of nontradeables will increase.
The effects on consumption of the initial capital imports 
are determined by the income elasticities of demand.
One may argue that the immediate effect of a decrease in 
the relative price of tradeables would create a surge in con­
sumption, hereby aggravating the existing current accounts 
deficit. However let us briefly examine the following set of 
assumptions about the shape of the Engel curve:
If the elasticities of each good were unity, which im­
plies a straight Engel income-consumption line, the move to 
the right would imply an increased share of tradeables in con­
sumption. If the elasticity is above unity for tradeables and 
below unity for nontradeables, which would imply E 2 being con­
vex from the right, the outcome would be similar, but with an 
even higher inclination to the tradeables sector. In figure 3
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the Engel curve is concave from the right, because we as­
sumed that tradeables, consisting mainly of commodities, 
would have a low elasticity compared to nontradeables.
The outcome of changed relative prices is thus diffi­
cult to predict because the trend in consumption towards 
tradeables is contradicted by the fact that the original 
capital inflow increases the total absorption capability of 
the economy, which, thanks to high income elasticity for 
nontradeables, will work against the original trend towards 
tradeables.
However, on the production side the effects of capital 
imports remain straightforward: Due to the change in rela­
tive prices of the two goods production of tradeables will
1fall, while the production of nontradeables will increase.
7.2.2. Changes in relative prices, changes in the real ex­
change rate and monetary integration.
We can show in the following way that in an open econ­
omy relative prices and the real exchange rate are identi­
cal :
If the nominal price of nontradeables is given, at 
least in the short to medium run due to nominal wage rigid­
ities, then the only way in which relative prices can 
change in a two goods model is when the nominal price of 
tradeables is changed. Being an open and small economy 
with given world prices, the exchange rate would have to 
adjust, which in turn amounts to seeing the relative price
1) This is based on the assumption of constant productivi­
ty in the tradeables sector. We relax this assumption 
in the next section.
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of nontradeables and the real exchange rate as the same 
thing.
So a rise in the relative price of nontradeables, as 
we have established in the example above, due to the intro­
duction of capital inflows would call for a depreciation of 
the real exchange rate.
Let us briefly return to the issue of monetary integra­
tion, and focus on the role of changes in the real exchange 
rate for the process of monetary unification.
Vaubel sums up two types of potential economic costs:
1) "It foregoes the possibility of using intra-group nomi­
nal exchange rate changes to exploit exchange rate illu­
sion and, hence, to increase intragroup real exchange 
rate changes and the level of employment, and
2) it foregoes the possibility of reconciling those real 
exchange rate changes, which take place even in the ab­
sence of nominal exchange rate changes, with the mainte­
nance of domestic price level stability in each of the 
prospective member countries."
2The first point is, according to Vaubel, irrelevant from a 
monetarist point of view, and is due to "Phillips curve il­
lusion". However, on the second point both Keynesians and 
monetarists3 agree that observed real exchange rate changes
1) R. Vaubel, "Real Exchange Rate Changes in the European 
Community. A New Approach to the Determination of Opti­
mum Currency Areas", Journal of International Economics,
S, 1978, 319-339.
2) R. Vaubel (1978), op. cit.
3) Still according to Vaubel, ibid.
- 236 -
indicate the economic cost of a currency union. And accord­
ingly, changes in the real exchange rate should be used as a
1criterion for the desirability of currency unification, un­
derstood in the sense that countries with only small devia­
tions from relative purchasing power parity should engage in
2monetary integration.
Summing up the effects of a monetary contraction we 
have shown that it primarily affects the tradeables sector, 
because the exchange rate reacts more quickly than the de­
cline of investments in the nontradeables sector, and that 
the longer term effects of a continuous capital inflow in 
order to finance the deficit on the current account will af­
fect the set of relative prices and hence the real exchange 
rate. This in turn will change the production pattern to­
wards the production of nontradeables, which, ceteris pari­
bus, will aggravate the "central" problem of external equi-
1) In this study it is shown by Vaubel that by using the 
minimum deviation in the real exchange rate criterion 
over the two periods 1959-76 and 1971-76 a very changing 
membership of a potential currency area would have been 
envisaged.
2) The issue of real exchange rate distorsions has recently 
been commented on by Thygesen (1981), op. cit., p. 306: 
"If a group of countries succeed in maintaining stable 
exchange rates amongst themselves, but not, at least 
initially, in harmonising their national inflation 
rates, the real exchange rates, i.e. measures of rela­
tive national prices or costs expressed in a common nu­
meraire will move. It appears plausible a priori that 
real rates could get more out of line and for longer pe­
riods in a system which emphasises nominal exchange rate 
stability than under alternative arrangements where ex­
change rate changes occur regularly because of either 
political decisions or market forces."
- 237 -
librium for participants in a currency area.
So we may conclude that a deflation with an over reli­
ance on tight monetary policies will put the adjustment bur­
den primarily on the tradeables sector.
7.2.3. Relieving the adjustment burden on tradeables.
How can then absorption be reduced without punishing the 
tradeables sector?
The obvious answer is to rely on fiscal contraction in 
concert with monetary contraction.
Improvements in productivity in the tradeables sector is 
another viable option.
A fiscal contraction, by cutting public expenditure, 
will, ceteris paribus, tend to reduce the interest rate, 
which in turn will work through to the exchange rate, thus in 
the first hand relieving the squeeze on the tradeables sec­
tor.
If a fiscal contraction is brought about by raising tax 
rates and keeping nominal government expenditure constant, 
the absolute level of absorption will decline, and with only 
the two sectors in mind and a lower income demand elasticity 
for the tradeables, the reduction will primarily hit the non­
tradeables sector.
Another option for shifting away the squeeze on tradea­
bles as a result of a monetary contraction is to improve pro­
ductivity in the tradeables sector.
This is shown in figure 4, next page.
In order to simplify the exposition capital imports as 
shown in figure 3 are neglected in figure 4.
We have a transformation curve between the two goods 
T-C. The initial relative prices are shown by the tangent to
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A, which gives the set of relative prices R-P.
Suppose now that productivity has increased, as a result
of investments in improved technology, this will raise produc-
1tivity at any level of employment.
At the initial set of relative prices, as shown by point 
A, a growth in productivity in the traded goods sector implies 
that the marginal value product of labour will rise above the 
initial wage rate, and wages will increase.
Only the tradeables sector can afford the higher wage 
rate, because of the higher productivity, so labour will be 
absorbed by this sector. With increased productivity, and 
higher amounts of labour, total and relative output of T must 
rise.
A new equilibrium point will be A 1, where the new set of
relative prices, shown by tangent R'-P', assure that the rela­
tive price of tradeables has risen compared to the example 
shown in figure 3.
7.3. Economic effects of non-accommodated budget deficits.
A tight monetary stance in order to reduce domestic in­
flation and to converge inflation rates inside a currency area 
at the lowest possible level will result in budget deficits
for the more inflation prone countries, because of the in­
crease in income transfers and the decrease in revenues trig­
1) How capital can be available for the tradeables sector for
productivity improvements in a period with high real in­
terest rates is difficult to see, and the first option of
combining monetary contraction with fiscal contraction is 
hence the more realistic option.
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gered by the deflationary effects of the initial reduction in
the money supply.
An economy belonging to a fixed exchange rates area is
restricted in its choice of financing modes.
Monetary finance to cover the deficit is excluded be-
1cause of its effect on the exchange rate.
This leaves us with bond financing and increased taxa­
tion. The practicality of the latter is dubious in the light 
of the tight monetary stance, and hence we shall concentrate 
our analysis on the effects of bond financing on the composi­
tion of final demand and future economic structure.
According to mainstream economic theory bond financing
of public expenditure will crowd out a roughly equivalent
2amount of private expenditure.
In a closed economy at full employment capacity, this 
crowding-out hypothesis is perfectly logical.
1) On the current account an increase in the money supply 
will add to total domestic expenditure, and will spill 
over into an increase in net imports, but in the short 
run the expansion will be primarily felt in the capital 
account, where the private sector will diversify its 
portfolio into foreign assets, because of the decrease in 
the interest rate. See J.A. Frenkel, T. Gylfason, J.F. 
Helliwell, "A Synthesis of Monetary and Keynesian Ap­
proaches to Short Run Balance of Payments Theory", The 
Economic Journal, 1980, Vol. 90.
2) Locus classicus is found in Gordon, R.J. (ed.), Milton
Friedman1s Monetary Framework: A Debate with his Crit­
ics pp. 139-42, Chicago 1 974, which refers to a magazine 
article of Friedman from 19 67. Later elaborations of the 
crowding-out issue are found in resp. A.S. Blinder & R.M. 
Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter", Journal of Public 
Economics, November 1973, and J. Tobin & W. Buiter, "Long 
Run Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy on Aggregate 
Demand", in J. Stein (ed.), Monetarism, North-Holland, 
1976.
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■jApart from being mainly a monetary problem, financial 
and portfolio crowding out as results of non-accommodated 
budget deficits seem likely in the small open economy, but
should at most be taken as a resource or supply constraint. 
Below it is argued that the more likely threat in the small 
open economy is crowding out via the exchange rate, which in 
turn could lead to real crowding out, or vice versa.
If the government sector uses the expansive thrust of a 
budget deficit primarily on consumption instead of on invest­
ments, and if private capital imports are discouraged because 
of expectations of an exchange rate realignment,3 then future 
total capital stock will decline.
A higher future output is then only possible at a higher 
price, which, ceteris paribus, implies a contractive longer 
run effect of a non-accommodated budget deficit.
This is what we could call real crov/ding out, and this 
phenomenon has not been described widely in the context of
2
1) Cf. T. Wilson (1979), op. cit., who showed that it was 
the monetary non-accommodation of the deficit by the cen­
tral bank, and not the deficit in itself which has poten­
tial crowding-out effects.
2) Which is also the conclusion of a more recent study by J. 
Tobin & W. Buiter, "Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Capital 
Formation and Economic Activity", in G.M. v. Fürstenberg 
(ed.), The Government and Capital Formation, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1981, p. 79.
3) These assumptions are indeed realistic, as the investment 
component of public spending has decreased dramatically 
in most countries and, at least in the case of Denmark, 
private capital imports have decreased from around 50% of 
total capital imports to less than .5%.
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the small open economy.
Before substantiating the hypothesis of real crowding 
out and crowding out via the exchange rate, we shall discuss 
the validity of the more traditional crowding-out hypothesis.
7.3.1. Bond financed fiscal stimulus and the crowding-out 
issue.
The effects of a bond financed fiscal stimulus operate
2mainly through the following channels:
i . Government borrowing in the credit markets puts enough 
upward pressure on interest rates to effect a transfer of 
funds from private lenders exactly equal to the size of the 
fiscal stimulus.
ii. Private expenditure must be reduced in view of this 
transfer of funds to finance government expenditure except to 
the extent that substitute sources of finance are available. 
Those expenditures most sensitive to interest rates are af­
fected .
iii. Higher interest rates induce the private sector to 
economize on its holdings of money balances.
iv. The sales of government bonds may have effects on the 
size and composition of the private sector's overall wealth 
which may affect its expenditure intentions, the associated 
credit demands, and its demand for money balances.
1
1) A notable exception in the context of the closed economy
is W. Lachmann, "Crowding out und die Budgetrestriktion 
des Staates: Eine Kritik", Kredit und Kapital, vol. 1,
1982, pp. 112-133.
2) See OECD (1982), Budget Financing and Monetary Control, 
p. 32.
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v. Government demand for credit is likely to attract capital 
from the rest of the world. If the exchange rate is allowed 
to fluctuate, the money supply will remain unaffected. With 
a fixed exchange rate money supply will expand or stay con­
stant according to the degree of central bank open market op­
erations. The end usage of the funds, consumption or invest­
ment, is of importance, as is the sector which imports the 
funds. The overall effect of a fiscal stimulus is determined 
by the simultaneous interaction of these above-mentioned 
channels.
Let us first consider the issue in the context of items
i and ii, and use an abstract of the Blinder & Solow/Tobin- 
Buiter^ model.
The assumptions:
Wages and prices are held constant during the period, and the 
overall production level is a function of demand.
Private wealth Wp , equals private capital, K, net public 
debt, D, and the money supply:
WP = K + D + M. (1)
Shares and bonds are perfect substitutes, and the level of 
interest is R.
The demand for money balances is a dependent variable of R,
Y, the national product, and Wp .
G is total public consumption, and let A be net public claims 
on the private sector.
T is net taxes and transfers.
1) Blinder & Solow, Tobin & Buiter, op. cit.
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The public budget equation is then:
M = G -  T -  RA + A (2)
M = dM/dt and A = dA/dt are the growth rates for the mon­
ey supply and the public claims on the private sector.
If the public sector expenditure is constant over time,
G' = G - RA, and taxes, T, a function of the national product
Y, we can rearrange equation (2) to:
M - A = G' + T(Y) . (3)
From equation (1), we can define the LM-curve as:
L(R,Y/WP)WP = M (4)
If the required capital intensity is determined by the 
level of interest, then the actual amount of capital will 
equal the desired capital intensity times the actual level of 
production. If investments are a proportion of the difference 
between actual and desired amounts of capital, we can define 
the investment function below:
K = I = i(P(R)Y - K) (5), where P is net private invest­
ments.
Let the propensity to save be determined by the differ­
ence between actual and desired private wealth. Income and 
other taxes are T - aY, which shows that taxes are a constant 
proportion of Y.
Our savings function can then be defined as:
WP = S = s(Y - W) (6)
Ey assuming that the sum of private sector and public savings 
equals real investments, the closed economy assumption, we can 
formulate the following IS-curve: 
s (Y - W) + aY - G ’ - i(P(R)Y - K) = 0 (7)
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The resulting LM and IS curves, equations (7) and (4), 
will at any given time determine the level of demand, and 
the level of interest.
The intersection will gradually move over time, as 
changes in private wealth and real capital will shift the 
IS-curve, and changes in real wealth and money supply will 
affect the LM-curve.
The growth in real capital is determined by equation 
(5), and the growth of the sum of D and M, is determined in 
equation (3).
As there are nearly as many assumptions of the true 
slopes of the IS-LM curves as there are contributions in 
literature, we shall briefly discuss the relevance of some
of the contributions.
1Tobin & Buiter show that their model has a stable sta­
tionary solution whichever financing mode is used. I.e. 
there is no crowding out, if the IS-LM curves have the usual 
shape, where the IS curve slopes downwards while the LM 
curve slopes upwards, and the demand for money increases 
when private wealth increases.
What happens in the Tobin-Buiter model is that a bond 
financed deficit can only be financed by the public if the 
interest rate is on a steady increase.
A higher interest rate will in the first hand influenca 
the capital intensity in industry. This in the short term.
In the longer term the demand for goods will be inde­
pendent of the interest rate, and in this way the gap be­
1) Tobin & Buiter (1976), op. cit.
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tween desired and actual capital intensity will at last be 
bridged.
The increase in the public spending and the correspond­
ing deficit on the budget will in the end be covered by a 
similar increase in revenues.
The critical factor in the argumentation of Tobin & 
Buiter is the lack of empirical knowledge of the asset de­
mand and supply functions.
In the short run IS-LM system the IS equation is actu­
alally the sum of the asset demand/supply equations.
2Infante & Stein, in a model with vertical IS curve and 
horizontal LM curve, get, not unexpectedly, results contrary
3to those of Tobin and Buiter and Blinder & Solow. Accord­
ing to the former, a bond financed deficit does not find a 
stable solution, or the fiscal multiplier is negative, or at 
least smaller than would be the case if the deficit had been 
financed by monetary measures.
The comparative statics of the IS-LM system and the 
limitations this causes when higher spending in each period
4is to be accounted for, was first commented upon by Silber, 
who showed that the continuous financing of deficit spending
1) For a discussion of this point see the newer contribu­
tion of J. Tobin & W. Buiter, "Fiscal and Monetary Poli­
cies, Capital Formation, and Economic Activity", in G.M.
v. Fiirstenberg (ed.), 1981, op. cit.
2) See E.F. Infante & J.L. Stein, "Does Fiscal Policy Mat­
ter", Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 2, no. 4, Nov. 
1976, pp. 473-500.
3) Tobin & Buiter (1976), op. cit., Blinder & Solow (1973), 
op. cit.
4) W. Silber, "Fiscal Policy in the IS-LM Analysis, a Cor­
rection", Journal of Money, Credit and Bankina. 2, 1970. pp. 460-472. -------
would lead to a nonstable intersection of the LM-IS curves,
whichever slope they may have. Only with mixed finance of
the budget deficit can a stable solution be imagined.
The same point is expressed very precisely in a later
icontribution by Chick:
"The equilibrium solution of the IS-LM model is either 
transitory, dependent on very special conditions, or 
consistent only with the stationary state."
The main deficiency of the IS-LM model, in the present
context of a small open economy tied to a strong currency at
least, is the implicit assumption in these models that an
equilibrium solution is dependent on a rise in real income.
Such an assumption is in, especially, the case of the
2Blinder & Solow model based on the belief that the short­
term multiplier which we got from our IS-LM analysis is
3higher than the ordinary long-term multiplier. That is, 
that the revenue per unit of new bonds is higher than the
1) V. Chick, "Financial Counterparts of Savings and Invest­
ment and Inconsistency in Some Simple Macro Models", 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 109, 1973, p. 642.
2) Blinder & Solow (1973), op. cit.
3) In Blinder & Solow's terminology: FB *T'*dB stands for
revenue per unit of new issued bond, and (1 - T 1)dB are 
the costs.
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costs of the increase in the budget deficit.
If this is the case, an equilibrium solution can only be 
obtained after a rise in real income.
An outcome based on an assumption of a steady increase 
in real income is not compatible with the general scope of 
adjustment to the strong currency option, which, as stressed 
in the first chapters, includes a decrease in real absorp­
tion.
With a high degree of foreign indebtedness, where the
debt service uses a high proportion of available foreign ex- 
2change, the option of increasing real income in order to 
balance the budget is unrealistic,^ in the case of a small
1) Cf. the following quote:
"If F0 ^ 0 as the monetarists claim, fiscal policy does
not work, but the system is unstable. The economy does
not return to its initial equilibrium before the deficit
spending, as monetarist doctrine holds, instead income 
falls cumulatively and without limit. If 0 <. Fg < (1 - 
T')/T', fiscal policy works as Keynesians have always be­
lieved, but the increases in GNP are not sufficient to 
close the budgetary gap.
Only if T'Fp exceeds (1 - T 1) . . . will the budget defi­
cit be falling, and thus only in this case will the sys­
tem approach its new steady state equilibrium." A.S. 
Blinder & R.M. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?, A Cor­
rection", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 5, Feb. 1976.
2) The implications of a foreign debt which has developed 
from 10% of GNP in 1973 to nearly 28% in 1981 is analyzed 
in the next three .chapters. However, it should be obvi­
ous that the servicing of this debt will strain the fu­
ture level of real income.
3) See the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 where it was con­
cluded that the ability of a small open economy to "fix" 
its own level of real income was impeded by the linkages 
in the money, capital and commodity markets.
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open economy like Denmark.
Furthermore, as Infante & Stein have pointed out, the 
main dubious assumption in the Blinder & Solow model is the
-)assumption of a fixed price level, P = 1, and the apparent 
negligence of an employment variable.
Another weakness in the IS-LM model is that bonds and 
claims to real reproducible capital are perfect substitutes 
in private portfolios, and there is no distinction between 
internationally traded and domestically traded assets.
7.3.2. The possibility of real crowding out in the small 
open economy.
As can be seen from the discussion above, the crowd­
ing-out issue has to a large extent been discussed in the 
context of the closed economy.
In an open economy financial crowding out can always 
be avoided by (private) capital imports, according to the
1) See Infante & Stein (1976), op. cit., pp. 476-80. Only 
very rarely is the importance of changes in the domes­
tic price level incorporated in the IS-LM analysis. An 
important exception is R.M. Mundell, "An Exposition of 
Some Subtleties in the Keynesian System", Weltwirt­
schaftliches Archiv, 1964, December, pp. 301-314. A 
newer contribution without explicit use of the IS-LM 
model is H. Hayakawa, "Does Fiscal Policy Really Matter 
in the Context of Variable Prices", Journal of Macroe­
conomics , 1979, p. 321.
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traditional view. In the Danish case a change in the pat­
tern of foreign borrowing has taken place during the last 
five years. Where the public sector and the private sector 
used to import nearly similar amounts of capital, net pri­
vate capital imports have virtually ceased and the public 
sector has accordingly stepped up its foreign borrowing re­
quirement .
The immediate reason for this change, is that foreign 
interest rates started to reach the domestic level of in­
terest, but another reason, which has until now been ne­
glected in the debate, is that expectations of future ex­
change rate stability for the Dkr have been pessimistic, in 
the light of continuing inflation differentials and contin­
uing budget deficits.
A depreciating currency, or expectations in the short 
to medium term of a depreciating currency, will tend to 
equalize the real costs of imported and domestic capital,
1
1) Cf. the following conclusion of the Danish section in 
OECD, Budget Financina and Monetary Control, Paris 
1982:
"To the extent that ex post crowding out has been ob­
servable, the process has worked through borrowing 
costs resulting from disintermediation rather than 
through outright availability effects. In particular, 
heavy government borrowing requirements have not been 
offset in any systematic way by lowering the permitted 
rate of increase in bank lending commitments to the 
private sector. Alternative sources of finance, for­
eign and domestic, appear to have offset some part of 
the crowding out effects of continued high government 
borrowing. But since some of the reduced— and more 
costly— volume of funds borrowed by the private sector 
has financed the acquisition of high yielding govern­
ment debt, the net effects may have been a crowding out 
of private fixed investments of larger proportion than 
that of private credit."
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which in turn is a, somewhat, new interpretation of the in­
terest parity theorem.
Let us below consider a simplistic model of potential 
real crowding out.
Let us assume that the public sector uses its increased
2spending on consumption instead of investment, and let us 
assume that the private sector either abstains from capital 
imports expecting imminent depreciations of the exchange 
rate, or reinvests the proceeds in higher yielding domestic 
government bond issue. The effect will be a future decrease 
in relative capital stock. Such a decrease in available 
capital will, ceteris paribus, decrease overall aggregate 
productivity. A future higher output can then only be pro­
duced by increasing the price-level. Such a price increase 
will have a contractionary effect on the overall economy, 
which again will imply a future real crowding out as a re­
sult of the initial deficit spending.
This hypothesis can formally be shown in the following
way: ^
1) Following Lachmann (1982), op. cit., and reaching simi­
lar conclusions as M. Feldstein, "Fiscal Policies, In­
flation and Capital Formation", American Economic Re­
view, Sept. 1980, and H. Hayakawa (1979), op. cit.
2) Such an assumption in the case of Denmark is justifia­
ble. See chapter 2.
3) Although the following formal presentation is slightly 
different from the one presented by Lachmann (1982), op. 
cit., the present model is in substance identical with 
the one used by Lachmann. However the usual caveats ap­
ply.
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Lst Yd = C(YP) + G + I (a)
where Yd is total aggregate demand for money, and
- C(Y^) is total consumption shown as being a function of 
disposable income, and
- G is public demand for money, and
- I is gross monetary demand for investments.
Disposable income is defined as Yp = Y - T(Y ), where T(Y ) 
represents aggregated tax revenues. (b)
On the supply side Y^-P = Yd , where Y^ represents total po­
tential output, and where A stands for disposable production 
factors, and P is the price level. (d)
Total output is: Y^ = K / p  , L/ii. (c)
If we assume unemployment we can rewrite the above equation 
as: Y^ = K/^
The deficit on the budget is defined as the difference be­
tween tax revenues and total government spending:
G - T = A D
Total income can be used on consumption, government spending 
and private investment. Between savings and investment we 
find the difference & D .
Kence we get the well-known budget identity:
Y = C  + T + I +  /}D
If all gross investments are assumed to equal the total 
amount of reinvestment, we get 
A  K = ¿ I r (e)
We then differentiate Y totally, but first equation (b) is 
substituted into equation (a): 
d Yd = ( «3 G + ^ I) / j JL (f)
where j x  = 1 - C '(1 - T ') .
If the private investments are dependent on government spend­
ing, G, we get the following multiplier:
9 Y d/ 3 G  = (1 + ( 3  1 / 3 G ) ) ^  (g)
If now I/G = -1, we find the situation of perfect crowding
out, i.e. a situation where government and private invest-
iments are perfect substitutes.
In the case of perfect crowding out, the only result of in­
creased public spending will be an increased price level.
We now include the supply side from equation (d):
-  9  H r  ( h >
Furthermore assuming a one sector model, where the price of 
investments equals the price of consumption, we get:
d i  = 0p-ir + p. 3ir = p«3-ir + p• «5k = 0p-ir + p.^^^
(i)
Substituting equation { ) into equation ( ) we now get the 
real government expenditure multiplier:
i s -  =  { i )
We can also solve the equation system for ^  P/^G, i.e. which
kind of effects increased government expenditure will have
for the price level, P, hence we get the price multiplier:
<3 P = P  ~ ~ f i )  O l / a G )  m
«9 G -  ir)
The derivative of main importance for our task is, not unex­
pectedly, d  1/9 G, which, if negative as shown on the preced- 
page would ensure a perfect crowding out.
1) See Lachmann (op. cit., 1982), p. 128.
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From equation (g) we see that as long as the derivative 
9 l / 0 G  > -1 , the demand for money will increase, and taking 
equation (f) into account we see that the effects on employ­
ment of increased G can be interpreted in basically two
1ways:
If increased government expenditure and increased nomi­
nal GNP lead to a decline in relative capital stock, because 
of our assumption that gross investment equals reinvestments, 
A  K = A I  I we reach a state where real capital will become 
scarce, and hence the result of increased expenditure will be 
"classical" unemployment.
The other way of interpretation is in essence contradic­
tory of the first and is dependent on the price effect of the 
increase in government expenditure.
If there is an increase in the price-level, real con­
sumption will, ceteris paribus, fall. If real consumption 
falls, there will be increased room for real capital forma­
tion.
Which one of these contradictory effects will be the
strongest is difficult to determine, but from equation (k) we
can see the immediate effects of increased expenditure on the
2price level. However a preliminary conclusion is that in­
creased government expenditure and simultaneous efforts of 
combating inflation through tight monetary policies will in-
1) Cf. Lachmann, op. cit., and Feldstein, op. cit.
2) Ibid.
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fluence capital formation negatively, and in this way con­
tribute to "classical" unemployment.
In equation (k), the denominator is positive, which 
implies an increase in the price level as the direct result 
of the increase in G.
In the nominator, the indirect effect is dependent on 
the value of ¿ I / 3 g J
From equation (g) we see that a positive value of 
d  I / 3 G  increases demand, and equation (k) shows that also 
the price level will increase.
A negative nominator will increase unemployment.
Again there is a reasonable set of hypotheses: One
hypothesis involves a crowding-in effect, and the other is 
determined whether there are free resources of production 
factors, especially capital, and as before it is difficult 
to reach a truly clear-cut conclusion.
In the first hypothesis we can assume that if there 
are free resources available, then an increase in (G - T) 
does not necessarily increase the steady-state real defi­
cit, seen as-a percentage of national product.
If there is a rise in inflation, then this ratio will
decline, and although the fiscal policy will look expen-
2sionary, it will absorb less rather than more private sav­
ings .
The likely outcome is then that available savings will
1) Cf. Lachmann (op. cit.), 1982.
2) See Tobin & Buiter in G.v. Fvirstenberg (ed.), op. cit.,
1981, p. 133, who makes a similar point.
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be shifted into equity, thus causing a crowding in.
The causal chain is then likely to be the following:
The accelerator effect caused by the higher level of ex­
pectations of potential future demand will increase the 
present level of investment, when private wealth and sav­
ings are shifted into the now more attractive asset, equity.
Hence we get a crowding in by asset substitution, and 
ex post we will see a decrease in the real public sector 
deficit per unit of output, even though the overall level 
of private savings is constant or decreasing.
However desirable such an outcome is, it is highly
dubious. In the original contribution of B. Friedman on
2the crowding-in issue, he assumes a high elasticity of 
substitution between bonds and capital, i.e. a shift to 
the right of the LM-curve. Plainly speaking, such an as­
sumption is questionable, because the high elasticity of 
substitution between bonds and capital will influence the 
preannounced tightness of the monetary policy. If budget 
deficits are financed outside the banking system at very 
short maturities, i.e. with treasury bills, and treasury 
bills are considered a sufficiently good "near-money",  ^
then the intended anti-inflationary impact of a tight mon­
etary stance will be sacrified.
1) See B. Friedman, "Crowding out or Crowding in? Eco­
nomic Consequences of Financing Government Deficits", 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1978, p. 593,
2) Cf. B. Friedman (1978), op. cit.
3) Cf. OECD, Budget Financing and Monetary Control, Paris
1982, which, in footnote p. 37, makes a similar state­
ment .
1
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The "crowding-in" possibility is therefore not so much 
a product of budget deficits as it is a direct product of an 
easing of the tight monetary policy, by creating more li­
quidity. In the context of the open economy, international­
ly traded assets should be introduced. The crowding-out ef­
fect of increased credit finance will then diminish because 
savings from foreigners will be made available through the 
difference between domestic and foreign interest rate lev-
If, as argued earlier, budget deficits have a direct 
bearing on the external balance, consistent budget deficits 
and hence balance of payments deficits, will affect expecta­
tions about a potential exchange rate realignment.
Such expectations will obviously reduce the incentive 
to import capital and/or make the financing of the capital 
account difficult with the existing interest rate differen­
tial. Accordingly the domestic rates will have to increase, 
which will promote financial crowding-out, or exchange rate 
realignments will increase the real value of domestically
held foreign debt, hereby increasing the chances of a crowd-
2ing-out via the exchange rate. Such an outcome is not sur-
1) The crowding-out issue in the concept of the open econo­
my has been dealt with only rarely. A notable exception 
is H. Lehment, "Internationale Aspekte der Staats­
verschuldung", in Beihefte der Konjunkturpolitik: 
Probleme der Staatsverschuldung, Heft 27. In a later 
contribution, Zur Neuorientierung der Staatlichen 
Schuldenpolitik, Kiel 1982, mimeo, Lehment discusses the 
concept of crowding out via the exchange rate.
2) In an analysis of investments and profitability in the 
Danish fisheries 1978 made for the "Jutland Institute of 
Technology", it was shown how long-term borrowings in 
Swiss Francs in the early seventies dramatically changed 
profitability prospects for a large part of the Danish
fishing fleet. Details can be obtained from this au­thor.
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prising, it is merely a reinterpretation of the interest rate 
parity theorem, which then in accordance with the hypothesis 
about IPRT presented in chapter 3, finally will have a poten­
tial crowding-out effect of private investments. There will 
be a time lag, which will be a function of the degree of ro­
bustness of the exchange-rate system.
According to the second hypothesis, an increase in gov­
ernment expenditure will lead to a general increase in the 
price-level, see equation (k), because the amount of capital 
is seen as the bottleneck. A general price increase and a 
stagnant level of private investment will lead to a situation 
of real crowding out.
The causal chain is as follows:
If the government expenditure is primarily spent on gov­
ernment consumption, then the ratio of real capital will de­
cline.^ Total aggregate productivity will fall, which indi­
cates that increased output only can be produced at a higher 
price. This will have a contractive effect on the economy 
and it implies the formerly mentioned degree of real crowd­
ing-out, as the indirect result of the increased level of 
deficit spending.
The above results are hardly surprising. The conclusion
1) This is very like the results found by A. Ostrofsky, "An 
Empirical Analysis of the Crowding Out Effect of Fiscal 
Policies in the US and Canada", Kyklos (1979), No. 32, 
vol. 4, which was a comment on an article with the same 
title by R.J. Cebula in Kyklos 1978, No. 31, vol. 3.
is the same common sense as the one first formulated by
1Wilson, that prolonged deficit finance and ticrht monetary 
policy in order to combat inflation are incompatible.
This in turn calls for a clearer formulation of a me­
dium-term financial target, as proposed in the preceding 
chapter, so that monetary and fiscal targets can be set in 
concert with one another, instead of competing with each 
other.
7.4. Stabilization policies and public sector growth.
In the present chapter we found that a tight monetary 
policy, which fixes the exchange rate at' a (too) high lev­
el, with resulting balance of payments deficits and corre­
sponding capital imports, tends to shift the production 
pattern in an economy towards the production of nontradea- 
bles, which in a small economy consist mainly of public 
services.
In this way a link between anti-inflation policies 
and public sector growth is established.
Below we shall show that deficit spending which part­
ly can be seen as a result of increased income transfers 
stemming from the recessionary impact of the initial mone­
tary contraction, in itself can contribute to an increased 
growth in the public sector if a misconception prevails
1) T. Wilson, "Crowding Out, The Real Issues", BNL, Quar­
terly Review, 1979, No. 130.
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about the nature of unemployment.
If, following our previous line of argument, a real 
crowding out is the result of extensive deficit spending, 
and if the capital/labour ratio is decreasing, then a 
classical type unemployment can very easily be confused 
with a Keynesian type unemployment.
If the unemployment is of the classical type, addi­
tional deficit spending will only produce a marginal re-
2suit, as wage increases s6on will catch up with the ris­
ing price level.
1) This point has been made by K. Lehment, Stabilization
Policy and the Expansion of the Public Sector, Paper
prepared for the conference on "Allocational and 
Structural Consequences of Short-Run Stabilization 
Policies in Open Economies", Stockholm 1981.
2) The view that public sector growth is inflationary is
widely held; cf. the following two quotations: "The
more fundamental source of inflation in all our coun­
tries and our economic difficulties has been the 
change in philosophy that occurred sometime in the 
1930s and earlier from the belief of the individual­
istic society towards a belief in the welfare state
. . . And as government has expanded its scope it 
has become increasingly difficult to finance the ac­
tivities of government by direct taxes and therefore 
has made the implicit hidden tax of inflation an ever 
more attractive strategy." M. Friedman, quoted from 
J.W. Nevile, "Government Expenditure and Inflation", 
Bank of New South Wales Review, No. 17, 1976, and "If 
workers are frustrated by rising taxation either in­
flation will accelerate (if the money supply is al­
lowed to expand) or unemployment will rise (if the 
money supply is controlled)." R .YU Bacon & W.A. 
Eltis, "How Growth in Public Expenditure has contrib­
uted to Britain's Difficulties", in The Dilemmas of 
Government Expenditure, IEA, 1976. In the present 
chapter the main point is less ambitious than proving 
that tax cost push is a main explanatory variable for 
inflation; we merely set out to see whether there is 
a link between the relative size of the public sector 
and stabilization policies.
Deficit spending and crowding out in the demand-aggregate 
supply schedule.
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Figure 6.
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In figure 6 this point is illustrated. If we start 
from a position with a balanced budget, the fiscal expansion 
will shift the demand curve from DQ to .
A new position is reached at point A, where demand curve 
intersects the supply curve S '. Here both the price level 
(P) and real output (Y) have risen.
If we now introduce an increase in nominal wages in or­
der to catch up with the initial level of real wages, the 
supply curve will move upwards towards S ’’.
A new intersection on the long-run supply curve S with 
S'* and D.j will show a position where output has returned to 
its original level and where the price level has been pushed
upwards. If tax rates in reality are proportional or only
2mildly progressive, there is good reason also to expect a 
budget deficit in this position B.
Position B is clearly not desirable, and different 
strategies can be devised to push the demand curve back into 
its original position, all of which will involve increased 
unemployment unless, cf. the previous Bacon and Eltis quote, 
the money supply is increased.
A permanent increase in public sector spending via the
3ratchet effect is then a very plausible outcome.
1) Following Lehment (1981), op. cit.
2) Ibid., p. 15.
3) Cf. A.T. Peacock & J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Ex­
penditure in the United Kingdom, Princeton 1961.
1
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Chapter 8
Exchange rate movements, competitiveness and public sector 
deficits. A comparative analysis.
In this chapter we intend to support the old Keynesian 
dictum that long-term real exchange rate equilibrium de­
pends on real as well as monetary factors.
An analysis of the variations of nominal effective and 
real effective exchange rates shows that the smaller EMS 
countries, Denmark and Belgium, have experienced very un­
satisfactory trade-offs between changes in nominal and real 
exchange rates. In this way profits in the tradeable sec­
tors have been squeezed, which is shown by comparing varia­
tions in unit labour cost indices with variations in export 
unit cost indices, GNP-deflators and the nominal effective 
exchange rate index.
Examining the changes in the structure of GDP uses, by 
comparing an average from 1968-72 with the actual pattern 
in 1982, we see how public consumption in Denmark has risen 
the most, while the decline in gross capital formation has 
been the highest amongst the EMS countries. These findings 
support our hypothesis of a squeeze on the tradeables sec­
tor as a result of tight monetary policies, while public 
sector consumption has risen thanks to expansive or accom­
modating fiscal policies.
Finally we show that there are no uniform trends be­
tween the EMS countries when economic performance and the 
expansion of public sector spending are compared.
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However we conclude that public sector growth, and 
hence changing relative prices between tradeables and 
non-tradeables should be taken into account when an 
equilibrium between purchasing power and the nominal ex­
change rate is focused upon.
A strong or an appreciating currency will, accord­
ing to new monetarist integration theory, put a brake on
inflation and strengthen the home country’s terms of
1trade, at least in the short run. A lowering of infla­
tion and hence a strengthening of the terms of trade 
will, ceteris paribus, improve competitiveness and in 
this way influence the adjustment process for monetary 
unification in a positive way. We recall that the ac­
knowledged view is that a long-term exchange rate equi­
librium exists inside an exchange rate area when changes 
in real exchange rates are minimized, and following from 
this, that real exchange rate changes are a comprehen­
sive and operational criterion of the comparative costs,
or comparative desirability of monetary unification for
2groups of countries.
3Keynes was first to argue that arriving at a long­
1) In contrast to the traditional view that an appreci­
ation will be accompanied by a loss of competitive­
ness which will last several years.
2) Cf. R. Vaubel (1978), Real Exchange Rate Changes in
the EC, op. cit.
3) J.M.A. Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, vol. IV 
in the Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, London 
1971 .
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term real exchange rate equilibrium depended on real, as
well as monetary factors.
In his "Tract on Monetary Reform" Keynes noted that
if disturbances are monetary " . . .  then we may expect
that purchasing power parity and exchange value will come
1together again before long". If on the other hand the 
disturbances are real, i.e. reparation payments or chang­
es in the relative efficiency of labour, " . . .  then the 
equilibrium point between purchasing power parity and the 
rate of exchange may be modified permanently".“
So if a long-term PPP is supposed to hold, which in 
reality is identical to the equilibrium value for the 
real exchange rate, then disturbances must be mainly mon­
etary.
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that 
real structural changes tend to change relative prices 
internally, which will cause substantial deviations of 
the equilibrium real exchange rate from its PPP level.^
The aim is to see how movements in the effective ex­
change rate have affected the real exchange rate in order
1) Ibid., p . 9 5.
2) Keynes (1923), op. cit., p. 97.
3) Which in some way tend to reinforce the previous
findings by L.H. Officer, "The Purchasing Power Pari­
ty of Exchange Rates: A Review Article", IMF Staff
Papers, 23, March 19 76, and P.A. Samuelson, "Theoret­
ical Notes on Trade Problems", Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 46, May 19 64.
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to evaluate the degree of real adjustment stemming from
movements of the effective exchange rate. We use data
from the EMS countries and learn that movements in the
effective exchange rate have only limited effects on
real adjustment in the smaller open economies, and when
1the concept of efficiency wages is introduced as a 
measure for real exchange rates and competitiveness, 
then the "true" level of the Danish efficiency wage, 
based on relative unit labour costs, seems to have been 
badly underestimated in previous surveys on internation­
al competitiveness.
If only judging the degree of competitiveness from 
the departure point of efficiency wages, then the appar­
ent success from linking the DKR to an external strong 
currency should be reconsidered. As the problem is to 
assess the implications of currency movements for bal­
ance of payments trends, we cannot solely rely on meas­
urements of efficiency wages.
It is not a hidden secret that many commentators in 
the past and in the present have picked the indices 
which seemed best to suit the purpose at hand. If some­
body wants to advocate a depreciation of a currency, an 
index showing only a small, or no depreciation is often 
chosen, etc.
1) Nicolas Kaldor introduced this term originally in a 
newspaper article "Economic Crisis, Exports and the 
Sinking Pound1', The Times, 9th November 19 76.
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So before we risk falling into the same trap, we shall 
briefly explain the fundamental differences between the ma­
jor published indices, a task very rarely performed, taking
into account the huge supply of literature on competitive-
1ness, which has been published during the last decade.
And it is worth keeping in mind that it is not only 
the actual present values of the indices which are of im­
portance, but the trend over the past decade, which is use­
ful. There is a time lag before a (too) strong currency 
will affect the level of inflation and the effect on com­
petitiveness. And furthermore, according to the theory 
presented in the previous chapter, a temporary overvalua­
tion will via the ratchet effect, contribute to an increase 
in government expenditure. In the second half of this 
chapter we shall make an exhaustive comparison of the defi­
cit spending patterns of the EMS countries,
8.1. Nominal and real effective exchange rate indices for 
the EMS countries compared.
Let us start by summing up the objectives of an index
1) A very thorough survey on the computation and usage of 
PPP was published in Journal of International Econom­
ics , vol. 8, May 19 78, with contributions of a.o. 
Thygesen, Vaubel and Frenkel. In these articles the 
focus was on which kind of national indices should be 
used in the computation of PPP. The aim here is to 
compare the basics of some already published indices 
for real exchange rates, the Morgan Index, the IMF 
Merm, but not the Fed. Reserve Boards, where esp. the 
Danish Krone is excluded.
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of nominal and real effective exchange rates.
1According to Morgan Trust there are basically four 
ways in which the indices can be used:
a) To describe day-to-day exchange rate movements in a 
summary fashion.
b) To estimate the effects of exchange rate changes on 
a country's balance of payments, trade, current ac­
count and even capital flows.
c) To appraise the interaction of exchange rate changes 
with inflation.
d) To derive exchange rate implications on the assump­
tion that over time nominal exchange rate changes 
tend to offset inflation differentials.
On the next page we have compiled a table of Morgan 
Trust and IMF indices for the EMS countries. The aim is 
on the basis of these sources to assess the changes in 
nominal and real exchange rates and then try to point 
out the deficiencies of this way of measurement when us­
ing the indices according to especially criteria c and 
d, but before starting on this task, some fundamentals 
about the construction of the two indices should be 
briefly mentioned.
The two indices have different base years, so they
1) See Morgan Trust, World Financial Markets, April 
1979. Another interesting discussion of the prob­
lems of measuring changes in price levels and ex­
change rates is found in M. Crawford, "Currencies in 
a Floating World", EIU Special Report No. 35, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit LTD., April 1977.
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are not directly comparable. The Morgan index measures each 
currency's movements against fifteen other currencies, using 
as weights the relative bilateral shares of trade. The 
trade weights used are based on 19 76 bilateral trade in man­
ufactures .
The IMF's multilateral exchange rate model (MERM) is 
the basis for the IMF index. This model was designed spe­
cially for the study of exchange rate effects on trade flows 
and includes several minor currencies in addition to the 
ones included in the Morgan index.
1A comparison made by "World Financial Markets" in 19 79 
showed that the two ways of computing indices do not make 
any difference. The main point is the problem of different 
base years, but that only influences the absolute level of 
the numbers. So with these limitations in mind, we can turn 
to the actual interpretation of the results.
Figure 1 points to the surprisingly weak degree of cor­
relation between loss of competitiveness and effective nomi-
2nal appreciation. The countries to the left of the 45-de­
gree line in the 1st quadrant do not follow this trend.
They have a higher nominal appreciation than real apprecia-
1) Morgan Trust, World Financial Markets, April 19 79.
2) In contrast to the results from R. Dornbusch, Issues in 
International Finance, Who and What Controls the $ , MIT 
19 79, here quoted from L. Katseli-Papfstratiou, The ReS- 
mergence of the PPP Doctrine in the 1970s, Princeton 
1979, p. 28.
198o.(1975=loo)
Fig.l.
- 272 -
Fig. 2
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Table 2. Changes in central rates within the Snake and the 
EMS from 19 75 to June 1982."*
DM H.fl. B.fr. D.kr. F.F. Lit.
Oct. 1976 +2 -2 -2 -6
Apr. 1977 -3
Aug. 1977 -5
Feb. 19782
Oct. 1978 +4 +2 +2
Dec. 19783
Sep. 1979 +2 -2.9
Nov. 1979 -4.8
Mar. 1981 -6
Oct. 19 81 +5.5 +5.5 -3 -3
Feb. 1982 -8.5 -3
Jun. 1 982 +4.25 + 4.25 -5.75 -2
1) Realignments of central rates, percentage change 
against the group of currencies whose parities were 
not changed.
2) Norway devalues 8%.
3) Norway withdraws from the system.
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Table 3. Annual rates of change in prices within the EMS
1countries.
Consumer prices
68/60 74/68 78/74 79/78 80/79 81/80 82/81
Belgium 3.2 5.9 7.9 3.9 6.5 7.6 10.2
Denmark 5.3 8.6 9.9 9.6 11 .5 10.7 10.1
Germany 2.9 5.4 4.5 4.0 5.2 5.9 4.7
France 3.9 7.2 9.8 10.9 13.2 12.5 13.3
Italy 3.8 8.7 16.7 15.0 20.4 19.0 15.0
Netherlands 3.9 7.8 7.4 4.3 6.6 6.7 5.8
Britain 3.5 8.7 15.6 14.3 15.5 10.7 9.5
GDP-■deflator
Belgiurit 3.2 6.8 7.6 4.3 4.4 5.0 8.2
Denmark 5.7 9.2 10.2 7.7 8.4 9.6 10.6
Germany 3.0 6.1 4.3 3.9 4.7 4.3 4.4
France 4.0 7.2 10.5 10.6 11 .5 11.8 12.7
Italy 4.3 9.0 17.1 15.7 20.4 17.6 15.8
Netherlands 4.9 7.9 7.9 4.2 5.3 6.0 6.2
Britain 3.7 8.7 16.5 15.1 18.9 11.8 8.5
1) Excluding Ireland and including Britain.
Sources: Eurostat and forecasts from commission depart­
ments, European Economy, vol. 12, 1982.
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tion. The three countries in the third quadrant gained on­
ly very little in competitiveness despite relatively large 
depreciations of the nominal rate. France even seems to 
have depreciated and lost competitiveness. The result for 
Britain is difficult to explain from this simple figure. 
However it is clear that Germany and the Netherlands gained 
in competitiveness despite a drastic appreciation of their 
currencies.
That currency indices sometimes can create more confu­
sion than clarity can be seen from figure 2, where IMF Merm 
figures have been plotted in our diagram. These figures 
are the most recent figures autumn 19tf2.
In the case of Germany and the Netherlands the IMF 
figures suggest a high degree of overvaluation, while the 
Morgan figures show the results which we would expect. Be­
cause of these countries' much lower domestic inflation 
rates, the drastic appreciation in nominal terms has not 
been followed by a similar loss of competitiveness.
The French franc, sterling, the Danish krone and the 
Belgian franc are all overvalued.
Let us return to tables 1 - 2 - 3 ,  and let us see how 
adjustment for especially the small countries has succeeded 
by relying on the strong currency option.
Has there been only a transitory loss of competitive­
ness by fixing the currency to the value of an external 
currency, which is considered to be more stable in the fu­
ture, in terms of purchasing power?
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Or has the loss of competitiveness been more perma­
nent as observers of a more Keynesian persuasion would 
suggest?
If we look at the national differentials of infla­
tion rates in table 3, divergence seems to be increasing 
rather than decreasing. Though not a fault which can be 
attributed solely to the EMS, it should be kept in mind 
that the convergence of inflation rates is a prerequisite
for the proper functioning of the fixed-rate currency
1area the EMS was planned to become. And if indeed there 
has been a relatively high state of calmness on the ex­
change markets in EMS member states, it should also be 
kept in mind that the costs are very high real interest 
rates for some of the weaker currencies, and high premi­
ums in forward markets (see tables 4 & 5).
1) It seems that monetary unification finally is growing 
from being a mere issue of coordinating domestic 
credit creation into becoming the more complex exer­
cise it rightly deserves (see chapter 1), cf. "Ac­
cordingly the strengthening of convergence is a pre­
requisite for any significant future development of 
the EMS. Such strengthening of convergence should 
apply to all economic policy areas (in particular 
budgetary policy) and be achieved by implementing co­
ordinated domestic and community policies . . . "
Oral statement from the committee of governors of the 
central banks of the member states of the EEC to the 
council of 15th March on the future of the EMS, 1982.
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In table 1, we see that Denmark and, especially, Bel­
gium experienced an appreication of the nominal exchange 
rate in the late 70s, which was not based on any particu­
lar strength in these countries' economic performance.
Despite having the highest frequency of exchange rate 
realignments, these frequent devaluations have not yet had 
their impact on the real exchange rate, which has been re­
markably stable both for Belgium and for Denmark, and the 
logic of letting nominal rates move so much when the 
trade-off between nominal and real rates is only slight, 
can indeed be questioned. Domestic policy measures could 
perhaps have accomplished the same?
If we look at the costs of having diverging inflation
1rates and fixed exchange rates, table 4 shows the differ­
ences in real interest rates.
The first lines show annual changes in consumer pric­
es minus money market rates, which is the normal way of 
computing real interest rates.
However, in a small open economy with the documented
1) Cf. the point made by Vaubel, that the costs of be­
longing to a currency area are exemplified by the di­
vergence between nominal and real effective rates; it 
could be added that these costs only apply for deficit 
countries, because they have to borrow externally when 
the stock of international reserves needs replenish­
ment .
- 278 -
implications for domestic macroeconomic policies, see chap­
ter 3, a more illustrative way of deriving real interest 
rates is to look at government bond yields and then sub­
tract the change in consumer prices.
Assuming that the government is running a budget defi­
cit, this measure shows how much the government is willing
1to pay depositors to keep their money in the country, when 
exchange-rate illusion no longer exists. The cost for fu­
ture Danish taxpayers is not discounted.
In table 5, the three-month forward exchange rate for 
the EMS currencies against the dollar is compiled for the 
last five years.
In a way this table shows the same story although from 
a different angle. The Danish krone has consistently been 
at a discount through the last five, years. The forward ex­
change rate should not be taken as a predictor of the fu­
ture rate of exchange generally, but under certain assump­
tions it is logical to see the forward rate as a trend set­
ter.
Under a fixed exchange rate system, the monetary au­
thorities hold the spot rate constant until they are forced 
to change it. Any expectations in the markets about the 
future stability of a currency is likely to have effects on 
the forward rate, via the interest rate.
A high discount on, say, Danish Kroner reflects the
1) The very low real rates for Italy and France are due to 
exchange controls.
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Table 4. Real interest rates in the EMS countries.
Annual changes in consumer prices minus money 
market rates (a)
Annual changes in consumer prices minus gov
ernment bond yields (b)
79/78 80/79 81/80 82/81
Belgium a 4.03 4.72 3.86 2.15
b 5.61 4.44 6.11 3.52
Denmark a 3.03 5.4 j 4.07 8.89
b 6.22 6.16 8.22 11.12
Germany a 2.69 4 .24 6.21 4.56
b 3.4 3.3 4.48 4.27
France a -1 .22 -1 .0 2.76 2.84
b -1 .42 -0.21 3.16 2.74
Italy a -3.14 -J.23 0.6 5.88
b -0.95 -4.29 1 .58 6.12
Netherlands a 4.73 3.53 4.31 2.68
b 4.48 3.61 4.85 4.48
Source : Changes in consumer prices : Table 3.
Changes in money market rates and Government 
bond yields: IMF
Financial Statistics.
Calculated from lines 60b, 60bs and 61.
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interest rate differential between the costs of borrowing 
Kroner in Copenhagen and dollars in the dollar market. 
However, with the experience in mind that central banks, 
with a currency which has hit the floor, tend to use an 
increase of the discount rate as their first option, it 
is coherent to see the forward rate as a predictor of 
kind.
If we turn the picture, then the premium on dollar 
will increase the very transaction costs, a currency area 
is supposed to minimize.
So it then turns out that departures from PPP, be­
cause goods and labour markets only react slowly, as sim­
plified by the sluggishness of the real exchange rate to 
adjust to changes in the nominal rates, are compensated 
by variations in thè real interest rate, which in turn 
affects international transaction cost in a way not very 
different from exchange rate uncertainty.
Table 5. Three months' forward exchange rates, discounts (-
and premiums on the currencies of the EMS measured
in dollars.
77 78 79 80 8 1 82
Belgium -4.1 2.36 0.11 5.11 -6.03 -1 .47
Denmark -15.40 -2.36 -3.02 2.56 -0.14 -5.31
France -2.55 5.26 2.19 5.85 -2.52
Germany 4.75 7.88 5.66 8.17 3.16 3.73
Italy -11.01 -2.41 -4.71 3.14 -9.83 -7.87
Netherlands 1 .40 2.23 2.41 8.17 2 .84 3.62
Britain 3.21 0.39 -2.01 4.48 1 .22 -1 .08
Notes: End of period, figures from 82 are from September.
Source: International Financial Statistics, November 1982.
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8.2. Trade competitiveness, squeeze of profits in the
tradeables sector and changes in effective exchange 
rates.
As the measurement of international competitiveness
1has been the subject of a heated debate in recent years, 
this section will analyze competitiveness using relative 
unit labour costs in a common currency.
This measure is in essence the same as Kaldor's "ef-
2ficiency wages", and is widely used.
If we assume that factor prices are sticky also in 
the longer term, then exchange rate overshooting as an 
effect of a too restrictive monetary policy/too nigh real 
interest rate, will affect firms in mainly two ways:
Firstly their variable costs will increase. This 
will result in a decrease in competitiveness, both in 
home markets as well as in foreign markets.
Secondly, if the firms do not want to lose markets 
they have to lower their prices. A lowering of price 
will first be felt in profits. This will eventually fil­
ter through to the investment rate.
So in order to see whether exporters have been 
squeezed on their profit margins to preserve market 
shares, cf. the hypothesis presented in the preceding 
chapter, the variations in cost competitiveness are com­
1) A survey of the arguments for the various measures of 
competitiveness is contained in ''The International 
Competitiveness of Selected OECD Countries", Economic 
Outlook, Occasional Studies, July 1978.
2) N. Kaldor (1976), op. cit.
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pared with an estimate for profitability in the tradeables 
sector.
For this task the unit value index for manufactured 
exports was selected.
When compared with the GDP deflator, a measure for 
"squeeze" in the tradeables sector is derived.
Such a way of measuring competitiveness is not en­
tirely new. Buiter & Miller used it in a slightly differ- 
1ent context. To use this way of measurement in the case 
of Denmark brings some startling results.
The reason for this is that the unit labour costs in 
Danish manufacturing industry have been clearly underesti­
mated for the last ten years, due to incomparability of 
Danish national account data to those of other countries. 
In this way the degree of competitiveness of the Danish 
industry has been consistently overestimated for the last
decade, which in terms of real exchange rates means that
2the current estimates are too low.
1) See W.H. Buiter & M. Miller, "The Thatcher Experiment, 
The First Two Years", Brookings Papers on Economic Ac­
tivity, 2, 1981.
2) This standard error*in the use of Danish National Ac­
counts by the US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), was first discovered by V. Puggard 
from the Federation of Danish Industries, whom I thank 
for valuable help and information. The BLS figures 
for labour costs are used by the OECD, IMF and other 
international organizations. In this way an error in 
the compilation of data seems to have had widespread 
consequences when comparing national economic perform­
ances .
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Table 7 shows the variations in the effective nominal 
exchange rate in the (a) column. For this the IMF effec­
tive rate index was chosen.
Column (b) shows the variations in relative unit la­
bour costs; this measure gives the change in competitive­
ness, which can be interpreted as the real exchange rate.
Column (c) shows the variations in export unit costs, 
as compiled by the IFS. Lastly, column (d) brings for 
comparison the change in GNP deflators.
The period chosen was 1979-1981. The reason for this 
was that 19 79 seems to be the year where nearly all the 
currencies reached their highest score on the effective 
exchange rate index. See table 1.
For Denmark the decrease of 25.7% in the effective 
exchange rate, brought only modest results on the downward 
movements of unit labour costs. Had factor prices been 
more flexible, a much higher decrease in ULC1s would have 
been expected.
If we assume that ULC1s are an adequate predictor for 
the state of the real exchange rate, then we can see that 
a decrease of 25.7% in the effective rate only brings a 
3.17% decrease in the real rate.
This is obviously a very bad trade-off, but it does 
not surprise as it corresponds with the result obtained in 
the preceding section. This large deterioration in cost 
competitiveness was and is being absorbed by the exporters 
to a considerable degree.
The unit value index for manufactured exports fell
287 -
4.25% from 1979 to 1981, and measured from 1979 to August 
19 82, the export unit cost index fell even more, 11.34%. 
With a decreasing effective exchange rate one should have 
expected the opposite result. However the sharp rise in 
the GNP deflator indicates the stickiness in factor pric­
es, while the decrease in export unit costs and the rela­
tively smaller decrease in ULC's compared to the effec­
tive rate, shows the degree to which exporters have been 
squeezing their profit margins in order to stay competi­
tive and keep market shares.
The only country which has had a worse trade-off be­
tween decreases in nominal and real exchange rates is It­
aly. Surprisingly Italy has also experienced a real in­
crease in export unit costs. With the modest response in 
the ULC to the decrease in the real rate, it is not unex­
pected that this advantage is eroding.
The Netherlands is the country which, from these 
figures, has had the best performance in terms of holding 
nominal and real rates steady. With a low increase in 
the GNP deflator it has remained highly competitive, and 
now only Denmark and to a lesser degree Belgium suffer 
from the "Dutch disease".
The loss of competitiveness did not lower demand for 
Danish exports, only the UK and Italy experienced lower 
volumes of exports. This decrease was countered in both 
cases by an increase in the export value unit costs.
(See tables 7 & 8).
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Table 8. Changes in export volumes. 19 79-1981.
Denmark Belgium Germany France Italy Netherlands UK
+14.33 +3.8 +10.8 +5.16 -3.3 +1.6 -14.6
Source: Derived from Eurostatistics, Data 
Economic Analysis, No. 9, 1982.
for Short-Term
The concept of unit labour costs as being a close proxy
for the real exchange rate has been attacked by, amongst
1others, Thygesen, who claims that measuring competitiveness 
by ULC's may lead to an underestimation of the changes in 
relative competitive positions, because changes in output 
per manhour are endogenous responses to changes in hourly 
earnings, and moreover, changes in output per manhour could 
be offset by changes in the price of capital.
With a tight monetary policy such an outcome is very 
plausible.
The reason why the concept of ULC's plays an important 
role in the present work is the assumption that the adjust­
ment required for the strong currency option was very weak 
in the smaller countries, and especially in Denmark.
1) Following Thygesen (1979), op. cit., p. 9.
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In order to maintain the competitiveness of industry, 
and thus reduce the unemployment rate, a reduction of mar­
ginal factor costs was required. This never happened, in­
stead the effect of a tight monetary policy was countered 
by an expansive fiscal policy, which exacerbated, and fur­
ther squeezed the profitability of the tradeables sector. 
So in this way variations in unit labour costs give a 
measure of the degree to which the needed adjustment has 
succeeded.
And if the hypothesis of Minford, that it is long-run
rather than current competitiveness which determines ex-
1port performance, is considered valuable, then the trend 
of the ULC's is highly significant.
The real appreciation, which we have observed in the 
case of Denmark is then equivalent to the rise in the real 
manufacturing wage rate.
Why did the real manufacturing wage rate then in­
crease when a decrease was needed?
Let us turn to the now familiar framework of the 
small open economy with prices for tradeables given. With 
a deficit on the current account, capital imports are 
needed in order to support the fixed exchange rate, and 
the budget deficit, cf. chapter 3. The capital inflows
1) P. Minford, "A Rational Expectations Model of the 
United Kingdom Under Fixed and Floating Exchange 
Rates", in K. Brunner & A.H. Meltzer (eds.), On the 
State of Macroeconomics, Carnegie-Rochester series on 
public policy, vol. 12.
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cause real appreciation, or alternatively maintain an al­
ready overvalued currency rate.
It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that cap­
ital inflows will alter the production and consumption 
pattern of the economy.
So the resulting increased demand for nontradeables, 
which is mainly services, public and private, and the 
change in relative prices is equivalent to a relative wage 
increase in the tradeables sector as labour is drawn out 
of manufacturing.
As exporters in the manufacturing industry expect the
loss of competitiveness to be transitory, they accept
profit margins being squeezed, which has a repercussion on
the future investment rate. With a time lag manufacturing
1output will decline, and so will exports.
It was shown above that PPP did not seem to prevail, 
at least not in the short to medium run. The solution 
could be that equilibrium relative prices are changing all 
along, which we demonstrated in chapter 7 would change the 
real exchange rate.
This trend of squeezing the tradeables sector in 
countries where real exchange rates adjust to changes in 
effective rates only very slowly could have been arrested, 
perhaps, if a part of the proceeds from the capital im-
1) Cf. Minford (1980), op. cit., and J. Niehans, The Ap­
preciation of Sterling - Causes, Effects and Policies, 
SSRC Money Study Group discussion paper, Social Sci­
ence Research Council 1981.
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ports had been used by the tradeables sector for invest­
ment purposes in order to improve competitiveness.
8.3. Cost/price intra-EMS competitiveness.
A point could be made, that the methods used in the 
previous sections for comparing changes in competitive­
ness do not take changes in intra and extra EMS competi­
tiveness into account. This is a valid point, but the 
question about trade creation or trade diversion in a 
fixed exchange rate system is somewhat outside the scope 
of the present task, although table 11 may suggest a di­
version. However it is a logical outcome that small 
open inflation-prone economies maintain competitiveness 
more easily in third markets, where direct price compe­
tition with goods from low inflation countries must be 
supposed to be less tense than is the case in second 
markets.
Table 10 shows the differences between competitive­
ness of the EMS countries, when an index including 17 
partner countries is compared with an index of pure in­
tra EMS trade. In the former index the effects of a 
strengthening dollar rate should be taken into account.
The general trend in the indices does not surprise, 
and the conclusions from the previous sections still 
stand.
The indices have as base year 1970, and an index 
number greater than 100 indicates an increase in rela­
tive prices.
In the index of intra-EMS competitiveness the Dan-
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ish score of 101.1 in contrast to the German 97.5 indi­
cates the effects of divergent inflation performances, 
when intra EMS trade is considered, which in the case of 
Denmark accounts for half of total foreign trade.
It should be noted that the Danish February devalu­
ation of 3% in 1982 has not been taken into account, but 
with the persistent inflation differential between the 
two countries, see table 3, this trend has probably been 
accentuated rather than diminished since.
The two indices have been prepared by the Commis-
1sion, and they are both based on GDP-prices, annual av­
erages and export weights are changed from year to year 
until 1979.
Judging from table 11, where the per cent distribu­
tion of Danish imports and exports is calculated, the 
aforementioned time lag between effective appreciation 
of a currency and loss of market share seems to hold 
true.
The Danish exports to Germany seem to follow the 
same trend as the one for all industrial countries 
(where Germany is included) and the same pattern can be 
found in the distribution of imports.
However, with the deficit on the current account in 
mind, it should be noted that this pattern does not ap-
1) European Communities, Monetary Committee, Twenty- 
third report on the activities of the Monetary Com­
mittee, Brussels, 15 May 1982.
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ply when real value terms of imports and exports are ac­
counted for.
8.4. Real exchange rate and the level of domestic demand.
In the preceding three sections it has been argued
that differences in relative economic performances amongst
the EMS member states, however measured, may justify
changes in real exchange rates.
The difficulty in choosing the right indices, and the
relevant base years for comparison of potential national
economic divergences is acknowledged, as are non price de-
1tenrinants and structural differences.
If adjustments are deferred for too long, serious 
distortions in the allocation of resources will eventually 
follow.
Let us briefly repeat the chain of argument:
With an appreciating currency, in real terms, firms 
in the open sector will experience a decline in profit 
margins, and a decrease in the investment rate will fol­
low.
If domestic demand is kept sufficiently strong by, 
say, lax financial policies, these cost increases in the 
tradeables sector will be translated into higher output 
prices in the non-tradeables sector.
The relative price of tradeables/non-tradeables will
1) See especially R. Vaubel, Strategies for Currency Uni­
fication, Kieler Studien, 156, where the author shows 
that even if inflation rates were fully converged in­
side the EC, real exchange rate adjustment would be 
required because of structural differences.
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decline, which again will result in a reallocation of pro­
duction factors between the two sectors.
Table 12, where changes in the structure of GDP uses 
from the pattern of 1968-72 to 1982 have been calculated, 
gives evidence of such a reallocation of production fac­
tors .
Again the case of Denmark is the most extreme. Here 
private consumption declined -0.8, while public consump­
tion increased a record of 8.0% of GDP, where the weighted 
EC average was 3.1%.
When looking at the increase in total consumption, 
Belgium and Denmark scored the highest increases respec­
tively. The dramatic decrease in fixed gross capital for­
mation of 8.7% in Denmark compared with the average EC 
score of 2.3%, weighted, would suggest a squeeze in prof­
its followed by a decrease in the investment rate.
The Danish investment rate being distinctly lower 
than those of her EMS partners could indeed aggravate 
structural differences, thus making a hypothetical refla­
tion difficult, as such a reflation would be hindered by 
the resulting weaknesses in the productive capital.
This trend can also be seen when examining the shares
of total general government expenditure in the EMS coun-
1tries, as shown in table 13.
The quite substantial rise in government expenditure 
of 16.51% from 1975 to 1980 in the case of Denmark, which 
again shows the highest rise, is not the result of in-
1) See table 13 for exact definitions.
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Table 12. Changes in the structure of GDP uses.
A comparison of average 1968-72 figures with 
the structure of GNP in 1982. EMS countries.
Belgi vim
Denmark
Germany
France
Netherlands
UK
Italy
EC, Average
Notes :
Priv Pubi. total fixed stocks totai
a 61 .4 14.1 75 .5 21 .4 1 .3 22.7
b 64.8 19.6 84.5 19.5 0.3 19.8
c 3.6 5.5 9.0 -1 .9 -1 .0 -2.9
a 56.9 20.0 76.9 24.3 0.7 25 .0
b 56.1 28.0 84.1 15.6 -0.3 15.3
c -0.8 8.0 7.2 -8.7 -1 .0 -9.7
a 54.8 16.4 71 .2 24.8 1 .5 26.3
b 55.4 21 .0 76 .4 22.8 -0.1 22.7
c 0.6 4.6 5.2 -2.0 -1 .6 -3.6
a 60.7 13.4 74.1 23.5 2.1 25.6
b 65.1 15.8 80.9 21 .1 -0.1 22.7
c 4.4 2.4 6.8 -2.4 -2.2 -4.6
a 56.8 16.3 73.1 25.3 1 .5 26.8
b 60.5 17.9 78.4 19.0 -1 .3 17.7
c 3.7 1 .6 5.3 -6.3 . -2.8 -9.1
a 62.5 17.8 80.3 18.5 0.7 19.2
b 60.3 22.1 82.4 16.2 -1 .8 14.4
c -2.2 4.3 2.1 -2.3 -2.5 -4.8
a 63.4 15.3 78.7 20.6 0.7 21 .3
b 64.2 18.1 82.3 20 .3 0.9 21 .2
c 0.8 2.8 3.6 -0.3 0.2 -0.1
a 60.8 14.6 75.4 22.5 1 .4 23.9
b 62.6 17.7 80.3 20.2 -0.3 19.9
c 1.8 3.1 4.9 -2.3 -1.7 -4.0
average 68-72, b = 1982 , c = b - a .
Sources: Eurostat/European Economy, National Accounts.
Figures from 1982 = estimates from commission 
departments, published in European Economy, 
12.
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Table 13. The shares of total general government expendi-
ture. In GDP/GNP in the EMS countries.
1975 19 76 1977 1978 1979 1 9 80 1 Change in %
Germany 47.1 46 .4 46.5 46.5 46.4 47.0 0.2
France 43.5 44 .0 44.2 45.1 45.3 46.2 6.2
U.K. 46.9 46 .1 44.1 43.7 43.3 45.5 5.7
Italy 43.2 42 .2 42.5 46.1 45.5 45 .5 5.3
Belgium 44.5 45 .1 46.7 47.9 49 .7 49 .5 11 .23
Denmark 44.8 44 .  1 45.0 45 .8 48.7 52.2 16.51
Netherlands 55.9 55 .9 56.0 57.5 59.5 60.4 8.05
Source: National Accounts of the OECD countries, 1962-79.
Figures for 19 80 are OECD estimates.
Total government expenditure = Current disbursements (capi­
tal consumption incl.) + gross capital formation.
This equals the sum of lines 23, 28, 29, 30 minus line 26 
in vol. 2, ibid.
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creased transfers in the form of social security in order 
to remedy the effects of high unemployment.
Table 14 shows that the increase in share of social 
security transfers in Denmark from 19 75 to 1980 was nega­
tive, and most other EMS countries show identical trends.
The significant changes are found when examining the 
share of general government debt interest payments in to­
tal government spending.
This is shown in table 15, and the high increases in 
interest payments must be the main culprit in the stagnat­
ing figures for the shares of social security transfers.
The giant step in indebtedness in the case of Denmark 
can also be seen from table 16, where the GNP/debt ratios 
have been calculated.
Not surprisingly, the Danish ratios show the highest 
degree of change. Due to a lack of recent figures, it was 
not possible to complete this table, but columns A, B and 
C show the significant increase in the Danish indebted­
ness . The repercussions of this on domestic parameters 
are in the case of Denmark analyzed in chapter 9.
Of particular importance is the increase in the level 
of externally held debt.
Why the level of foreign debt weighs heavier than the 
amount of debt held domestically is because the "inflation 
tax" can reduce the real level of domestic debt, while fi­
nancial assets held abroad either must carry a substantial 
premium in terms of interest, or be denominated in a for­
eign currency, which has a better prospect of maintaining 
future purchasing power.
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8.5. Financial policies and public sector growth.
An overvaluation of a currency is in theory of a tem­
porary nature. On the demand side the resulting current 
account deficit will have deflationary effects. Interest 
rates will increase and/or the money supply will decline. 
This again will reduce the level of aggregate demand, 
which again will reduce the growth of prices and wages.
In this way the initial overvaluation of a currency will 
automatically adjust to a more realistic equilibrium lev­
el. However expansionary financial policies can halt this 
adjustment mechanism, as was shown in chapter 3. With a 
direct link between budget deficits and current account 
deficits, expansionary financial policies will maintain 
inflationary expectations, initially in the non-tradeables 
sector and later also in the tradeables sector. In this 
way the adjustment burden will, as previously shown, fall 
mainly on the sector exposed to the exchange rate.
In order to explain the explosion of government ex­
penditure in Denmark, we shall in the following analyze 
financial policies in the EMS countries and try to formu­
late a common denominator for expansionary and contrac­
tionary policies respectively.
Basically two ways exist for doing this:
a. By focusing on the ratio of government borrowing to
1that of the changes in annual money supply, and
1) This approach could be coined the more monetarist ori­
ented, and has been used recently by the EC Commis­
sion. See European Economy, 12/82.
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b. By focusing on government borrowing and the yield
1curve which is short-term interest rates divided by 
long-term rates.
Tables 17 and 18 represent the first approach. We see 
(in table 17) that the strong currencies Hfl's and DM's 
have reduced their money supply considerably after the 
first oil-price hike. Also Belgium had a very tight 
policy. Denmark tried to restrict the money supply in 
79/80, but it seems that this trend has been broken 
since.
Looking at the liquidity ratio, there are erratic 
trends for the weaker currencies, but in spite of rela­
tively high levels of the money supply, there have been 
stable or even declining liquidity ratios.
What is really amazing are the money supply per unit 
of output ratios. For a country like Germany the trend 
is quite stable despite the variations in the money sup­
ply, while figures for Denmark do not seem to follow a 
trend. If we now include the budget deficits we get a 
slightly different picture (table 18).
Although the ratios presented in this table by 
their very nature cannot be directly comparable, they
1) Looking at the interest rate structure is the more 
traditional, Keynesian approach. An analysis using 
this approach for a comparison of UK and US finan­
cial policies is R. Coglan, "The Conflict Between 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy", The Banker, Oct. 1981.
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Table 17. Monetary aggregates/annual changes %
68/60 74/68 78/74 79/78 80/79 81/80 82/81
a 8.3 11.8 12.7 7.9 4.3 5.4 7.4
b B 0.4 -0.6 2.9 1.0 -2.5 1 .6 -1 .2
c 3.6 6.1 10.7 5.4 1.8 6.6 6.9
a 10.3 10.9 9.2 9.6 5.3 6.5 5.6
b D 2.7 0.1 2.2 1 .1 -1.4 2.1 0.2
c 5.8 6.2 6.7 5.0 3.2 6.5 4.6
a 8.5 13.7 10.6 4.8 8.0 6.6 6.8
b NL -1 .4 0.3 0.2 -1 .1 2.0 2.0 0.0
c 3.5 8.3 8.1 3.0 7.4 8.1 6.2
a 10.5 9.8 13.6 9.3 8.4 11.8 12.0
b DK -0.5 -2.6 0.8 -1 .6 0.2 2.2 -1.6
c 5.2 6.3 11.1 6.1 8.6 12.0 8.8
a 13.7 14.1 14.9 13.5 11.8 12.6 14.1
b F 3.8 0.9 1 .0 -0.4 -1 .0 0.5 -0.8
c • 7.9 8.1 11.6 10.1 10.4 12.4 11 .8
a 13.6 16.2 22.4 22.8 19.9 17.9 15.8
b I 3.0 2.0 2.8 1 .2 -4.2 0.5 -1 .8
c 7.4 11.1 20.4 17.1 15.3 18.1 13.7
a 5.4 13.7 9.9 12.8 14.9 15.6 12.4
b GB -1 .4 2.1 -7.3 -3.4 -2.0 4.7 2.3
c 2.3 11 .0 7.9 11.2 16.5 17.0 11.0
Notes: a = Money supply (DK, F, NL: M2, D, I: M3, B:
M2H, GB: UKL M3,
b = Liquidity ratio, 
c = Money supply per unit of output.
Sources: Coitvmiss ion/Europe an Economy, 12/82.
Table 18. Budget deficits and changes in money supply
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
41.2 60.5 81.2 86.7 170.7 515.9 297.8 244.6 a
4.3 5.1 5.3 5.7 7.0 9.4 13.1 12.4 b B
10.6 8.6 6.7 6.8 4.2 1.9 4.5 5.2 c
19.9 16.1 40.3 78.7 77.5 130.4 163.8 171.2 a
2.0 0.8 1.7 2.2 3.1 5.9 7.2 8.8 b DK
10.0 4.9 4.3 2.9 4.0 4.5 4.4 5.2 c
154.6 97.6 49.2 54.5 106.8 118.9 189.1 151.1 a
5.8 3.6 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.5 4.5 3.9 b D
3.7 3.7 5.0 5.1 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.6 c
27.1 8.1 12.4 31.2 12.4 -9,5 36.7 47.9 a
2.2 0.5 0.8 1.8 0.8 ~0.£ -1.9 -2.9 b F
8.3 6.0 6.5 5.7 6.6 *.5 5.2 6.1 c
60.2 48.3 40.4 46.0 46.1 56.3 84.3 84.7 a
11.7 9.0 8.0 9.7 9.5 8.4 11.9 11.1 b I
19.4 18.6 19.7 21.2 20.7 14.9 14.1 13.1 c
144.5 34.5 16.7 160.1 139.3 248.7 288.0 261.9 a
2.7 2.4 1.4 2.2 3.1 3.4 4.6 4.2 b NL
1.9 6.8 1.3 1.4 2.2 1.4 1.6 1.6 c
223.9 172.9 18.7 103.8 94.1 72.9 62.6 65.8 a
4.9 5.0 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.5 2.4 1.9 b GB
2.2 2.9 2.9 4.1 3.4 4.9 3.8 2.9 c
Notes: a = Government borrowing requirement (as de­
fined by the Commission; note the differ­
ences from standardized OECD figures)/ 
Change in money supply (see preceding ta­
ble) . NB: (-) = financial surplus.
b = Government borrowing requirement/GDP.
c = Change in money supply/GNP.
Sources: Table 17, Eurostat/European Economy, 12/82.
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show the restrictiveness of monetary policy in relation to 
changes in the fiscal balance.
In Denmark and in Italy monetary expansion slowed 
down less, despite high deficits, than was the case in 
other countries.
Generally the now well-known trend emerges. Germany 
and the Netherlands experience a high degree of monetary 
stabilization because of their stable level of budget def­
icits, while the high increases in budget deficits in Den­
mark and Italy are partly offset by monetary expansion.
Only France has followed, consistently, a strategy 
of monetary accommodation of budget deficits, which theo­
retically should limit the chances of financial crowding 
out, but render the currency more impotent.
An analysis along the lines as presented above- has 
obvious lacks. Firstly, small open economies engaged in 
monetary integration efforts use, by definition, an ex­
change rate target for their monetary policies instead of 
relying on a pure monetary target. Denmark's monetary 
performance, using the method above, is hardly impressing.
Yet the level of the real interest rate is the high­
est amongst the EMS countries (see table 4), which points 
to a very tight monetary policy.
The explanation can be found when looking at table 
16 again. Here the high rate of foreign indebtedness in 
Denmark, column B, suggests that the high level of money 
supply has been neutralized by an extra inflow of high-
1) Cf. European Economy, op. cit.
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powered money, thus maintaining a high level of real inter­
est and a high level of the nominal money supply.
This expansion of the money supply by adding to the 
monetary base, supports the exchange rate, supports the 
high level of interest and prevents the work of the auto­
matic adjustment mechanism as devised by the newer monetar­
ist theories.1
Approach B, which focuses on the yield curve between 
the long and the short rates of interest, is depicted on 
charts 1 - 2 - 3 .  On the horizontal axis the budget sur­
plus or deficit is shown, and on the vertical axis we have 
the yield curve. The logic behind this curve is that money 
can be said to be really tight when short rates rise sub­
stantially above long rates.
So in the charts first quadrants represent easy mone­
tary and easy^fiscal policy, second quadrant represents 
tight monetary and easy fiscal policy, third quadrant means 
tight monetary and tight fiscal policy, while easy monetary 
policy and tight fiscal policy is shown in quadrant 4.
In the three charts Denmark and Belgium represent the 
weaker currencies while Germany is an example of the strong 
currency. The Belgian performance is, at first sight, eas­
ily dismissed as lax, but in the case of Denmark and Germa­
ny an interesting pattern emerges.
Germany seems to have gone from relatively easy mone­
tary and fiscal policies in the seventies to tight monetary 
and easy fiscal policies in the 80's. An exception is
1) Cf. chapters 3 and 5.
Monetary and fiscal policy i
yield curve=short bank rate/- 
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1982. In the case of Denmark the pattern is nearly identi­
cal while the direction is the opposite. From tight mone­
tary policies in the 70's, 79 being an exception, and easy 
fiscal policies, the 80's seem to be dominated by both easy 
monetary and easy fiscal policies.
This observation seems to explain the previous obser­
vation that the effective nominal exchange rate eclipsed in 
79, i.e. after the tight monetary conditions in 77 and 78.
This way of measuring the "tightness" of monetary 
policy has two obvious drawbacks.
Firstly, having unity as an arbitrarily chosen divid­
ing line between easy monetary and tight monetary policy 
overrepresents the "true" level of tight money.
To call money tight, short rates should rise consid­
erably above the level of long-term rates.
Secondly the government bond yield rate which has 
been used here as a proxy for the long rates is invariably 
a function of the need to finance the budget and/or the 
deficit on the current account. Hence the loosening of 
monetary policy in the 801s as shown in chart 3 for Denmark 
is a result more of an increase in the long rates than a 
fall in the short rates. From this angle of reasoning it 
could be argued that monetary policy in Denmark still is 
tight, because of the real cost of short-term funds, while 
the long-term rate is set too high by the central bank.
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8.6. Economic performance and the expansion of the public 
sector in the EMS countries. 1970-19 80.
How did the small trade-off between variations in nom­
inal and real exchange rates and the expansion of the pub­
lic sector affect economic performance in the EMS coun­
tries?
The following nine charts show scattergrams where eco­
nomic performance initially was correlated to selected in­
dicators for the expansion of the public sector, inflation 
and employment. As can be seen in most cases, the disper­
sion of observations is so massive that the original corre­
lation coefficients did not have any meaning. They have 
therefore been left out of the analysis.
Charts 4 and 5 show the lack of a Phillips curve ef­
fect and inflation/real GNP growth respectively.
Chart 4 indicates that the UK, Italy and Denmark seem 
to have the smallest trade-off between inflation and em­
ployment, while chart 5 shows that UK and Denmark experi­
enced the lowest degree of real GDP growth, while, together 
with Italy, scoring highest in inflation performance.
The remaining seven charts focus on the effects of 
variations in indicators for the size of the public sector.
Chart 6 gives the overall picture. Denmark has by far 
the highest increase in the ratio of public sector debt 
held by the private sector to GDP from 19 70 to 19 80. At 
the same time scoring second lowest in GDP growth suggests
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that the multipliers in public spending in Denmark have 
been very small indeed. France, with the lowest level of 
public sector debt has the highest GDP growth rate.
Charts 7 and 8 show economic growth compared to:
a) Average share of government expenditure in the EMS 
countries, and
b) The change in the share of government expenditure.
In both cases Denmark is scoring the extreme values. The 
big change in government expenditure shares shows that 
Denmark got a very modest result out of the effort. Even 
Belgium, with nearly the same change, fared better in 
terms of economic growth.
Charts 9 and 10 look at the employment side. Does a 
high proportion of government employment coincide with a 
hi'gh degree of GNP growth? In order to answer this ques­
tion the ratios for average government employment and 
changes in government employment/total labour force have 
been calculated, and not unexpectedly, Denmark has the 
highest government employment ratios on both accounts to­
gether with the lowest economic growth rates.
In charts 11 and 12 the same indicators for govern­
ment employment have been compared to annual growth of 
nominal wages and the growth rates of the consumer price 
indices. These charts do not seem to give very much in­
formation. By comparing growth rates of nominal wages 
the Danish and Belgian scores are on the average, while 
Denmark together with Italy and Britain as previously 
mentioned scored highest in consumer inflation.
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The wide dispersion shown in these charts between na­
tional trade-offs, GDP growth/public sector debt and other 
indicators and the previously examined difficulties for 
the smaller countries in arriving at a long-term real ex­
change rate equilibrium supports the original Keynesian 
thesis that if disturbances partly are real "then the 
equilibrium point between purchasing power and the rate of 
exchange may be modified permanently".
The influence of an expansive public sector on the 
relative price of tradeables and non-tradeables should 
therefore be taken into account in monetary integration 
theory.
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Chapter 9
Towards a reinterpretation of the "central problem" of mone­
tary integration. The balance of payments as a fiscal phe­
nomenon. The case of Denmark.
In the following chapter we try to consider the balance 
of payments as a fiscal phenomenon, as opposed to the more 
established view that the balance of payments is a pure mon­
etary phenomenon. If a devaluation of the current account, 
which is equal to a revaluation of the capital account, did 
not seem to have had an effect on the overall balance of 
payments due to price stickiness in factor markets, as shown 
in the previous chapter, then the role of devaluation in a 
small open economy is indeed ambiguous for solving the "cen­
tral problem" of external equilibrium. However we find that 
a devaluation can promote domestic debt sales, which in turn 
tend to hold down the real level of domestic interest rates, 
because more and more of the budget deficit could be financed 
domestically.
By examining Danish balance of payments data, we find 
that the chronic external imbalance originates in accounts 
which cannot be directly affected by exchange rate realign­
ments. In this way, the tool which could most effectively 
be assigned the external equilibrium target would be more 
cautious budgetary policies compared with improved Danish 
competitiveness. In the last section of the chapter we show 
how demand and consumption patterns, as predicted by our hy­
pothesis, have changed after a decade of a rather ambitious
- 32B -
Danish exchange rate policy. Finally we analyze the place­
ment and maturity structure of the Danish internal and ex­
ternally funded debt. We conclude that the room for maneu­
ver for Danish monetary policy indeed is narrowing, and that 
the "strong currency option", not unexpectedly, contains the 
seeds for its own destruction.
A significant feature of the Danish economy during the 
1960's and 197 0's has been the remarkably stable structure 
of the balance of payments. The current account has been in 
the red for the last twenty years, with an annual deficit 
which is now 3.5% of GNP. In section 3.3.5 we found that 
the government budget deficit (expression B) equals private 
savings, public savings and the deficit on the current ac­
count .
In the present chapter we shall, on the background of
the two-sectors model, suggest that the balance of payments
in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate is more a
fiscal phenomenon than a pure monetary phenomenon as the
1monetary approach to the balance of payments maintains, 
thus assuring budgetary policies their proper place in the 
contemporary theories of monetary integration.
And following from this, if the position on the balance
1) In the monetary approach to the balance of payments (see 
J.A. Frenkel & H.G. Johnson (1976), op. cit.), Johnson 
noted that a balance of payments problem was "a monetary 
phenomenon, representing a disequilibrium in the demand 
for money", shown by net in- and outflows of interna­
tional reserves.
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of payments can be seen to have fiscal origins, then exchange
rate realignments should be seen not merely as a "switch mech-
1anism", but also as a way of shifting finance for the budget 
deficit from external sources to internal sources. Below we 
shall elaborate on this point, but let us first return briefly 
to the tradeables/non-tradeables sector model. Later we shall 
see how this theory fits with German and Danish investment and 
savings data from the last decade. In the last part of the 
chapter actual changes in employment structure in Denmark are 
analyzed as are the borrowing requirements of the two sectors, 
in order to see how a decade of quite ambitious Danish ex­
change rate policy has changed vital domestic parameters.
9.1. Changes in gross investment, government financial sav­
ings in Denmark and Germany. A fiscal approach.
Let us assume that the private sector output is pure 
tradeables and the non-tradeables sector is largely dominated 
by the public sector.
We recall from chapter 3 that a current account deficit 
could be seen as composed of two components: the private sec­
tor deficit and the public sector deficit.
And as suggested by Corden, a private sector deficit is 
mainly attributable to private firms'short-term borrowings 
from one another, and such behaviour is supposedly determined 
by some sense of commercial logic. And if it is not, a coun­
try's public sector cannot be blamed if commercial commitments
1) See section 3.3.4 in the present text,
2) Cf. Corden (1977), op. cit.
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are not honoured.
Another explanation for a private sector deficit could 
be if the central bank initially had set the real interest 
rate too low, and hence induced companies to borrow too ex­
tensively, which again would result in private sector defi­
cit .
If on the other hand, assuming no public sector, sav­
ings exceed investment, an accumulation of foreign claims 
will occur because of the resulting current account sur­
plus.
However the main point is that, in a market economy, a 
private sector deficit or surplus should be seen as a re­
sult of credit transactions between domestic and foreign 
economic agents, and as such this need not be a matter for 
public policy concern. If we now look at the part of the 
current account deficit which "belongs" to the public sec­
tor, the picture understandably gets different. The public 
sector, narrowly defined, does not produce tradeables, and 
hence foreign transactions will per definition become a 
one-sided affair.
The public sector's part of the current account defi­
cit can thus be seen as equalling the public sector's fi­
nancial dissavings minus sales of public debt instruments 
to the private domestic sector and the central bank. This 
implies that changes in the current account deficit can be 
seen as being a function of the increase in governmental 
dissavings minus that part of the increase which has been 
covered by domestic savings. The residual must be financed 
by the central bank. Still assuming an open economy en­
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gaged in a currency area, the central bank can only meet the 
financing requirements by running down official reserves, 
this in turn will emerge as a deficit on the official settle­
ments account. In. this way the monetary approach to the bal­
ance of payments seems to have an important fiscal dimension, 
which again supports the conviction that fiscal variables are 
of central importance in monetary integration, and it can 
further be argued that the accepted stance in "mainstream" 
monetary integration theory— "that monetary integration does 
not require fiscal integration, since governments can finance
budget deficits by borrov/ing on the community's capital mar-
2 3kets" seems to be on somewhat shaky foundations.
In order to illustrate the hypothesis that the "central" 
problem of monetary integration, i.e. external equilibrium, 
has fiscal origins, consider now savings, investment and cur­
rent account data from Denmark and Germany from the last dec­
ade as well as the movements in the nominal value of DM in 
terms of Dkr. (tables 1, 2 and 3).
1) See above section 2.3.
2) This is the early Corden statement, see his Monetary In­
tegration, Princeton 1972.
3) There are two strains in this argument. The first argu­
ment was based on changes in relative prices, as shown in 
chapter 7, and secondly, continuing budget deficits will 
accordingly prolong the adjustment process to "the strong 
currency option" and hence aggravate the "central" prob­
lem of monetary integration, namely the external equilib­
rium problem.
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In the foregoing section we found that the DKR in terms 
of real exchange rates was overvalued relatively to the DM. 
From table 3 we see that the DM has been appreciating nearly 
50% in nominal terms vis-à-vis the Dkr.
From the Danish data, table 1, we see that there has 
been a rather constant decline on the current account from 
1.8% in 71 to 8% in 1980. The very low result in 1981 
should be taken "cum grano sale", because it is the current 
account we are looking at. If we include the invisibles ac­
count, 3-4% should be added for the last 3 years in order to 
correct for net interest payments on the foreign debt.
The investment rate of 25% approx. in the years before 
the first oil price hike falls, not unexpectedly, down to
21% in 75. It then picks up in 76, 77 and 78, where it
starts falling to a historical low of 16% in 1981.
When investment recovered in 76, the government budget 
deficit did not budge. Indeed the quite unique, in an EMS 
context, shift from a budget surplus of 2.2% in 73 to a 6% 
deficit in 75 has repercussions on the current account, when 
the Danes used the savings of, amongst others, the Germans 
(see table 2) which had a current account surplus through 
all the years except 1980.
However these savings were not used to finance a return
to the "historical" investment rate from before the first
oil price rise. The deterioration in the investment rate 
can be seen as complementary with the increase in governmen­
tal financial dissavings.
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There is some evidence that private savings, mostly in 
Germany though, constitute a fairly stable share of GNP, if 
we see private savings as the sum of gross domestic invest­
ments + balance on the current account - government savings.
Looking at the private sector deficit which in the last 
three years has decreased in Denmark drastically, see next 
section where the Danish balance of payments is analyzed, it 
is evident that the foreign component of domestic invest­
ments is decreasing because of the overvaluation of the DKR. 
Foreign investors must be assumed to be profit maximizers, 
at least in the longer run when direct investments are con­
cerned, and when plants and capital apparatus are articially 
overpriced because of the overvaluation of the currency, and 
hence high real interest rates, investments will decline.
In Germany, which relative to Denmark has an underval­
ued currency, we see not unexpectedly the opposite trend. 
From a low investment rate in 75, the trend is generally im­
proving, although the historically high investment rate from 
before the oil-price increases has not yet been reached.
The governmental financial dissavings ratio reaches its 
highest level in 75, and is then gradually declining (except 
1981). So what we see, is that a change in investments 
seems to offset changes in the governmental (dis)savings ra­
tio. Below we shall discuss the effects of nominal and real
1) This point has been extensively elaborated upon by R.I. 
McKinnon, 'Dollar Stabilization and American Monetary 
Policy", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceed­
ings, May 1980.
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exchange rate realignments in such an environment.
9.2. Devaluations on the current account and on the capital 
account.
As can be seen in table 1, the current account deficit 
in Denmark did not seem to budge (except in 1981) by the 
very large nominal devaluation vis-à-vis the DM in the peri­
od under review. On this background we shall try to ques­
tion the traditional view that the exchange rate is a useful 
instrument for determining the rate between domestic savings 
and investment, as the more traditional adjustment approach­
es would suggest.1
In an open economy where the state of the public fi­
nances plays an important role, a devaluation of the current 
account will obviously be sterilized by the complementary 
appreciation of the capital account. For the public sector 
share of the deficit on the current account, a devaluation 
of the domestic currency will nominally increase net inter­
est payments on the invisibles account, hereby increasing 
the debt-servicing burden.
For the private sector part of the deficit on the cur­
rent account the merits of devaluation are indeed ambigu-
2ous. However, focusing on how exchange rate changes may 
influence the rates of public savings and private invest­
ii See chapter 6, where different adjustment strategies 
were discussed.
2) As can especially in the discussion of J-curve effects. 
See i.e. E. Spitaller, Short-Run Effects of Exchange 
Rate Changes on Terms of Trade and Trade Balance, IMF, 
Staff Papers, June 1980.
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ment, we can hypothesize the following:
Assume that the law of one price holds, as described 
in chapter 2 in the section of commodity market linkages, 
and the devaluing economy is small, then the domestic price 
level will increase with the full amount of the devalua­
tion, which again in terms of cash-balances will imply that
these will decrease in real terms. If now inflationary ex-
ipectations are static, as suggested by Michaely, then pri­
vate savings will increase, as will private investments.
If we still assume that the sum of gross domestic invest­
ment plus the balance on the current account minus govern­
ment savings constitute a stable share of GNP, as is shown 
in tables 1 and 2, then a real exchange rate realignment
would diminish the public sector deficit and increase gross
2domestic investment.
Another way of argument, which has recently been used
3by Congdon, is that the higher price level following a de­
valuation is accompanied by an increased demand for holding 
debt instruments from both the commercial banks as well as 
from the central bank. In this way the banking system can 
increase assets without changing monetary equilibrium.
1) M. Michaely, "Relative Prices and Income-Absorption Ap­
proaches to Devaluation: A Partial Reconciliation",
American Economic Review, March 1960.
2) Cf. McKinnon (1980), op. cit.
3) See T. Congdon, "A New Approach to the Balance of Pay­
ments", Lloyds Bank Review, Oct. 1982.
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Table 3
Lowest intervention rates Dkr/Dm. 
From May 1972 to October 1981.
May 1972 211,775
March 1973 218,135
June 1973 230,132
Oct. 1976 244,520
April 1977 252,080
Aug. 1977 265,345
Oct. 1978 275,960
Sept. 1979 289,760
Nov. 1979 304,230
Oct. 1981 320,980
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab, 1981.
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The effect of this for the central bank is that more pub­
lic sector debt can be taken on without engaging in open mar­
ket operations.
The chain of argument is the following:
If economic agents are more willing to hold more monetary 
assets after a devaluation because of the higher price level, 
then more government debt instruments can be sold domestical­
ly. If we, for this purpose, define money as consisting of 
solely notes and coins and bank deposits, then the former rep­
resents claims on the central bank, which are matched by the 
central bank by claims on government, while the latter are li­
abilities which then are matched by the banks by investing in 
government debt instruments.
In this way an exchange rate realignment seems to promote 
domestic debt sales, which as mentioned in chapter 8, would 
tend to hold down the real level of domestic interest rates.
9.3. Public and private sector foreign indebtedness. The 
case of Denmark.
The conclusion to draw from this fiscal approach to the
1balance of payments is, as Corden was first to point out, 
that only the foreign debts incurred by the governmental sec­
tor is a matter for public policy concern, and hence budgetary 
policies become a tool of primary importance for solving bal­
ance of payments problems. It is in this context that the 
need for a well formulated medium-term financial target aris-
1) W.M. Corden (1977), op. cit., p. 51.
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es, as was discussed in chapter 6.
Below we shall analyze the growth of private and public 
sector foreign indebtedness in Denmark, and from this try to 
draw some policy conclusions.
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the Danish balance of payments 
for the last 5 years, broken down on the capital accounts in 
order to focus on the distribution of capital imports between 
the public and the private sector, as well as stocks of 
debts. On a flow basis table 4 shows how the current account 
deficit has been financed. We see how private capital im­
ports topped in 197 9 and decreased in 1981 to a mere 16% of 
public capital imports.
In table 5 where private capital imports are broken down 
into types of credits, the decrease in trade credits is re­
markable. From 2319 millions of DKR in 1977 to Dkr. 201 mil­
lions, this decrease is partly a result of the reduction in 
imports. When this decrease is compared with the similar fall 
in financial loans, it could very well give an impression of 
a growing unwillingness to participate in the financing of 
the balance of payments deficit.
This because the interest differential vis-S-vis the Eu­
ro-markets is diminishing, and also because many Danish firms 
with the diminishing interest differentials and expectations 
of future exchange rate realignments are afraid of being 
crowded out via the exchange rate.
The breakdown of public capital imports shows, not unex­
pectedly, the rapid growth in redemptions and interest pay- *
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merits. Examining the stocks of debt, table 7, it is signifi­
cant that the public sector net foreign debt now has supersed­
ed the private debt.
The main conclusion to draw from this brief examination 
of Danish balance of payments data, is that it is not so much 
the trade account which is in chronic disequilibrium. The 
disequilibrium originates in accounts which cannot be directly 
affected by an exchange rate, realignment.
On the contrary, only more cautious budgetary policies 
together with some improvement of Danish competitiveness, see 
preceding chapter, will remedy the present external payments 
difficulties. Another point, if private capital imports more 
or less have been substituted by public capital imports, the 
old dictum of the central bank, that the high real interest
rate in Denmark is an incitement for the private sector to fi-
2nance (part of) the balance of payments deficit, seems also 
to lose its validity. If there is only a very low level of 
private capital imports the very high real interest rate seems 
to be unjustified.3
1) If budget deficits remain growing at the present rate, to­
tal public debt (external and internally held) will grow
to 110% of GNP in 1985 from the present 60%. See Dansk 
Industri, 12/8 2.
2) The theory behind this dictum originates from Ohlin et al.
proposals about high interest areas.
3) The Danish central bank has already been caught in the di­
lemma of high interest differentials, when exports of Dan­
ish domestic state bonds were suspended in 1979.
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9.4. Capital imports and changes in economic structure.
In chapter 7 we demonstrated that an overvalued curren­
cy, i.e. a currency which depended on capital imports for 
supporting the central rate, would have repercussions on do­
mestic structure. Via a change in relative prices, demand 
and consumption patterns would change as would the relative 
size of the tradeables and non-tradeables sector respectively.
Tables 8 and 9 give evidence which supports our theory.
In table 8 figures have been compiled from the Danish ATP 
statistics which try to show the degree of job creation and 
job destruction in the two sectors.
It is of course difficult to judge arbitrarily which 
sectors are sheltered and which sectors are unsheltered from 
the influence of a high real * exchange rate.
A conservative way of dividing would be to say that on­
ly columns 9 and 10 could be said to be pure non-tradeables 
sectors. This division is in accord with our previous defi­
nition of openness.
That construction industry has lost jobs in a recession 
is no wonder (column 3), but that manufacturing (column 2) 
has decreased 8% while central government jobs have increased 
8.6% and local government jobs have increased a record 28% 
from 1978 to 1982.
The change in relative prices, which according to our 
theory should take place, is difficult to measure. However
1) The construction of the ATP statistics and the princi­
ples of compilation are presented in S .E.B5-111/1981, 
Danmarks Statistik.
Statistiske 
Efterretnincrer 
Serie 
A+B, 
various 
issues. 
ATP 
Statistics
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by disaggregating the consumer price index into all the sub­
indices (see table 9) we see that the highest price increas­
es have been in fuel and power, column C. This increase has 
its origins elsewhere and is not a pure Danish phenomenon, 
but the sharp price increases in column J, miscellaneous 
services, column I, leisure and entertainment, column H, 
transport and communication, and column G, medical care and 
health are valuable indicators of a trend towards a change 
in the relative price of tradeables/non-tradeables.
The change in the composition of demand and output 
which has taken place in Denmark during the last decade 
where the exchange rate policy has been based on the strong 
currency option has traditionally been defended on the basis 
that public sector jobs have an import content below that of 
private consumption and investment.
However by focusing on the important role of budgetary 
policies for the balance of payments such a belief seems to 
be inconsistent with simultaneous participation in a mone­
tary integration scheme.
9.5. Eudget financing and debt management. Domestic and 
external government debt. The case of Denmark.
Below we shall briefly discuss the role of government 
budget deficits, and in the case of Denmark we shall see 
how the structure of domestic as well as external debt and 
the need for refinancing of the existing stock of debt, se­
verely limit the range of options in domestic financial 
policies.
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It should be noted that it is not the aim to discuss the
validity of debt neutrality^ or other doctrines from the "new
2classical macroeconomics", i.e. that financing modes of gov­
ernment deficit do not matter, which in fact is only an ex­
tension to the field of public finance of the well-known 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Instead we shall assume a degree 
of public debt illusion or asset illusion,3 and/or an opti­
mistic belief in the capability of the capital markets to re­
finance the debt in the future.
We shall start by analyzing first the structure of the 
public external debt, then the public domestic debt, and in 
the last section we shall try to draw some policy conclu­
sions .
9.5.1. Danish governmental external borrowing.
As mentioned earlier the Danish balance of payments has 
for the last 20 years been in deficit, which has meant a 
steady increase in the net foreign indebtedness, which in 
late 81 was 117 billion kroner, see table 7.
1) Cf. i.e. Barro, Robert, "Are Government Bonds Net 
Wealth?", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 82, 1974.
0. Gandenberger, "Public Debt Illusion and Time Prefer­
ence Rates", The German Economic Review, 12, 1974. J.M. 
Buchanan, "Barro on the Richardian Equivalence Theorem", 
Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1976. D. Ricardo, "On 
the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation", Lon­
don 1817, in P. Sraffa (ed.), Works and Correspondence 
of David Ricardo, Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
2) See chapter 6 for a discussion of these doctrines.
3) The locus classicus for a clear debate of different ' 
forms of debt illusion is A. Puviani, Teoria dell1Illu- 
sione Finanziaria, Roma 1903.
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This balance of payments deficit has traditionally been 
financed by private and public capital imports, but as is 
shown in table 4, this pattern has changed, so that in 1981 
a private capital export took place. If we define non-reg- 
istered movements as private flows, what else, then the ac­
tual outflow was in the range of DKR 892 million.
This outflow was a clear demonstration of the dilemma 
of following the strong currency option and at the same time 
running persistent balance of payments deficits.
When the Eurodollar interest rate rose drastically in 
the first quarter of 1981, hereby decreasing the difference 
between domestic and foreign interest rate levels, the do­
mestic rate, already being the highest real interest rate in 
the EMS (ch. 8, table 4), could not be further increased in 
an already depressed economy.
With an already very low level of private investments 
(see table 12, chapter 8) and hence no pressure on the do­
mestic rate, and turbulence on the exchange markets, domes­
tic borrowing became a realistic alternative for private 
borrowers. The conseguence of this is then that the gross 
borrowing for financing the external deficit will be public 
for the next couple of years. Table 10 shows the borrowing 
requirements.
From table 4 it is seen that the trade account has im­
proved drastically the last couple of years.
So it is the total interest and redemption of the pub­
lic external debt in 82 and 83, see table 11, which creates 
the deficit.
Table 10
Balance of payments 
deficit
Loans to developing 
countries
Redemption of public 
debts
Gross financing re­
quirements
Source: Finansredeg^relse
12.7 18 20
0.7 1 1
4.0 8 11
17.4 27 32
1981 1982 1983
982. Ministry of Finance.
The ordinary yearly debt service, interest and amorti­
zation of public external debt taken up during the 70’s is 
substantial.
Whether the international capital markets are capable 
of honouring this commitment is indeed doubtful if worldwide 
economic activity increases.
The real dilemma is what to do with the private foreign 
debt, table 7.
If the internal level of interest cannot be pushed up 
further because of political repercussions, the private sec­
tor will use the domestic markets for funds. Foreign debt 
commitments will then induce a decrease in international re-
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Millions 
,tj kroner
Interest 
on central 
tiovenunent 
debt
Interest 
on other 
public debt
Total interest
Redemption 
o f central 
tlovcm,nent 
debt
Redemption 
o f other 
public debt
Total
redemption
Total interest 
and  
redemption !
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serves. A move in this direction has already started in 1980 
and 1981, see table 4. A decrease in the international re­
serves contradicts the very notion of the strong currency op­
tion.
If there is a steady decrease in the level of interna­
tional reserves it will not be impossible for the central 
bank to stick to the external commitments in the form of par­
ticipation in the EMS. And it will signify a drastic U-turn
1for Danish monetary policy.
The main conclusion to draw, however, is that the rather 
ambitious Danish exchange rate policy has the seeds for its 
own destruction via the dramatic increase in yearly debt 
service on public debt and the decreasing marginals between 
foreign and domestic interest rates.
9.5.2. The structure of the Danish public external debt.
Two main objectives in debt management policy are mini­
mizing borrowing costs and achieving a balanced maturity 
2structure. In order to minimize borrowing costs the debt
1) A cornerstone in Danish monetary policy has been, and is 
still, the external commitment, i.e. having an exchange 
rate target. This commitment dates back to 1951 with the 
so-called "Letter-agreement" (see Danmarks Nationalbank, 
Annual Report 1951), which states that decreases in the 
international reserves must have an effect in diminishing 
domestic liquidity. Such a policy of non-sterilization 
is a prerequisite for any participation in currency 
schemes like the snake and the EMS.
2) See OECD, Government Debt Management, Objectives and 
Techniques" Paris 1982.
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should be spread over several currencies and the best possi­
ble borrowing terms under given circumstances should be ob­
tained.
The longer the average life of the total debt and the 
more balanced the distribution of maturity dates and the 
amounts of maturing debt, the smaller the refunding needs in 
a particular year. In this way a balanced maturity struc­
ture will contribute in achieving other objectives, such as 
maintaining orderly market conditions and minimizing the 
market impact of government debt operations, besides being 
a necessity for medium-term fiscal and monetary planning, as 
devised in chapter 6.
Table 12 shows a disaggregation of the internal as well 
as the external debt into maturities and currency denomina­
tions. We shall in this section concentrate on the latter.
The absolute amounts have been converted into relative 
amounts in table 13, which also shows a breakdown into loans 
with variable coupon rate.
The composition of the debt does not give any indica­
tion of following the Danish trade pattern, but is merely a 
function of the ruling conditions in the different currency 
markets.
The sharp increase in the debts denominated in dollars 
is explained by the longer maturities in especially the dol- 
lar-markets, both the Eurodollar and the national credit 
market. The increase in loans with variable coupon rate is 
according to "Finansredeg0relsen" due to new markets with
1) Ibid. , p. 15.
2) Finansredeg^relsen 1982, M in is tr y  of Finance, p. 79.
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Table 1_2
Danish government debt, end of fiscal years 78-81 
(in millions of Dkr.)
78 79 80 81 *
A. Loans
Long-term bonds 1492 1390 1288 1189
Short-term bonds 29579 43002 66919 99737
Savings bonds - - - -
Lottery bonds 1000 1000 1 200 1 200
One and two year debt 
certificates 13050 1 6950 21350 33250
Total internal debt 45121 62342 90757 135376
External debt: 
Denominated in 
Dollars 11647 13045 19930 31 000
Swiss francs 3230 3894 5223 6339
German Marks 10382 14309 1 2748 1 2269
Swedish Kr. 361 373 368 320
Japanese yens 158 2 2033 3272 3776
Other currency units 1 937 2090 3805 3817
Total external debt 29139 35744 45346 57521
Total debts 74260 98086 136103 192897
B. Total bank in­
debtedness -17686 -12383 -1 0117 -2626
Total government debt
(A+B) 56574 85703 125986 190271
A+B in % of current
government revenue 63.1 87.3 118.1 * 169.6'
Government external 
debt in % of national 
income 10.1 11.5 13.7' 16.1 ’
' = Ministry of Finance estimates.
Figures derived from: Danske Statslan 1981.
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these kinds of loans, which then can be tapped, but it is 
probably also because of expectations of a general decline 
in interest rates. To investigate whether the Danish gov-^ 
eminent has become less creditworthy and thus having to pay 
a higher spread over LIBOR is somewhat futile because of 
two reasons. Firstly, to which countries should Denmark be 
compared, and secondly, and more important, the front-end 
fees of Danish public loans are not published anywhere. If 
small spreads over LIBOR are seen as a matter of national 
prestige, then a less creditworthy country can often doc­
tor the terms by agreeing on a high front-end fee.
The absolute decrease, hence relative decrease, in the 
proportion of German marks is remarkable when compared with 
the steady proportion of Swiss francs.
Danish treasury bills were until March 1979 marketed 
abroad, but as the effective rate at that time was so much 
higher than the expected change in the exchange rate, such 
a way of financing the deficit on the balance of payments 
proved to be very expensive.
The coming liberalization of foreign sales of Danish 
treasury bills, now because interest margins have narrowed, 
is planned officially because that may lower domestic rates 
further, but it can also be interpreted as the first sign 
of real difficulty in financing the deficit, because this 
way of financing the deficit must carry a premium in order 
to attract foreign funds. In this way the financing gets 
relatively expensive, unless the exchange rate is altered 
radically.
O rd in a ry  yea rly  atnorlizatioti o f  external fu n d e d  debt
Table 1j.
outstanding (is o f  Decem ber 31, j q S i
A fiHintn n f  kroner Redemption
Principal 
mnntints 
nntitriiidhlg 
nt the end  
nj the year
■98« ...........................................................................................................................................................................  -  57 5 2 1,1
*|02 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  6 . 6 2  2 ,3  5 0 . 8 9 8 , 8
<>83 .......................................................................................................... ................................................................  7 - 8 0 5 ,7  43 - °93>l
...........................................................................................................................................................................  7-9 2 4 . '  35 169
3 8 5  ...........................................................................................................................................................................  7 ' 8 9 , 2  27-979-8
5ÌÌ6 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  5 - 8 5 4  2 2 . 1 2 5 , 8
n i l ;  ...........................................................................................................................................................................  5  .r>r’0 <3 16 . 36 5 , 5
« 8 8 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  5-6 4 2 >2 1 ° - 9 2 3>3
-j39 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  3 . 5 5 2 , 8  7-370,5
S 9n ...........................................................................................................................................................................  3-5 1 >^9 3-853’6
->91 .................................................................................••........................................................................................ 1 0 7 6 , 5  2-777 . 1
5 9 2  ...........................................................................................................................................................................  8 1 4 , 3  1 . 962 ,8
5 9  3 ......................................................................................................................................................................  1 2 6 , 7  1.836,1
■>04 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  1 2 4 , 8  1 - 7 1 i ,3
■ io* , ...........................................................................................................................................................................  1 0 7 , 9  1 6 0 3 4
■ m l ) ...........................................................................................................................................................................  1 0 2 4  1.501
§ 0 7  ...........................................................................................................................................................................  9 8 , 8  1 .402 ,2
1 9 8 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  0 8 , 8  i . 3 0 3 4
l<)9...........................................................................................................................................................................  1)8,8 1 2 0 4 , 6
............................................................................................................................................................... 1 t .8 f . 1
*11 ............................................................  ...................
302 ....................................................................................................................................... ...................................
'"'A.................................................
r>t>5 .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................  1 (>.'j 2 >5 ' 3 7 . 3
 ...........................................................................................................................................................................  -  13 7 »3
so? ....................................................................................................................... — 13 7 »3
Source :Danske Statslàn 1981,Ministry of Finance,Copenhagen.
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In table 14 the ordinary yearly amortization of exter­
nally funded debt is shown. As is the case with the inter­
nally funded debt, see next section 9.5.3, a high rate of 
redemption is due in 1983. So in this respect the distribu­
tion of maturity dates seems somewhat skewed. Likewise the 
table shows the problem which will arise by refinancing the 
existing stock of external debt.
If we look at the maturity structure of central govern­
ment debt, table 15, we notice the dramatic shift in the ma­
turity structure. From having the largest part of the debt 
in very long-term maturities in 1970, the opposite is now 
the case. More than 85% of the debt is short to medium 
term.
In the years up to 1980 Denmark's international re­
serves were steadily growing, as the result of the combined 
public and private capital import.
From 1980 the reserves have started decreasing, see ta­
ble 16. If the exchange rate realignments are included the 
fall in the reserves was DKR 2122 millions, and if we ex­
clude exchange rate gains and extra SDR's, we get a loss of 
reserves of Dkr. 5391 million. Such a fall in reserves is 
indeed remarkable when it is considered that the figures are 
not corrected for inflation. However if we include undrawn 
credits, table 17, we see that these have been in a constant 
increase, and now amounts to 36% of the international re­
serves.
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9.5.3. The placement and structure of Danish internally fund­
ed public debt
Looking at the domestically funded part of the public 
debt we see the opposite trend of the one we found in the ex­
ternally funded part.
The stocks of debts are found in table 12, but the aver- 
age maturities have changed from 2 years 7 months in 19 79 to 
4 years at the end of fiscal year 1981;
The coupon rate was increased in 1980 from 8% to 12%.
With depressed sales this meant a substantial increase in the 
average return from these assets.
The placements of the internally funded public debt do 
not follow a uniform pattern.
The increase for the non-bank sector, see table 18, is 
probably a result of the stagnation in house construction. 
Usually institutional investors used the market for private 
mortgage debt for medium and long-term placements, but with 
the low level of activity in the construction sector institu­
tional investors seem to have moved into short-term bonds and 
treasury bills instead.
Table 19, amortization of the internally funded debt, in­
dicates that the hub of redemption is in 1983, which coin­
cides, unfortunately, with the high redemption rate of the ex­
ternally funded debt that year.
1) See Finansredea^relsen 1982, op. cit. and Danske Statslan
1980 and 1981 .'
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9.6. The effects of the budget deficit on monetary policy.
1As amongst others Hoffmeyer & Hansen point out the main 
objective for Danish monetary policy has been the secure fi­
nancing of the balance of payments deficit, this by maintain­
ing a steady level of international reserves.
The instrument for this has been and is still a relative­
ly higher domestic level of interest than the one abroad.
When the Danish budget changed from a position of surplus 
to one of deficit in the mid seventies, it became more impor­
tant to control the growth in the money stock.
The main instruments for this are, besides controlling 
the money supply, quantitative restrictions in the banking 
sectors and credit ceilings.
The only variable in a fixed exchange rate system which 
affects the money supply positively and which is outside the 
control of the central bank is the amount of private capital 
imports.
Let us now briefly present an outline of some very basic 
relationships for the influence of budget financing on the in­
terest level.
There are three ways a budget can be financed:
a) By borrowing from the central bank.
b) By borrowing from the banking sector.
c) By borrowing from the non-bank sector.
A budget deficit creates an expansion in M1, which is defined
as the private sector's claims on central bank, the government
1) E. Hoffmeyer and L. Hansen, "Danish Monetary Policy During 
the Last Decade", Kredit und Kapital, No. 2, 1978.
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or the foreign sector.
If this deficit is financed by the government drawing 
on its cash-line in the central bank, i.e. monetizing the 
deficit, the immediate result would be an expansion of the 
money supply, which, ceteris paribus, would result in a de­
crease in the interest level.
If the budget deficit is financed by selling bonds or 
treasury bills to the banking sector the direct effect de­
pends on whether the new government debt is seen as an ad­
dition or a substitute for other assets in the bank's port­
folio. ^
If the bank's holdings of other assets are unaffected, 
the result is an increase on both sides of the bank's bal­
ance sheet and the broadly defined money supply will in­
crease by an equal amount. Unlike central bank finance 
there will be no increase in the supply of high powered 
money.
The sale of government debt to the non-bank sector has 
no immediate effect on the monetary base or on the broadly 
defined money stock.
Purchase of the debt instruments implies a change of 
ownership of deposits from the private sector to the gov­
ernment and back again when the money is spent.
If the domestic financial market is sophisticated 
there should be no substitution effects by the introduction 
of a new asset. However the most likely result is an up­
ward pressure on the interest rate as a result of the mar­
keting of the new debt instruments.
1) See OECD, Budget Financing and Monetary Control, Paris 
1982, p. 15.
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Foreign financing of the budget deficit means that the 
foreign currency proceeds must be used to purchase domestic 
currency on the exchange market before it can be spent by 
the government.
In a system with fixed exchange rates net capital im­
ports will increase the narrowly defined money stock, or 
they will increase credit levels in the banking sector.
This can lead to a disequilibrium in the money market, which 
again will affect the portfolio composition in the non-bank 
sector. A decrease in the domestic interest level will in­
duce the non-bank sector to bring down its foreign commit­
ments .
The first way of finance, central bank finance, in­
creases the money supply and lowers the interest rate level. 
Private bank finance seems to have a neutral effect, or only 
slightly positive effect on the money supply.
Finance from the non-bank sector must be assumed to 
have a neutral or only slightly positive effect on the money 
supply. Foreign finance in a fixed exchange rate system, 
however, expands either high powered money or expands the 
banking sector's liquidity.
In the context of Denmark we see how the high degree of 
monetary financing in 1975 and 76, when the budget shifted 
from its surplus to its deficit position, put a strong down­
wards pressure on the Krone.
Sales of debt instruments had been sluggish, and in the 
hope of helping the economy out of recession, the government 
tacitly agreed on monetary finance.
The recession had resulted in a severe shortfall in
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revenues, and as it was difficult to reach a political con­
sensus for large scale government borrowing, a high degree of 
monetary finance was introduced. The result was, not entire­
ly unexpectedly, a narrowing in the span between foreign and 
domestic interest rates, which led in turn to instability in 
the exchange market.
The following aggressive sales of debt instruments in 77 
and 78 changed the structure of interest in favour of govern­
ment debt instruments. A significant part of private capital 
imports was placed in domestic bonds and treasury bills be­
cause the interest span had become too large. The effect on 
the exchange rate was the peak in the nominal effective rate 
in 1979, see chapter 8. The trend we have seen developing in 
the last couple of years, of substituting private capital im­
ports for public capital imports, shows that the room for 
monetary maneuvre has been narrowing. High short interest 
rates will eventually have a spill-over effect on the long 
-jrates, which again will inhibit residential construction and 
fixed investments. So in the current climate with high unem­
ployment rates and a stagnating economy it is doubtful wheth­
er the strong currency option will continue to be a realistic 
choice. The liberalization of foreign sales of Danish gov­
ernment debt instruments will either make the financing of 
the deficit more expensive or it will decrease the domestic 
interest rate level. Both options will have severe repercus­
sions for the traditional cornerstone in Danish monetary pol­
icy of having a realistic external commitment.
1) Can you twist the interest structure? According to
Hoffmeyer & Hansen an operation twist in the case of Den­
mark has only had a very short-term and limited success. 
Hoffmeyer & Hansen, op. cit., 1978.
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Chapter 1 0 
Summaries and conclusions.
Below we shall briefly make a summary of the 
findings of the individual chapters. From this 
summary we try to draw some conclusions about the 
ability of a small open economy using the strong 
currency option as an adjustment tool for monetary 
unification.
The strong currency option is chosen by a small 
open economy because the open sector is seen as a 
transmitter of inflation. This is a logical ex­
tension of the Scandinavian inflation model. The 
danger is now that the high rate of unemployment, 
which is partly a result of the appreciating exchange 
rate, makes a deficit on the budget nearly unavoid­
able. When monetary finance is excluded, because 
of the exchange rate target commitment, capital im­
ports are necessary *- which in turn, ceteris paribus, 
tend to put upward pressure on the exchange rate.
An overvaluation of a currency, which is normally 
a temporary phenomena, can, via expansive fiscal 
policies combined with the ratchet effect, lead to 
a permanent expansion of the government sector. This 
will make further adjustment more difficult, and may
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easily transform a temporary overvaluation into 
a protracted one, which in turn implies the ex­
istence of a vicious circle also for an over­
valued currency. This hypothesis was originally 
used by DeGrauwe ^  in a study about the over­
valuation of the belgian franc. We try to extend 
the scope of this hypothesis in the present study.
Most theory on monetary integration has 
focused on "global" advantages and disadvantages 
of a currency area. The present study approaches 
the problem differently. We look at cost and 
benefits from the angle of the individual national 
state taking part in a scheme of integration.
In a mixed economy restrictive monetary 
policies will be felt more burdensome by the trade- 
ables sector. This for two reasons. The impact 
of high real interest rate will add to fixed 
costs, and secondly, a high real exchange rate will 
squeeze profits on overseas markets.
In order to share adjustment costs between the 
tradeables and the non-tradeables sector more evenly, 
a more prominent role for budgetary policy is set 
forward in the process of monetary integration.
1) P.DeGrauwe (1983), op.cit.
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How much autonomy has a small open economy 
really got in setting targets for domestic macro- 
economic policies?
By analysing international linkages in the 
capital market, in the commodity market and in:-, 
the money market, we conclude that domestic policy 
autonomy is illusory.
A two country, two goods policy model is introduced 
and we conclude that devaluation alone does not 
solve problems of external disequilibria.
By establishing a link between budget deficits 
and trade deficits, we accentuate the importance of 
cautious budgetary policies in the process of monetary 
integration.
The usual preconditions for solving the 
"central problem"of monetary integration, i.e. 
internal and external equilibria at a fixed exchange 
rate, are analysed, in chapter 4, and we find in 
chapter 5, that a total external deficit of a 
currency area as a whole, will have to be carried 
by the members of the currency area, which have the 
lowest capability of controlling domestic inflation­
ary pressures.
The obvious answer to this problem is a higher 
degree of coordination of national economic policies 
inside a currency area.
By using a traditional Meades model we show that
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policy conflicts between countries, arising from 
income targets incompatible with balance of pay­
ments equilibrium are results of an inconsistency 
between policy targets and policy instruments.
We present a framework for coordinating na-* 
tional medium term financial- targets.
Such a framework for coordination would be an 
obvious advantage over the present over reliance on 
tight monetary policies and accommodating fiscal 
policies.
By using a modified Salter diagram the impact 
of captial imports on consumption and production is 
analysed. Due to a change in relative prices, pro­
duction of tradeables will fail and the production 
of non-tradeables will increase.
By assuming that changes in relative prices and 
changes in the real exchange rate are next to the 
same thing, we show that a deflation with an over 
reliance on tight monetary policies will put the 
adjustment burden primarily on the tradeables sector.
Accommodating fiscal policies, i.e. sustained 
budget deficits can lead to a financial crowding out 
of private investments. We show that the more likely 
outcome for an open economy is crowding out via the 
exchange rate.
The main conclusion, however, is that prolonged 
deficit finance and tight monetary policy in order to 
combat inflation are incompatible.
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The first part of the empirical part of the 
present study presented an analysis of the variations 
in nominal effective and real effective exchange rates 
for the EMS countries. Denmark and Belgium were the 
countries which had the least satisfactory trade­
offs between changes in nominal and real exchange 
rates.
By comparing variations in unit labour indices, 
export unit cost indices and GDP-deflators with the 
changes in the nominal effective exchange rate, we 
found that there indeed had been a high degree of 
squeeze in the profits for danish exporters. By 
comparing the changes in end uses of GNP the decline 
in capital formation in Denmark was significantly 
higher than elsewhere.
Such decline in investments will no doubt 
create inflationary bottlenecks on the supply side, 
when the long expected recovery sets in.
Public sector consumption was shown again to 
hav© risen most in Denmark.
From different indices for the fiscal and 
monetary stance we see that Denmark did indeed ex­
perience a decade of tight monetary policies and 
accommodating fiscal policies.
In this way our hypothesis seems to stick.
It is demonstrated that there are no uniform 
trends between economic performance and the expan­
sion of the public sector for the EMS-countries.
However,with the highest rise in public in­
debtedness and a very modest performance in terms 
of economic growth and employment, the public
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spending multiplier seems to be very ineffective 
in the case of Denmark. Even when domestic in­
flation rates are coming gradually under control, 
one could ask whether the strong currency option 
and the resulting enormous increase in foreign 
indebtedness, was the most cost effective instru­
ment for combating inflation.
With structural differences in the EMS 
countries, i.e. that disturbances are real instead 
of monetary, the equilibrium point between long 
term purchasing power parity and the nominal 
effective exchange rate is probably very difficult 
to arrive at. This because of a continuous change 
in relative prices. With this change in relative 
prices and the huge increase in foreign indebted­
ness in mind, a once and for all time devaluation 
is not necessarily the right instrument in the case 
of Denmark. So in chapter 9 we try to analyse the 
balance of payments as a fiscal phenomenon.
From chapter 3 we recall that a current account 
deficit is composed of two con^ponents: the private
sector deficit and the public sector deficit.
With private investment recoveries budget 
deficits should decline according to old fashioned 
anticyclical deficit finance. In the case of Denmark 
they did not budge. With the public sector taking 
over more and mpre of the foreign borrowing i.e.
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that the private sector deficit is drastically 
decreasing a devaluation on the current account, 
which conversely means a revaluation of tfie capital 
account is ambiguous. This if the deficit origin­
ates in the public sector.
However an exchange rate realignment may 
promote domestic debt sales, which would tend to hold 
down the real level of domestic interest rates. This 
would in turn improve the competitiveness of the 
tradeables-sectar.
Our initial hypothesis depicted a change in 
economic structure as a result of the strong currency 
option. By looking at job creation and job de­
struction from Danish ATP-statistics, we find that 
in four years manufacturing jobs have decreased 8% 
while central government jobs have increased by 8,6% 
and local government jobs show an increase of a 
record 2 8%.
By disaggregating the consumer price index, we 
show that services have had the highest price increase 
which, ceteris paribus-, supports our thesis of a change 
in relative prices, although the evidence is of a 
somewhat sketchy nature.
The last part of chapter 9 analysed the structure 
of the danish debt. With a rapid decrease in private 
foreign borrowing the public sector has taken over as 
the main provider of foreign exchange to boost the 
international reserves.
- 378 -
With a narrowing of the interest rate marginals
i.e. an equalization of the costs of foreign and 
domestic money, the problem arises of what to do with 
the private sector foreign debt. A narrowing of the 
interest rate span can be brought forward by two 
factors, either in concert or separately.
With a large rate of unemployment in especially 
the construction sector, a lowering of interest rates 
is a political necessity in order to revive this sector.
Another plausible outcome is that it will become 
more and more difficult to finance the balance of 
payments deficit, and a remedy would be to encourage 
foreign sales of domestic bonds and treasure bills.
Such a step would tend to equalize the foreign 
and domestic interest rate levels.
The private sector will now use the domestic 
money markets for raising funds. The amount which is 
used for honouring foreign debt commitment will in­
duce a decrease in the level of foreign reserves.
Such a move has already taken place.
A decrease in the level of foreign reserves does 
not at all harmonize with the strategy of having a 
strong currency, and as mentioned in the chapter, 
this could very well mark the end for the strong 
currency option.
Is that good or bad?
With domestic inflation under control, paid for 
by a deep recession, the strong Danish krone linked
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to the DM by a high interest rate margin, could 
probably be substituted for a strong danish krone 
supported by more cautious budgetary policies.
However the main thing is that Denmark has had 
the worst trade-offs between external indebtedness 
and economic performance, however measured. So 
one could ask whether the excercise seemed worth­
while .
One more factor must be mentioned in order to 
answer the question above. There seems to be a 
conceptual mistake in the practical interpretation 
of the Scandinavian inflation model,when this model 
is considered in the context of monetary integration.
Evidence from the present study show that the 
inflationary pressure came from the non-tradeables 
sector. With profits in the nontradeables sector 
being squeezed, and with the dramatic expansion of 
the government sector, this does not surprise. So 
perhaps the effects of an overvalued currency should 
be incorporated into the Scandinavian inflation 
model. With an overvalued currency inflationary 
pressure is likely to come from within.
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